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The positions of Berlin’s pluralism  
 
There are three possible positions for Berlin’s pluralism. Firstly, it can be PUT – 
Pluralism as a Universal Theory. Secondly, it can be PPT- Pluralism as a 
Particular Theory and thirdly, it can be PMT – Pluralism as a Meta-Theory. We 
can analyse the real position of Berlin’s pluralism from two separate pieces of 
writing: his Russian history and his moral philosophy. And these two pieces tend 
to indicate that pluralism is a universal theory or PUT. That is, in his Russian 
history, Berlin seems to rank three Russian thinkers – Herzen, Tolstoy and 
Turgenev – on top as being superior to all others and present them as pluralists. It 
can be inferred that he presents pluralism as normative or PUT through his 
analysis of the three thinkers. In Berlin’s writing on moral philosophy, Berlin 
seems to connect his pluralism with traditional liberalism by the value of 
negative freedom. And if pluralism is part of liberalism, it can be inferred again 
that pluralism is a universal theory or PUT like liberalism.  
 
However, the research in this thesis shows that pluralists are eclectic thinkers 
who draw for some ideas on the counter-enlightenment and other ideas on the 
enlightenment. Berlin does not present the three thinkers as pluralists. He just 
admires some of their counter-enlightenment ideas. So he does not present 
pluralism as a universal theory through the three thinkers. The eclectic character 
of pluralism also makes it clear that, in his moral philosophy, Berlin does not 
intend to make his pluralism part of liberalism, since liberalism is more of an 
enlightenment idea than the eclectic idea that is Berlin’s pluralism.   
 
While Berlin’s pluralism as eclectic does not collapse into either side of 
liberalism, it is clear that the theory is independent from them. And the 
possibility that pluralism is a universal theory or PUT through the description of 
these three thinkers or through the connection with traditional liberalism is 
therefore false. As an independent theory, pluralism can be a universal theory 
(PUT) by itself but the indications in Berlin’s writings especially in his moral 
philosophy lead to the conclusion that pluralism is not a universal theory (PUT) 
but a particular theory (PPT) and a meta-theory (PMT).   
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Chapter 1 Monism, pluralism and the positions of Berlin’s pluralism 
 
Part 1: Monism and Pluralism: the ideas   
 
Before we can analyse the exact position of Berlin’s pluralism, it is necessary to 
clarify its basic concept first especially its difference from monism – the theory 
that pluralism claims to be opposed to. A clear understanding of their differences 
will help us proceed to the next level of analysis. In the following section, the 
concept of monism will be presented first followed by the concept of pluralism.    
 
Monism  
 
The concept of monism which Berlin and other scholars have described seems to 
be an extreme one. But actually, there is also a flexible one as well.  
 
Monism: the extreme version  
 
From Berlin’s writing, he seems to describe monism only as an extreme concept. 
It is the concept according to which there is only one true answer to all 
questions or there is only one final solution to all problems. With only one true 
answer, all other answers are certainly false. For extreme monists, it is not 
important whether we can reach this one true answer but we just need to believe 
that the answer does exist somewhere. Berlin explains:  
 
A wider thesis (of monism) underlay this: namely, that to all true questions there must be one 
true answer and one only, all the other answers being false […] If we do not know (the answer), 
our successors may know or perhaps wise men in antiquity knew, and if they did not, perhaps 
Adam in Paradise knew, or if he did not, the angels must know, and if even they do not know, 
God must know – the answers must be there.
1
  
 
In the cases where many true answers exist, they are naturally compatible with 
one another and we can combine them into a single group of compatible values. 
                                                
1
  POI, 5-6.  
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There is naturally no conflict between the true answers. So the other answers that 
appear in conflict or incompatible with these true answers are naturally false and 
must all be rejected. Berlin says:       
 
…the true answers, when found, must necessarily be compatible with one another and form a 
single whole, for one truth cannot be incompatible with another – that we know a priori. 
2
  
 
Crowder explains extreme monism in a political context:  
 
The true moral system, once known, will enable us to iron out all political conflicts and make 
possible a perfected society in which there will be universal agreement on a single way of life. 
3
  
 
This extreme version of monism therefore consists of the complete 
compatibility of true answers.  
 
Monism: the priority version     
 
Apart from the extreme one, there can be another version of monism which is a 
priority one. For the priority one, the true answers do not have to be compatible 
with one another. They can be incompatible. However, the compatible ones are 
naturally the core values and they are naturally superior to the incompatible ones. 
That is, priority monists divide true values into two levels: core values and other 
values. Core values are always compatible with one another and are always 
regarded as superior. The other values which are not grouped with core ones can 
be either incompatible with core values or incompatible with one another and are 
always regarded as inferior. This means priority monism accepts that true 
values can be incompatible. But it ranks the compatible core ones as 
superior to the incompatible ones. In this case they do not consider the 
incompatible values as false as in extreme monism. They believe them to be also 
true but true to a lesser extent than core ones.     
 
                                                
2
  CTH, 6   
3
  Crowder, 2004, 128.  
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For priority monists, if the incompatibility between true values does not create 
any problems, they will allow it to remain. But if there is any problem, they will 
always give priority to the core compatible values over the incompatible ones.  
 
In other words, for priority monism, the compatible core values always override 
incompatible values. If we explain priority monism with a picture, it will be as 
follows:  
 
  
 
 
This version of monism is referred to as ‘priority monism’ since it gives priority 
to the compatible core values. Jonathan Schaffer explains this by appealing to 
concrete objects as follows:  
 
Priority monism targets concrete objects and counts by basic tokens. It holds that exactly one 
basic concrete object exists—there may be many other concrete objects, but these only exist 
derivatively. The priority monist will hold that the one basic concrete object is the world (the 
maximal concrete whole). She will allow that the world has proper parts, but hold that the whole 
is basic and the parts are derivative. In short, she will hold the classical monistic doctrine that the 
whole is prior to its parts. This doctrine presupposes that the many parts exist, for the whole to be 
prior to. Historically, priority monism may have been defended by Plato, Plotinus, Proclus, 
Spinoza, Hegel, Lotze, Royce, Bosanquet, and Bradley, inter alia.
4
 
 
                                                
4
 Schaffer, Jonathan, "Monism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), 
URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/monism/>. 
One core value or one group of 
compatible core values  
Incompatible values (less true) 
Unjustified values  
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Schaffer’s explanation of priority monism is quite similar to the above 
explanation even though there is no mention of the incompatible parts in 
Schaffer’s argument.  
 
Monism’s method of judgment  
 
From the above, it is clear that monism will have either only one true answer or 
one group of priority answers. This results from its method of judgment which is 
to exclude from consideration the contexts of values, such as situations, cultures 
or the relation between people and their values, such as their feelings towards 
values, their respect for or their commitment to the values. They take into 
account only the content or conceptions of values. Then they refer to a single 
universal ranking to compare them. As a result, there will always be only one 
value or one group of compatible values on top of the ranking. This means that 
monists can always achieve the one true answer by referring to the universal 
ranking. The other values which are incompatible with the top value will 
naturally be put below it according to a system of universal ranking.  
 
In this method whereby monists exclude all contexts of values from 
consideration, they exclude the relation between people and values as well. In 
this case, the monists seem to require the people who judge values not to relate 
themselves to those values but to detach themselves from the values and to 
compare them impartially; that is by considering only the contents or conceptions 
of values.  
 
The monist method of judgment might be similar to the judgment of two persons 
(or more) by the IQ test. That is, in order to find out the most intelligent person, 
they would need to exclude all contexts that they believe to be irrelevant to 
intelligence. They then take into account only the elements that they believe to be 
relevant to intelligence such as people’s mathematic, language and logic ability. 
In this case, they would refer to the IQ test which they believe to be the universal 
standard to compare and judge intelligence. And there would always be one 
person who got the highest score from the test. That person would be judged as 
the most intelligent one.  
 10 
 
By excluding irrelevant contexts, they would look only at people’s ability to do 
the test without looking at their other abilities (which are unjustified by the test 
such as creative or artistic ability). The relation between the judges and the 
people is also not relevant. For example, even if one of the people has always 
been the judges’ best student (with the best performance) and the judges have 
had a very good opinion of him, this would not be taken into account for the 
judgment at all. It is only their ability to do the test that the judges consider in 
arriving at the score.  
 
By this method, monists would always be able to find the one true answer. The 
method, in summary, is to limit or exclude contexts, detach them from values and 
refer to a universal standard to compare them. This way, they will always be able 
to achieve the one true value or the ultimate value. By using a universal standard, 
it is impossible to justify two conflicting values as both ultimate at the same 
time. That is, it is impossible to have more than one ultimate value in monism. 
And it would not be right if the monists were to justify other lower ranking 
values (which might be judged as better by other non-standard rankings) to be 
equally ultimate to the ultimate one at the top of the ranking by the criteria of the 
monists.     
 
Berlin’s pluralism  
 
For Berlin, monism is a false theory since it can lead to a number of negative 
consequences especially violence. Berlin describes the negative effects of 
monism as follows:  
 
Most revolutionaries believe, covertly or overtly, that in order to create the ideal world eggs must 
be broken, otherwise one cannot obtain the omelette. Eggs are certainly broken – never more 
violently or ubiquitously than in our times – but the omelette is far to seek, it recedes into an 
infinite distance. That is one of the corollaries of unbridled monism, as I call it – some call it 
fanaticism, but monism is at the root of every extremism. 
5
    
 
                                                
5
  POI, 14 
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And,  
 
If this [the monist one answer too all] is possible, then surely no price is too heavy to pay for it, 
no amount of oppression, cruelty, repression, coercion will be too high, if this and this alone is 
the price for ultimate salvation of all men? This conviction gives a wide license to inflict 
suffering on other men, provided it is done for pure, disinterested motives.
6
    
 
However, what he means here is specifically the extreme monism which he 
defines elsewhere in his writings. Whether he is aware of the existence of priority 
monism and whether he disagrees with it in the same way as he disagrees with 
extreme monism cannot be determined at present given that Berlin never alludes 
to it. 
 
By believing that extreme monism is false, he therefore proposes the theory of 
pluralism which appears to be in a total opposition to extreme monism. 
 
The theory of pluralism that Berlin proposes has the key elements as follows:   
 
The diversity of ultimate values  
 
In Berlin’s pluralism, in contrast to monism which has only one ultimate value, 
there must be at least two ultimate values (or a greater diversity of them) belong 
to different contexts and being judged as ultimate in the different contexts. Berlin 
offers an illustration of this by presenting two poets as an example. He says that 
the Italian poet Dante degli Alighieri is the best poet in the Italian style, and that 
the Greek poet Homer is the best in the Greek style.7 They are therefore the 
ultimate poets in different traditions of poetry. Ultimate values can be either the 
neutral values judged as ultimate in different contexts, such as the two concepts 
of liberty, or they can be cultural values judged as ultimate in different cultures, 
such as the humility of the Christians and the pride of the Republicans. The 
                                                
6
  CTH, 47  
7
 CTH, 81. 
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following quotation can also serve as an indication of Berlin’s view of the 
diversity of the ultimate values:             
 
There are many worlds, some of which overlap. The world of the Greeks is not that of the Jews 
nor of eighteenth-century Germans or Italians; nor is the worlds of the rich the world of the poor, 
nor that of the happy the world of the unhappy; but all such values and ultimate ends are open to 
human pursuit.
8 
 
Having said that ultimate values belong to different contexts, this means that 
Berlin takes into account the contexts of values, in contrast to monism which 
excludes them. Berlin places importance on the notion of contexts. He believes 
that each value is good in some particular contexts, not in all contexts. For 
example, the value of honour has been praised only in some contexts while it has 
been considered inappropriate in some other contexts. Contexts can be concrete, 
such as situations. For example, whether we place high or low value on 
monetary gain would probably depend on the specific situation we are in. If we 
are desperately poor, we might find money more valuable than other values such 
as love and friendship. But if we are rich, we might find money less valuable 
than love and friendship. This means the value of money is relative to differing 
situations. Berlin clarifies this as follows:  
 
What matter is to understand a particular situation in its full uniqueness, the particular men and 
events and dangers, the particular hopes and fears which are actively at work in a particular place 
at a particular time.
9
     
 
The term situation refers to concrete contexts. But there can also be abstract 
types of context. Firstly, the abstract contexts can be categories – values can be 
judged differently in different categories. For example, the value of truth is 
judged differently within a religious framework and in an academic discipline. 
Secondly, the abstract contexts can be attitudes – values can be judged 
differently according to different attitudes. For example, if we have a positive 
attitude towards friendship, it contains a higher value. Thirdly, the abstract 
                                                
8
 CTH, 85  
9
  Berlin’s quote in Crowder, 2004, 140.  
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contexts can be cultures – values can be judged differently by different cultures. 
For example, pop music might be praised more in contemporary cultures than in 
the past while classical music is judged otherwise. Fourthly, the abstract contexts 
can be paradigms – values can be judged differently in different paradigms. The 
meaning of the paradigm in sciences, according to Kuhn, covers mainly the 
scientific theories and/or methodologies that they use for a given period of time. 
For example, Kuhn cites Aristotle's analysis of motion, Ptolemy's computations 
of planetary positions, Lavoisier's application of the balance, and Maxwell's 
mathematisation of the electromagnetic field as paradigms10. The paradigm, if 
applied to moral philosophy, can be concerned with the moral perspective and 
methodology that the moralists use to the judge values in each theory. For 
example, we can cite the overall utility in utilitarianism and human rights in 
liberalism as paradigms. In this case, moral values tend to be judged differently 
according to each (moral) paradigm.   
 
The ultimate values justified in different contexts (e.g. situations, categories, 
attitudes, cultures or paradigms) are often incompatible with one another in the 
sense that we cannot place them, by ignoring their different roles in the different 
contexts, into the same group or category. For example, we cannot reduce the 
two poets Dante and Homer into the same category of poet. Berlin says: 
 
The idea that he [Machiavelli] planted in my mind was the realisation, which came as something 
of a shock, that not all the supreme values pursued by mankind now and in the past were 
necessarily compatible with one another. 
11
 
 
And, 
 
…two incompatible outlooks; […] which differed, not in all respects – for they were all human, 
but in some profound irreconcilable ways, [were] not combinable in any final synthesis. 12  
 
                                                
10
  Kuhn 1962/1970a, 23 
11
  CTH, 8  
12
  CTH, 10  
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While we cannot reduce them into the same group or category, we also cannot 
have both of them at the same time. Dworkin gives an example of life given 
over to spontaneity – ‘following the urges and impulses of the moment’ and life 
given over to prudence – ‘committing to forethought, particularly for the needs 
and interests of others’. He says  
 
If you tried to bring these two values together in a single life the result would be a terrible 
mess.
13
 
 
And Berlin argues the inability to have incompatible values at the same time by 
saying that:  
 
Total liberty for wolves is death to the lambs.14   
 
Not only are they incompatible and irreconcilable; in addition, they are often 
incommensurable, in the sense that there is no universal criterion (such as the 
universal reasoning or scale) that can be agreed by all cultures to compare and 
judge one value as being better than another. This is in contrast to monism 
which, as mentioned above, relies on a universal ranking to compare and judge 
values. Because of the lack of a universal criterion, Berlin claims, for example, 
that it is absurd to judge that Dante is better than Homer and vice versa since 
they are good in their different contexts.15 Regarding incommensurability, Berlin 
explains:  
 
These visions (of societies) differ with each successive social whole – each (society/culture) has 
its own gifts, values, modes of creation, incommensurable with one another: each must be 
understood in its own terms – understood, not necessarily evaluated 16 
 
And 
                                                
13
  Dworkin, LIB, 78 
14
  CTH, 12 
15
  CTH, 81. 
16
  CTH, 9  
 15 
 
[Machiavelli] merely points out that the two moralities are incompatible and he does not 
recognise any overarching criterion whereby we are enabled to decide the right life for men.
17  
 
The term incommensurability is frequently used in Berlin’s writing. The concept 
seems to be one of the most important ones in pluralism. Because of this, there 
usually is no priority or special status given to any ultimate values in pluralism. 
This is also in contrast to monism which gives priority to ultimate values over 
other values.  
 
Regarding the incommensurability of values, although Berlin claims that the 
values in pluralism are incommensurable, he does not define the conception so 
clearly. Many scholars interpret the term incommensurability in a strong sense as 
‘values are completely incomparable’. For example, when they say friendship 
and money are incommensurable, they seem to believe that friendship and money 
cannot be compared in any way. However, Ruth Chang18 argues that the term 
‘incommensurability’ should mean only that ‘values cannot be precisely 
measured by some common scale of units of value’ (such as in the utilitarian 
view). But it does not mean that values are completely incomparable. Values 
might be comparable in some other way which does not refer to the common 
scale of units. Chang claims that we should use the term ‘incomparability’ to 
mean ‘values are completely incomparable’ instead of the term 
‘incommensurability’. Therefore, according to Chang, if values are 
incommensurable, they are immeasurable according to a scale of units. But we 
might be able to compare them in other ways.  
 
From Berlin’s writings, it seems that he agrees with Chang’s definition of 
incommensurability which refers to the inability to find some common scale of 
units with which to measure values in different contexts. An indication of this is 
that Berlin has never agreed with any aspect of the utilitarian view. Berlin says:  
 
                                                
17
  CTH, 8  
18
  Chang, MCC, 1  
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There are no immutable, universal, eternal rules or criteria of judgment in terms of which 
different cultures and nations can be graded in some single order of excellence…
19
  
 
Put this claim together with the above claim that Berlin does not believe we can 
all agree on any ‘universal criterion’ with which to compare values in the 
different contexts, and it leads to the conclusion that Berlin excludes 1) the 
utilitarian common scale of units and 2) a universal ranking. However, he 
does not define ‘incommensurablility’ in a strong sense in which values are 
completely incomparable. He does not rule out all possibility of comparing 
values.  
 
For Berlin, when values are incommensurable due to the lack of a common scale 
of units and universal criteria and they can be judged as ultimate only relatively 
in different contexts, Berlin seems to claim it is sufficient to say that they are 
equally worthy of pursuit, or equally ultimate in relation to one another. 
Values, such as the Christian’s humility and the Republican’s pride, when judged 
as ultimate in the different cultures, are, according to Berlin, equally worthy of 
pursuit (in their different ways). Berlin says:  
 
We are urged to look upon life as affording a plurality of values, equally genuine, equally 
ultimate, above all equally objective; incapable, therefore, of being ordered in a timeless 
hierarchy, or judged in terms of some one absolute standard.
20 
 
But without a universal ranking, how can Berlin claim them to be equally worthy 
as one another? There seems to be three different ways to explain how it is 
possible for two ultimate values in different contexts to be ‘equally ultimate’. 
One is to say that the two values are equally ultimate according to their own 
conceptions. That is, the conceptions of values in themselves are equally 
ultimate to one another. For example, negative liberty and positive liberty are 
equally ultimate to one another according to their own conceptions. We cannot 
refer to any universal reasons to judge one as better than the other. The role of 
                                                
19
 CTH, 37  
20
 CTH, 79  
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universal reasoning is limited in this case. Even if we are in the Original Position, 
as in Rawls’ hypothetical situation (where almost all contexts and biased factors 
are excluded), we still cannot refer to any universal reasons to judge between 
them. Chang calls this ‘equally ultimate’ by their conceptions as ‘parity’. She 
explains the definition of parity as:  
 
The core idea of parity can be approached by focusing on the idea of an evaluative difference 
with respect to a covering value. Where there is some evaluative difference between items, that 
difference is 1) zero or non-zero and 2) biased or non-biased. A difference is zero if it does not 
have extent. A difference is biased if it favours one item and correspondingly, disfavours the 
other. A zero difference then must be unbiased. The traditional trichotomy of value relations can 
be explained in these terms. If a difference is non-zero and biased, one of items is better than the 
other. If it is biased in favor of x and against y, x is better than y. And if the difference is very 
great, then x is very much better than y. If, instead, a difference is zero and therefore unbiased, 
the items are equally good.  
 
If we take the idea of evaluative differences as explanatory of value relations, the question 
naturally arises, why should we think nonzero, biased differences (better and worse than) and 
zero (unbiased) differences (equally good) are the only kind of differences there are? In 
particular, why should we rule out the possibility of nonzero, unbiased differences?  21 
 
The conception of parity is therefore concerned with the differences between two 
values when they are nonzero and unbiased or when they are neither equally 
good nor better than the other. Put simply, it is when two values contain 
different conceptions which are ultimate in different aspects from one another so 
they cannot be equally good or better than the other. But since they are both 
justified as ultimate, they are ‘on a par’ in Chang’s term. Negative liberty and 
positive liberty can be an example of such ‘on a par’ values.   
 
And because of their different conceptions which are ultimate in different 
aspects, a small improvement of quality in each value does not make one better 
than the other. Chang says:  
 
                                                
21
 Chang, IIPR, 26 
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If items are neither better nor worse than one another, and yet a small improvement in one does 
not make it better than the other, the items are on a par.
22
  
 
Consider the two concepts of liberty: even if we increase a small amount of one, 
we still cannot make it better than the other. The same result would happen with 
the comparison between freedom and equality. Chang explains this ‘on-a-par’ 
conception in her article in a very clear and subtle manner and it seems that 
Berlin’s idea of ‘equally ultimate’ status between values is similar to her view. 
For example, Berlin says that the two concepts of liberty are incommensurable 
(on any common scale or universal ranking) but equally ultimate even in 
principle23 – that is, without taking into account any contexts.  
 
Chang’s parity or Berlin’s equally worthy is, in short, the alternative way to 
accept two ultimate values as equally worthy to one another merely according to 
their conceptions. It can be without referring to any common scale or universal 
ranking. We might consider ‘parity’ or ‘equally worthy’ as a special type of 
ranking; or the fourth ranking apart from better, equal (on the scale) and worse. 
Berlin seems to depend on it to justify the equal worthiness of incommensurable 
values.    
 
Another way to explain how values in the different contexts or cultures can be 
equally ultimate is by saying that they are equally ultimate by culture. This is 
when values are judged relatively as ultimate in their cultures and we have some 
relation towards those cultures. For example, we probably have some deep 
respect or commitment to those cultures. So even though we might be able, in 
some ways, to compare them, we avoid doing so. Our respect or commitment to 
the cultures prevents us from comparing the values belonging to them. And, by 
avoiding comparing them on any ranking, we give them the status of being 
equally ultimate to one another. For example, it might be possible to compare the 
values of the Greeks with those of the Chinese if we were able to appeal to some 
universal reasoning (universal reasoning might be available in the O.P.), but we 
                                                
22
 Chang, IIPR, 26.  
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 FEL, 118 
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seem to avoid doing so since we respect the two cultures equally. Instead, we 
grant right away that they are equally ultimate. The same is true for the values of 
Muslims and Buddhists, and also for the other religious/cultural values that we 
often do not want to compare.  
 
This case is concerned with the influence that cultures have on us. They have our 
respect or commitment so we feel that they are valuable. We then accord them 
special status which makes us unable to compare them. Lukes recognises this 
special status of cultural values and refers to them in terms of the ‘sacred’. For 
Lukes, it is normal that we would avoid comparing the sacred things and grant 
them equally worthy right away. He says:     
 
The values that the attitude of incommensurability protects are sacred values. ‘Sacred things’, 
wrote Durkheim, are ‘those which…interdictions protect and isolate; profane things those to 
which these interdictions are applied and which must remain at a distance from the first. To be 
sacred is to be valued incommensurability. 
24 
 
For the sacred values, even if we try to compare them, such as by referring to 
some universal reasoning, it would not in any way make us actually view one of 
them as better than another. This is probably similar to the comparison of two 
daughters. If we have to compare our daughters with whom we have a very close 
relationship, it would be very difficult, sometimes impossible, to accept one as 
better than the other. This is because we deeply love them both. They both have a 
special status for us. No matter what qualities each has more than the other – 
beauty, intelligence, personality, as some universal reasoning can rank them – it 
would not in any way make us actually view one of them as better than another. 
Or, even if one of them improves her qualities, she is still not better than the 
other for us. We would normally consider them both as on-a-par or equally 
worthy as one another. This is certainly different from how we view other people 
we do not know. Therefore, the special status that we grant to some values could 
justify the equal worthiness between them right away, without the need to refer 
to any universal ranking to compare them.  
                                                
24
 Lukes, IIPR, 188  
 20 
 
The sense of the sacred, according to Lukes, does not cover only cultural or 
religious values but can be applied to neutral values such as political or ethical 
values as well. It means that any values can be sacred if they belong to the 
cultures that have some influence on the persons who live in the cultures. In 
other words, any values can become sacred if people in those cultures respect or 
commit to them. Lukes says:  
 
It is not only believers, particularists, conservatives, romantics, and traditionalists who treat their 
favoured values as sacred; liberals do too.25   
 
Chang seems agree with Lukes on the idea of the equal worthiness according to 
culture or the special status of values as well. That is, she has raised some 
examples of incommensurable values which seem to be sacred values as well.  
One of them is the comparison between friendship and money of which Chang 
says:   
 
It might, for instance, be a constitutive obligation owed to one’s friends that when confronted 
with a choice between a friendship and a sum of cash, one judges that they are incomparable. 
26
 
 
In fact, friendship is one of the sacred values which most of us usually respect or 
are committed to so that we do not want to compare them with other values 
especially money – the value that seems to contain a materially shallow attitude. 
We therefore often consider friendship as equally worthy to money while in fact 
they are probably not equal (in their conceptions), but we merely avoid 
comparing them.  
 
Therefore, in pluralism, when we have some relation to values or cultures, the 
relation can be taken into account in the comparison of values. When we 
compare them, we often deny using any universal reasoning but refer instead to 
our respect or commitment to them and instantly consider them equally worthy 
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as one another. In this case, the conceptions of values might not be taken into 
account. Our reasoning might also not be taken into account. Only our relation to 
the values (our commitment or respect) is the main element of the comparison.  
 
This indicates another opposite element to monism. When the monists compare 
values, as mentioned earlier, they detach themselves from them (no respect or 
commitment is taken into account) and compare them impartially by appealing to 
a universal ranking. But, in this case, when pluralists compare values, they 
attach themselves to them (taking into account their respect and commitment) 
and compare them by appealing to their attachment to them.  
 
It is likely, from Berlin’s writings, that Berlin would agree with this judgment of 
‘equally ultimate by culture or by the special status of values’ as well. However, 
according to Berlin’s own explanation, he claims that values can be equally 
ultimate as one another by mutual understanding. That is, for Berlin, we all 
have the ability to ‘enter into’ the life of other people (by using imagination) and 
to thereby understand and feel empathy for them, no matter how different those 
lives are from our own. And when we can understand the life of another, we can 
also justify their values as being ultimate in the same way that they believe them 
to be. It follows from this that we can justify others’ values as equally ultimate as 
our values. This process of understanding people (or the ‘inside view’ in Berlin’s 
term) makes it possible for values that derive from different cultures to become 
‘equally ultimate’ as one another. This is possible without getting into any 
unbiased hypothetical situation. Berlin says:  
 
…the way of life which, no matter how different from our own, normal men could find it natural 
to pursue, such ways of life as we, armed as we are, with the capacity to perceive the 
(objectively) good, beautiful and just, in all their guises and transformations, should not find it 
too strange to pursue in similar conditions, even if we do not ourselves accept them.
27
      
 
From all the above, there are three different ways that ultimate values judged 
relatively in different contexts or cultures can be affirmed ‘equally ultimate’ (or 
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‘equally worthy’ or ‘on a par’) to one another, without the need to refer to any 
universal ranking. We can say that this makes incommensurable values 
comparable (as equally worthy as one another). And the way Berlin compares 
and approves the equal status between them can be one of the three ways 
mentioned above or probably all of them. The ‘equally worthy’ or ‘on a par’ can 
be seen as a special form of comparison which approves two contrary ideas at the 
same time. Firstly, it approves that ultimate values are relative to contexts (i.e. 
they are ultimate only in their contexts) while secondly it also approves that these 
values are equally ultimate as one another. With this special form of comparison 
that pluralists use to compare and justify incommensurable values, pluralists can 
achieve a cross-cultural judgment or agreement between people in the different 
cultures.  
 
Overall, this means that Berlin approves the justification of ultimate values in 
different cultures. It is not necessary for ultimate values to be recognised by 
universal criteria. Only contextual or cultural criteria are deemed sufficient. As a 
result there are at least two (but potentially a diversity) of ultimate values, judged 
relatively in different contexts or cultures, but justified as equally ultimate as one 
another in pluralism.   
 
So far, from the explanation of Berlin’s pluralism the main differences between 
pluralism and monism can be summarised here. In pluralism, Berlin takes into 
account the contexts of values such as situations, categories, attitudes, cultures 
and paradigms and these contexts make the ultimate values which belong to the 
different contexts incompatible with one another in the sense that we cannot 
reduce them to the same category nor can we have both of them at the same time. 
The contexts also make the values incommensurable with one another in the 
sense that it is hard for all cultures to agree on any common scales of units or any 
single universal ranking to compare and judge values in different contexts. This 
is because when values belong to different contexts or cultures, they are normally 
justified as ultimate by different rankings. However, Berlin says that those 
ultimate values justified in different contexts are equally worthy as one another. 
There are three different ways to justify their equal worthiness which are 1) to 
justify them by their conceptions, 2) to justify them by their cultures and 3) to 
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justify them by mutual understanding. After having justified them as equally 
worthy, there will be at least two ultimate values (but potentially a diversity of 
them) in pluralism. The picture of the top ranking of pluralism can be as follows: 
 
 
 
In contrast to pluralism, as mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, monism 
does not take into account the contexts of values at all (or monists might include 
a few contexts which they believe not to create bias in the judgment of values). 
Without contexts, the monists can easily agree on a universal ranking or 
universal reasoning to compare values impartially. This means that the values in 
monism are always commensurable or comparable. The comparison by a 
universal ranking always results in one ultimate value. But if there are more than 
one, they are usually compatible with one another. From all the above elements, 
there will always be only one value or one compatible group of values on top of 
the ranking in monism which is in contrast to pluralism. The picture can be:  
 
 
 
The main difference between pluralism and monism, if reduced to one element, 
is the number of the ultimate values on the top of the ranking – one in monism 
and many in pluralism.  
 
A diversity of ultimate values  
One ultimate value or one group of 
compatible ultimate values  
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In this case, it is not possible for pluralism to have a harmonious society (or 
indeed one that might approach utopia) but a conflicting society. In contrast, the 
harmonious society or the utopia is the main objective in monism.  
 
Here, as the distinction between pluralism and monism is clear, we can employ it 
in analysing pluralism and monism further in the following chapters. Thus far, 
we can say that the one and the many ultimate values are the indications that 
pluralism cannot in any way be combined with monism.    
 
The Human Horizon  
 
In this case, although there can be a diversity of ultimate values in pluralism, it 
does not mean that Berlin accepts everything and adopts a relativist position. 
Values are limited in number. Berlin says:  
 
The number of human values, if values which I can pursue while maintaining my human 
semblance, my human character, is finite – let us say 74, or perhaps 122, or 26 but finite, 
whatever it may be’. 28 
 
Moreover, from Berlin’s quotation, he does not only describe values as equally 
‘ultimate’, but equally ‘objective’ as well. And this ‘objective’ status of values 
comes from the objective part in pluralism. That is, for Berlin, all justified values 
in pluralism, no matter how diverse and relative to contexts/cultures they are, 
must be within the scope of ‘the human horizon’ (Berlin’s term). This human 
horizon, in Berlin’s view, seems to consist of two necessary conditions: the first 
one is the moral ‘central core’; the second is the psychological condition.  
 
1) Berlin does not specify in detail the definition of the central core, and nor does 
he mention any values as core values. He just plainly claims that there is a 
‘central core’ of moral conception which all human beings share, and contends 
that all justified values in pluralism must satisfy this conception. Berlin says:  
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All men have a basic sense of good and evil, no matter what cultures they belong to.29  
 
And 
 
There are, if not universal values, at any rate a minimum without which societies could scarcely 
survive. 
30 
 
John Gray affirms that Berlin has some kind of ‘minimum morality’ in pluralism. 
Gray says:  
 
[For Berlin, liberalism] is one form of life among many that may flourish within the common 
human horizon of the minimal values that are universal. 
31 
 
We might be able to understand Berlin’s central core by investigating the values 
that he excludes. They are extremism, violence, killing and war. Berlin says:   
 
To make such an omelette, there is surely no limit to the number of eggs that should be broken – 
that was the faith of Lenin, of Trotsky, of Mao, for all I know of Pol Pot. […] Some armed 
prophets seek to save mankind, and some only their own race because of its superior attributes, 
but whichever the motive, the millions slaughtered in wars or revolutions – gas chambers, gulag, 
genocide, all the monstrosities for which our century will be remembered – are the price men 
must pay for the felicity of future generations. 
32
   
 
And  
 
Few today would wish to defend slavery or ritual murder or Nazi gas chambers or the torture of 
human beings for the sake of pleasure or profit or even political good […], or mindless killing.33 
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The quotations show that the values that belong to totalitarianism, despotism, 
Nazism, cannibalism or other violent groups and cultures do not satisfy the 
central core conception, and as a result they are not justified by Berlin’s 
pluralism. In this case, the value that is most likely to be regarded as Berlin’s 
central core can be put simply as ‘non-violence’. If this is true, then this would 
correspond to Crowder’s own explanation of Berlin’s central core.34 For 
Crowder, the core should be concerned with the (basic) moral requirements or 
values that all or most people have accepted historically. Apart from the ‘non-
violent’ element, there seem to be no other values even freedom or equality that 
all or most people have accepted (or would like to accept) historically.   
 
2) Values in pluralism are not only required to satisfy the moral core conception, 
but must in addition fall within the scope of human psychological conditions, 
and thus not beyond them. The psychological conditions that restrict the values 
in pluralism seem to consist of ‘imagination, understanding and empathy’, or 
the process that Berlin calls ‘the inside view’. That is, values in pluralism must 
be within the human ability to imagine, understand and feel empathy; in other 
words, they must be something that we can access and identify through this 
‘inside view’. Berlin explains the latter as follows:   
 
Both thinkers [Vico and Herder] advocate the use of the historical imagination, which can enable 
us to ‘descend to’ or ‘enter’ or ‘feel oneself into’ the mentality of remote societies; thereby we 
understand them…
35 
 
In this case, values in pluralism will be justified only if people can imagine, 
understand and feel empathy for them. If people cannot do so, as the values are 
beyond their imagination, understanding and empathy, then these values will not 
be justified. In this case, values such as the cultural ones which appear to be 
illusions or to be too fantastical, such as those of the Nazis or the cannibals, 
would not be justified in pluralism.      
 
                                                
34
  Crowder, 2004, 133.  
35
  CTH, 82  
 27 
We are called upon to exercise our imaginative powers to the utmost; but not to go beyond 
them; not to accept as authentic values anything that we cannot understand, imaginatively ‘enter’ 
into. 
36 
 
Hardy explains them in terms of the psychopath:  
 
The psychopath or ‘pin-picker’ is the figure Berlin often used to illustrate what he meant by 
attitude and/or behaviour that would fall outside the human horizon.
37
  
 
Some scholars interpret the diversity of values in Berlin’s pluralism in the sense 
that there can be evils or bad values according to the fact that pluralism accepts a 
diversity of values which are incompatible with one another and there is no 
universal ranking or reasoning to judge them. For example, Gray says:   
 
Berlin’s pluralist thesis of the incomparability of ultimate or fundamental values applies to evils 
as well as to goods. 
38
 
 
In this case, Berlin’s human horizon, which requires values to be within our 
imagination, understanding and empathy, rules out the possibility that pluralism 
would accept evil values, since the evil values such as Nazism and cannibalism 
can never be within our understanding nor can they receive our empathy. 
Therefore Berlin’s human horizon successfully rejects Gray’s argument.     
 
By saying that the values must be within our ability to imagine, understand and 
feel empathy for, Berlin says we do not have to accept them as our values and/or 
be able to live with all of them. To ‘understand’ and to ‘accept’ (as our values) 
are two different conceptions and they must be separated from one another. Only 
the first is required in pluralism, not the latter. Berlin says:  
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As ways of life which, no matter how different from our own, normal man could find it natural to 
pursue […] with the capacity to perceive the (objectively) good, beautiful and just […] even if 
we do not ourselves accept them. 
39
 
 
And  
 
…but to understand is not to accept. 
40
 
 
The two conditions of the human horizon – the central core and the 
psychological conditions – are related to one another, as Berlin claims that the 
first leads to the latter. He does not explain how this is so, but it is probably 
because the non-violent values are naturally what we can imagine, understand, 
and feel empathy, for whilst the violent ones (such as the cannibals’ rituals) seem 
to be beyond the scope of our imagination and understanding. These two 
conditions help pluralists screen out unacceptable values such as the extreme, 
violent values, and make the doctrine distinct from relativism as Berlin says:  
 
I believe relativism to be false on both grounds…
41
  
 
Crowder however differs from the interpretation presented above, and reads 
Berlin’s central core in a different way. He claims that it in fact pertains to 
general goals; in other words, it should be about the goals that all human beings 
share. According to Crowder, ‘there are certain generic ends that are pursued by 
all human beings’.42 From Crowder’s perspective, Berlin’s central core might be 
happiness, prosperity, justice and other goals which are, to the same extent, wide 
and general. These general goals will take differing forms in diverse cultural 
practices. However, it seems impossible that any of these goals, no matter how 
wide and general they are – even that of happiness – would be shared by all or 
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most people. For example, the goal of Buddhism is to be aware of human 
suffering, and to let go of the self or ego on the grounds that its retention is not 
consistent with happiness. And since Berlin’s central core must consist of 
something that is shared by all or most people, Crowder’s interpretation seems to 
be false. If it is the case, as argued above, that Berlin’s central core consists 
merely of the non-violent requirement, then this would seem to be something that 
all or most normal, (i.e. not psychopathic) people could share.  
 
Moreover, in Berlin’s argument, he seems to use the central core to justify 
‘acceptable’ values, rather than to justify people’s ‘goals’. For example, he asks 
us not to accept the values of the psychopath. The non-violent requirement can 
apparently be used to justify ‘acceptable’ values, and not people’s ‘goals’. 
Therefore, Berlin’s central core should be closer to the interpretation that I 
presented above than it is to Crowder’s.     
 
Taking the two conditions (or the human horizon) into account, the diversity of 
ultimate values which are contextually or culturally relative must, as mentioned 
earlier, satisfy the central core of non violence, and must be within the scope of 
the psychological conditions of understanding and empathy. Put simply, those 
contextually and culturally relative values must satisfy the conditions of Berlin’s 
objective human horizon. This is why Berlin says they are all ‘objective’.   
 
The inconsistency in pluralism is solved   
 
The human horizon which is used to justify the values in pluralism as objective 
values can solve the inconsistency in pluralism. The inconsistency raised by 
some scholars is: how can ultimate values be relative to their contexts or cultures 
but at the same time all be objective? Berlin himself seems to put it in an 
inconsistent way. He says:  
 
Any of which (ultimate values) may find itself subject to conflicting claims of uncombinable, yet 
equally ultimate and objective ends.
43
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Crowder says:  
 
It [Berlin’s diversity of ultimate values] amounts to cultural relativism, and so conflicts with his 
commitment to  […] his notion of moral universals…
44
 
 
Therefore, the answer is that, although these ultimate values are relative to their 
contexts, they can all be objective by the justification of the (objective) human 
horizon. The human horizon in this case acts as the universal criterion to justify 
the relative values as objective.  
 
In the above explanation, when Berlin says that values are incommensurable or 
there is no universal ranking to judge between them, and he considers them all 
equally worthy as one another, he means only the ultimate values (on the top 
ranking). But, overall, there can be some rankings in pluralism.  
 
That is, if Berlin refers to the universal criterion (or the human horizon), there 
can be some rankings of values in pluralism. Firstly, the human horizon divides 
values into two levels: ‘acceptable values’ (the ones which satisfy moral and 
psychological conditions), and ‘unacceptable values’ (the ones which do not 
satisfy them). Among the acceptable ones, some, if not all, are judged 
independently or relatively as ‘ultimate’ in different cultures (since there is no 
universal criterion at this stage, and Berlin’s human horizon is apparently 
insufficient to judge any values as ultimate). All of them, Berlin claims, are 
equally worthy to one another. These ultimate values can be separated into 
another ranking which is the ranking of ultimate values, living beyond acceptable 
values.   
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Consider the top ranking, the pluralist values that are ultimate in their different 
contexts and cultures but found to be equally worthy to one another and which 
are justified by the universal criterion of the human horizon are, for example, 
humility vs pride, friendship vs money, liberty vs equality, Berlin’s two 
conceptions of liberty and all the non-violent cultural/religious values.  
 
From this ranking, we can see clearly the framework of pluralism. That is 
pluralism must have at least two or a diversity of ultimate values which are 
contextually or culturally relative and found to be incompatible and 
incommensurable with one another. But they are equally worthy. And they 
satisfy the central core of non violence, and remain within the scope of the 
psychological conditions of understanding and empathy. The framework of 
pluralism therefore has two important elements. The first is concerned with the 
equally ultimate values at the top ranking and the second is concerned with 
justification by the objective human horizon.  
 
Compromise and sacrifice  
 
Apart from all the above elements of pluralism, there is another element that is 
also important in pluralism. It is the compromise and sacrifice between 
ultimate values. Consider that there are at least two ultimate values in pluralism, 
usually conflicting with one another. It is necessary for pluralists to compromise 
between them. The compromise can be by moderating the conception of each 
ultimate value, so that they are able to exist together. Dworkin, for example, 
Acceptable values justified 
by the human horizon  
Unacceptable values 
unjustified by the human 
horizon   
Ultimate values judged in 
different cultures, but found to 
be equally worthy 
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claims that if we were to moderate the definitions of liberty, equality and 
democracy such as by restricting/reducing the scope of their conceptions, then 
we could resolve any incompatibility between them and locate them in parallel 
with one another. As he puts it:   
 
We might say: liberty is not the freedom to do whatever you might want to do; it is freedom to do 
whatever you like so long as you respect the moral rights, properly understood, of others. […] In 
any case, it is far from obvious that liberty understood in this different way would produce an 
inevitable conflict with equality.45    
 
And 
 
If a conflict between liberty and equality is inevitable [it is because Berlin] depends on that 
[extreme] account of liberty, then you will have that reason for rejecting that view [that they are 
conflicting]…46  
 
However, if in some cases we cannot compromise and/or modify such 
conceptions – as would perhaps be the case with religious or sacred values, 
which require the adherents of this religion to preserve the conceptions as they 
are. This is why Bernard Williams does not agree with Dworkin. Williams claims 
that some people might be deeply committed to the original conceptions. To 
modify their conceptions would be to create a sense of loss for them. Williams 
says:  
 
(After changing the conception of liberty in order to make it compatible with justice) the 
conception of liberty, liberty as they conceive it, has been violated in virtue of a certain 
conception of justice which they do not share. (It is a sense of loss.) 
47
 
 
In this case, Berlin suggests that we should choose by referring to the situation 
at hand, and without appealing to universal reasoning (since it is absent at this 
stage). For example, if we need to choose between two ultimate values to which 
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we are committed, say, between friendship and money, we cannot refer to any 
process of reasoning to choose them. Universal reasoning does not help us here. 
Neither can be better or worse since they both have our commitment. The only 
method we can use here is to choose them according to the situations and/or 
contexts we are in. Berlin says:   
 
The concrete situation is almost everything.48 
 
If the ultimate values are cultural values, Berlin tends to believe that people refer 
to their cultural identities to choose between ultimate values. Berlin explains 
how important cultural identities are:   
 
A German cannot be made happy by efforts to turn him into a second-rate Frenchman. […] Men 
can develop their full powers only by continuing to live where they and their ancestors were 
born…
49 
 
Choosing by situation or by cultural identity, as we do not appeal to universal 
reasoning, we appeal instead to contextual or cultural reasoning in order to 
consider the best choice in each situation. It is therefore misleading to say that 
we do not appeal to any reasoning at all in choosing between ultimate values. 
According to Lukes:  
 
…careful, discriminating thought is needed to determine what values are at stake in any given 
situation of choice, especially if one or more of the values is sacred. 
50 
   
As Berlin encourages us to choose between conflicting values, it is also alright if 
we promote one value over the other, since values are promoted here for the sake 
of resolving conflicts, and not with a view towards approving one value as being 
intrinsically better than the other. Garrard says:   
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There is nothing illogical for Berlin about a pluralist promoting one good over others, provided it 
is not done on the grounds that the chosen good is intrinsically preferable to the goods not 
chosen.
51
  
 
Consider Berlin’s claims that the ultimate values are ‘equally ultimate’ or 
‘equally objective’ as one another as explained above, so that to choose and 
promote one value always results in the sacrifice and/or the loss of another 
equally worthy one. Berlin says:   
 
Some among the great goods cannot live together. That is a conceptual truth. We are doomed to 
choose and every choice may entail an irreparable loss. 
52 
 
In this case, if the values in pluralism are not ‘objective’, when pluralists choose 
or promote one over the other it would not generate a loss of the other. It would 
be only a trade-off between conflicting choices. But Berlin stresses the 
‘objective’ status of values in pluralism (as justified by the human horizon), 
which means that there is as a result always a loss in pluralism.      
 
The trade-off is used by the monists. It is when we make a choice by referring to 
values’ universal ranking. And the values judged by universal ranking as less 
worthy would always be traded off for the more worthy ones. This trading off of 
the less worthy value does not generate a sense of loss.   
 
It is similar to when we buy products. When their values are unequal, we always 
choose the better one. For the one we do not choose, it is a trade-off rather than 
sacrifice. We drop it for something better. And we do not feel any regret. Lukes 
says:  
 
(Trade-off) is an economic, more specifically a commercial, metaphor. […] Trade-off suggests 
that we compute the value of the alternative goods on whatever scale is at hand, whether cardinal 
or ordinal, precise or rough and ready. 
53
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The element of sacrifice or loss set out above is also another important idea in 
pluralism. It is presented here in order to show its contrast to the trading-off idea 
of the monists. So far, the general ideas and the framework of pluralism are 
clearly presented. In summary, pluralism consists of 1) the diversity of ultimate 
values justified in different contexts or cultures and incompatible and 
incommensurable with one another. 2) They are however equally worthy or 
equally objective as one another. 3) They are within the scope of the objective 
human horizon. And 4) since they are equally worthy but conflicting, we must 
always compromise between them or sacrifice one of them and this will always 
generate the sense of loss.      
 
The elements of pluralism are clearly in contrast to those of monism which 
consist of 1) only one ultimate value or one group of compatible ultimate values. 
2) They are comparable on a universal scale or ranking. And 3) to choose one 
over the other is considered as a trading off rather than a sacrifice, which does 
not generate any sense of loss.  
 
Part 2 The positions of Berlin’s pluralism: PUT, PMT or PPT  
 
Can pluralism be monism?  
 
From the above elements of pluralism, especially the diversity of ultimate values, 
pluralism cannot collapse into monism. However, it can still collapse into 
monism in other conditions; that is, if pluralism determines its position as the 
only universal theory, or, if pluralism acts as if it were superior to all other 
theories in all contexts. In either case, pluralism would immediately collapse 
into monism. It seems that many scholars especially Berlin’s followers such as 
George Crower and Henry Hardy believe this to be Berlin’s position. For 
example, Crowder says:  
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Berlin’s liberal convictions (note: Crowder believes that pluralism is liberalism) are 
fundamentally universalist rather than ‘agonist’ or only locally valid. 
54
  
 
Or, they do not explicitly say so but they seem to describe pluralism as being 
superior to all other theories. To stress the point, pluralism can collapse into 
monism in two different conditions:      
 
1) If it is PUT – PUT stands for ‘Pluralism as the only Universal Theory’. This is 
the attitude that pluralism is the only true theory while other theories are 
considered false.  
 
The character of PUT is that it has values as its subjects; PUT manages moral 
values under the pluralist framework. For example, PUT manages a plurality of 
values as equally worthy as one another within the scope of the human horizon. 
However, it does not deal with other theories since it sees other theories as false.  
 
2) If it is PMT – Another condition that makes pluralism collapse into monism is 
if it is PMT. PMT stands for ‘Pluralism as a Meta-Theory’. PMT is the attitude 
of having pluralism as a normative meta-theory or a superior theory to all other 
theories. It accepts that some other theories (in a limited number) are also true 
but they should be managed under the pluralist framework.  
 
The character of PMT is that it has theories as its subjects. PMT manages 
(moral) theories under the pluralist framework. For example, PMT manages a 
plurality of theories as equally worthy to one another within the scope of the 
human horizon.  
 
From the above, pluralism will collapse into monism if it is either PUT or PMT. 
On the other hand, pluralism will not collapse into monism if it is PPT.   
 
3) PPT – The condition that prevents pluralism from collapsing into monism is if 
it is PPT. PPT stands for ‘Pluralism as Particular Theory’. This is the attitude that 
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pluralism is a particular theory being equal in its dignity or worthiness to some 
other theories. And as a particular theory, pluralism will be chosen only in some 
particular contexts rather than being chosen in all contexts. As a result, it can be 
sacrificed for other theories in some particular contexts as well.  
 
The character of PPT is that it has values as its subjects; PPT manages its values 
under the pluralist framework in the same way as PUT. But the difference is that 
PPT determines its position as equal (in dignity and/or worthiness) to some other 
theories, not as the only true theory.  
 
It should be noted that the term ‘theory’ in all the above cases means merely ‘the 
attitude’ towards political and ethical values and theories, rather than meaning 
the theory in full practical form which includes the implication of the institutions 
as well.  
 
So, there are three possible positions of pluralism 1) pluralism as universal 
theory or PUT –considered as monism at theory level. 2) Pluralism as meta-
theory or PMT –considered as monism at meta-theory level. And 3) pluralism as 
particular theory or PPT – considered as pluralism at the level of theory. It is 
clear that the first two positions will make pluralism collapse into monism while 
the last position will prevent it from the collapse. We will have to investigate 
further to discern if Berlin’s pluralism can be defined as any of the three.    
 
The conditions for PUT and PMT   
 
Put simply, the conditions for judging pluralism as PUT, PMT or PPT are as 
follows:  
 
The conditions for PUT and PMT 
 
1) PUT – it is the only true theory. Its subject is values.  
 
2) PMT – it is the supreme theory. Its subject is other theories.  
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3) PUT and PMT – they will be applied to all contexts. 
 
The conditions for PPT 
 
1) It has equal dignity to other theories.  
 
2) It will be applied to some particular contexts.  
 
Analysing the position of pluralism from Berlin’s two pieces of writings 
  
To know the exact position of Berlin’s pluralism, we need to look at Berlin’s 
writings. However, there are two different types of writings which contain 
different subjects from one another. One is Russian history in which Berlin 
describes the important incidents happened in Russia and the ideas of some of 
the Russian intelligentsia in the 19th century. The other is his writings on moral 
and political philosophy in which he describes his ideas of pluralism. In the 
contents of the two, the first seems to agree with and/or praise Russian 
intelligentsia (later found to be the counter-enlightenment liberals) and the latter 
seems to agree with and/or praise traditional liberalism (especially the value of 
freedom). Scholars therefore believe that Berlin might combine his theory with 
either of them: Russian thinkers (or the counter-enlightenment liberalism) or 
traditional liberalism. 
 
There are two possibilities. On the one hand, if pluralism is part of either one, it 
means that pluralism tends to be a normative theory (PUT). This is because, in 
his Russian history, he puts three Russian thinkers on the top ranking so it looks 
like he wants to present their ideas (or the counter-enlightenment liberal ideas) as 
the norm. And in his moral philosophy, if his pluralism is combined with 
traditional liberalism, pluralism would be a normative theory since traditional 
liberalism is considered as a normative theory. On the other hand, if pluralism 
is independent from both, there are equal possibilities that it is a normative 
theory (PUT) or a particular theory (PPT) or a meta-theory (PMT) or obtains 
more than one position. We might be able to find indications or arguments from 
the elements of pluralism to prove these positions.  
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The assumption of this thesis as to the status of Berlin’s pluralism is that 
pluralism is independent from both – the Russian thinkers (or the counter-
enlightenment liberalism) and traditional liberalism – and it is not a universal 
theory (PUT) but a particular theory (PPT) and a meta-theory (PMT).   
 
Two steps to prove the assumption   
 
1) Firstly, we need to ask if pluralism is independent from the two theories of 
liberalism (traditional liberalism and counter-enlightenment liberalism). If it is 
not independent, then it is a combination of either of them. And to combine them 
as one theory, pluralism tends to be a normative theory (PUT). The assumption 
will be false. But if it is independent, there is a chance that the assumption of this 
thesis is true.    
 
2) Secondly, if pluralism is independent from the two theories of liberalism 
(traditional liberalism and counter-enlightenment liberalism), we need to ask 
further whether the indications or arguments in Berlin’s writings support its 
status as a universal theory (PUT) or a particular theory (PPT) or a meta-theory 
(PMT). If there are sufficient indications or arguments to reject the PUT position 
and support the other two positions – PPT and PMT, then the assumption is true.   
 
Pluralism  
Russian 
Thinkers 
Liberal
ism 
PUT 
Independent  
PUT PPT PMT  
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Put simply, first we need to know whether pluralism is an independent theory. If 
it is, there is a chance that it is PPT and PMT as assumed.   
 
The first step  
 
As mentioned, the first step is to observe if, for Berlin, pluralism is independent 
from the two theories. This is by looking at Berlin’s two pieces of writings. Now, 
let’s have a look roughly at his writings on Russian history.  
 
Berlin’s Russian history  
 
In his writings, Berlin describes the situation in Russia during the 1840s onward 
in terms of a diversity of ideas conflicting with one another and spreading around 
the country.55  
 
While he claims ideas are in conflict in Russia at that time, his narrative seems to 
suggest that they are comparable and should be ranked at different levels. First, 
he seems to put the Russian Empire of Tsar Nicolas I at the lowest level as he 
claims that the Tsar’s government did many harmful things to the people 
including the impact of widespread corruption and the rejection of all freedom of 
speech.  
 
Second, he seems to put the two opposed sets of extremists consisting of the left 
and the right on a higher level than the Tsar while both seem to exist on the same 
level as one another. In this case, he seems to believe that the two groups 
constituted a progression in Russia aimed at changing the country for the better. 
Yet they are both limited as a result of the extremity of their beliefs and actions 
inevitably resulting in violence.  
 
Third, he seems to situate the other group of intellectuals, those who were 
moderate in their ideas and/or whose ideas seem to be closer to pluralism, at the 
                                                
55
  All references to Berlin’s Russian historical writing are taken from RT - Russian 
Thinkers (2008) and POI - The Power of Ideas (2000). 
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highest level of all. Most notable among these intellectuals are three in particular 
– Alexander Herzen, Tolstoy and Turgenev whose ideas, according to many 
readers, have much in common with pluralism. These three intellects are Berlin’s 
heroes in his narrative of Russian history; he refers to them as ‘three moral 
preachers of genius’.56    
 
If we put Berlin’s historical narrative onto a chart, it would be as follows:   
 
[1 The top end] the three thinkers – Herzen, Tolstoy and Turgenev 
[2 The middle rank] the left – [equal to] – the right  
[3 The lowest rank] the Russian empire, Tsar Nicolas I  
 
Although the ideas of the heroes (at the top level) are closer to pluralism, the way 
Berlin explains them does not convey that their ideas are particular or contextual 
or equal to other groups but ultimate on the ranking and/or normative (PUT).  
 
From the above, the first piece of Berlin’s writing on Russian history seems to 
present the three Russian thinkers as heroes. Readers understand from their 
heroic position and some of their elements overlapping with pluralism that the 
three thinkers are, for Berlin, pluralists. So if Berlin actually presents them as 
pluralists and puts them on top of the ranking, it means that he intends to present 
pluralism as normative (or PUT).  
 
The analysis of whether or not the three thinkers are actually pluralists (for 
Berlin) will be in chapter 2 and 3. It will be done by taking the ideas of 
pluralism presented above to compare with the ideas of the three thinkers in 
Berlin’s writings. The analysis however turns out to be that the three thinkers are 
more akin to the counter-enlightenment liberals whose main ideas and 
elements are different from pluralism. The two theories – pluralism and counter-
enlightenment liberalism – are therefore independent from one another. When 
they are independent from one another, it is proved that Berlin does not use his 
                                                
 
56
  Kelly, RT, 29.  
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Russian history to present pluralism as the norm or PUT. But he seems merely to 
present his admiration for the three thinkers (and/or the counter-enlightenment 
thinkers).   
  
This first proof of pluralism as independent from the ideas of the Russian 
thinkers or the counter-enlightenment will be spelled out in chapters 2 and 3.   
 
Berlin’s Moral philosophy  
 
The second piece of Berlin’s writing is on moral or political philosophy in which 
Berlin describes his idea of pluralism. In these writings, Berlin seems to relate 
pluralism to (the enlightenment or traditional) liberalism. For example, he 
seems to stress negative liberty more than the positive liberty. Many scholars 
including his followers claim that pluralism is part of or another version of 
traditional liberalism. Crowder (one of Berlin’s followers), for example, claims 
that:  
 
…pluralism’s imperfectability brings with it a positive recommendation: only those forms of 
politics are plausible which acknowledge and accommodate the effects of imperfection, in 
particular dissatisfaction, alienation and significant social conflict. Prominent among political 
forms that meet this description is liberalism […] In short, pluralism recommends liberalism by 
way of anti-utopianism.57   
 
And  
 
Berlin says now one thing, now another. In some places he denies any necessary connection 
between pluralism and liberalism. But elsewhere he asserts that pluralism does indeed imply 
liberalism, as when he refers to ‘pluralism, with the measure of negative liberty it entails’.
58
   
 
John Gray, in contrast to Crowder, says that pluralism, despite some overlapping 
ideas, is different in its main elements and structure from traditional liberalism. 
He says:  
                                                
57
  Crowder, 2004, 146  
58
  Crowder, 2004, 143 
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In the pluralistic view, it is the recognition of the ultimate validity of conflicting claims, rather 
than the special claims of liberty (or liberalism), that is most stressed.
59
 
 
And 
 
Liberalism universalism is at odds with value pluralism and must be rejected.
60
 
 
However, Gray says, based on the necessity of liberty in pluralism (e.g. the 
liberty to choose between conflicting values or to solve conflicts), he still 
believes that pluralism is another version of liberalism; but it is more a particular 
(or non-absolute) liberalism which allows people to choose illiberal values. Gray 
calls pluralism in his view ‘agonist liberalism’ (Gray’s idea will be spelled out 
in chapter 4). And if pluralism is liberalism (either as part of the traditional sort 
or in another version), pluralism tends to be a normative theory (PUT).  
 
There will be an analysis in chapter 4 to prove if pluralism is or can be another 
version of liberalism. This is done by taking the ideas of pluralism mentioned 
above and comparing them with the ideas of traditional liberalism. The analysis 
however turns out to be that pluralism and liberalism are significantly different 
from one another. And because of their differences, pluralism cannot be another 
version of liberalism.    
 
When they are independent from one another, it means that Berlin does not write 
pluralism in the way to combine it with traditional liberalism or to be another 
version of liberalism and to make it a normative theory or PUT. But he seems to 
merely present his idea of pluralism which might have some overlapping 
elements with liberalism.  
 
The proof that pluralism is independent from traditional or enlightenment 
liberalism will be spelled out in chapter 4.   
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The second step  
 
When we can say that pluralism is independent from both versions of liberalism, 
we now move to the second step, that is, to prove if pluralism is PUT or PPT or 
PMT as mentioned above.  
 
The evidences for PPT (pluralism as a particular theory)  
 
It seems that there are a number of indications in Berlin’s ideas of pluralism to 
imply and/or to support the claim that pluralism is PPT rather than PUT. The 
indications are:  
 
1) Incompatibility: When we can separate pluralism from the two versions of 
liberalism, we can see that the three theories’ main ideas conflict with one 
another (this will be spelled out in details in chapters 2 to 4). We might be able to 
say that pluralism is incompatible with them. And if they are incompatible, 
according to Berlin, we cannot reconcile them into one and the same theory 
while we cannot have all of them at the same time. 
 
2) Incommensurability: When the three theories are incompatible, they tend to 
be incommensurable as well. As mentioned earlier, Berlin does not believe in 
any universal ranking or reasoning. He also does not believe in any impartial 
method to judge between values. But that is the only way to judge and arrive at 
the one best answer to anything. Without an appeal to a universal ranking, there 
is no basis to judge even pluralism as the one best theory (PUT). Even if Berlin 
wants pluralism to be a universal theory, he does not have any basis at all 
(referring to his rejection of universal ranking) to support the position. Moreover, 
when Berlin judges values, he takes into account the contexts of values. With 
contexts, he seems unable to judge any one of them as better than the other or as 
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the supreme value. It is likely that he would judge theories in the same way, that 
is, to take into account the contexts of the theories. And the outcome would be 
that he is unable to judge any one theory as better than the other or being PUT, 
even pluralism.       
 
3) Equally worthy: when theories are incommensurable and Berlin seems 
unable to judge one as better, he tends to justify them (pluralism and the two 
versions of liberalism) as equally worthy as one another in the same way that he 
justifies ultimate values held in different contexts. He probably refers to the three 
ways that he uses to justify ultimate values as equally worthy to justify these 
theories as equally worthy as well. That is, he might justify them by their 
conceptions or by the respect and commitment people have for them or by the 
mutual understanding between people in the different contexts. The result is 
likely that the three theories are equal to one another.  
 
4) Particular theory: when they are equal to one another but we cannot have all 
of them at the same time (since they are incompatible as mentioned), it follows 
that we have to choose each of them according to context. Pluralism as one of the 
three must be chosen according to context as well. There should not be any 
exception for pluralism when pluralism is equally worthy to the other two. This 
can show that pluralism is a particular theory. Although there is no claim from 
Berlin saying directly that pluralism is a particular theory, all indications as 
already mentioned lead to the conclusion that it is a particular theory (PPT).  
 
Pluralism as a particular theory can be shown in picture as:  
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The evidences for PMT     
 
Since Berlin tends to believe that the three theories (pluralism and the two 
versions of liberalism) are equally worthy as one another, he might justify some 
other theories as equally worthy as these theories as well. For example, there are 
some indications that Berlin might justify multiculturalism and 
communitarianism as equal to pluralism as well. However, he does not accept 
every theory. For example, he claims not to accept relativism, utilitarianism 
and totalitarianism. To judge by the theories that he justifies and those that he 
rejects, it seems like Berlin refers to the objective human horizon to select or to 
justify them. This is because for the theories that he justifies such as the two 
versions of liberalism, multiculturalism and communitarianism, they are within 
the human horizon of non-violence and psychological conditions of 
understanding and empathy. But for relativism, it is not within the human 
horizon in that it does not have any justification of values, so it might allow 
violence or something beyond understanding and empathy to happen. 
Utilitarianism and totalitarianism, by their principles, can also lead to violence. 
While Berlin does not accept the theories that could lead to violence, it can be 
implied that Berlin refers to the human horizon to justify theories in the same 
way as he does with values.  
 
And if he refers to the human horizon to justify theories, it means his attitude or 
judgment of theories is according to the pluralist framework which accepts a 
Pluralism as PPT = equally 
worthy as the two versions of 
liberalism (enlightenment 
liberalism and counter-
enlightenment liberalism)  
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plurality of theories as equally worthy (including pluralism) so long as all are 
within the human horizon as the universal criterion. The pluralist framework in 
this case acts as a meta-theory (PMT), or the theory that Berlin uses to manage 
all acceptable theories. It should be noted that the term ‘theory’ means only the 
‘attitude’ towards political and ethical theories rather than having a formal 
meaning that involves the implication of the institutions.  
 
Pluralism as meta-theory can be shown in picture as:   
    
 
 
 
According to all the above indications, it is likely that pluralism is PPT and PMT. 
The detail of the two proofs (of PPT and PMT) will be spelled out in chapter 5.   
  
To conclude part 2, there are three possible positions for Berlin’s pluralism 
which are PUT (pluralism as universal theory), PPT (pluralism as particular 
theory) and PMT (pluralism as meta-theory). The PUT and PMT position would 
make pluralism collapse into monism while the PPT position would preserve its 
pluralist position. 
 
In order to know the exact position of pluralism, we need to look at Berlin’s 
writings. There are two separate strands to his writings which are the writings on 
Russian history and the writings on moral philosophy (or pluralism). The first 
Ultimate theories within the 
human horizon such as pluralism 
and the two versions of liberalism  
The theories unjustified by the 
human horizon such as  relativism 
and totalitarianism  
The whole picture is pluralism as meta-theory (PMT) 
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describes and praises three Russian thinkers who are found to be counter-
enlightenment liberals. The latter on the other hand describes the ideas of 
pluralism but seems to connect it with enlightenment liberalism. We need to look 
at both of them.  
 
Many scholars believe that pluralism is part of or another version of either side of 
liberalism: the enlightenment one or the counter-enlightenment one. And if 
pluralism is combined with either of them, it will be PUT or a universal theory.  
 
However, the assumption of the thesis is that the position of pluralism is not PUT 
since it is not combined with either side of liberalism. And it is more likely to be 
PPT since Berlin seems to rank pluralism as equally worthy as the two versions 
of liberalism (and some other theories). And, at the same time, it is likely to be 
PMT as well since Berlin seems to refer to the pluralist framework to manage all 
acceptable theories (including pluralism). The arguments to support this 
assumption will be made in the following chapters.    
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Chapter 2 Berlin’s Russian history  
 
As mentioned in the first chapter, the first piece of Berlin’s writing is on Russian 
history in which Berlin seems to present three Russian thinkers – Herzen, 
Tolstoy and Turgenev – as heroes or as superior to all other groups of 
intelligentsia, both the left (the socialists) and the right (the conservative 
liberals). Readers understand from their heroic position and aspects which 
overlap with Berlin’s pluralism that Berlin intends to present them as pluralists. 
And if Berlin actually presents them as pluralists and puts them on top of the 
ranking, it means that he intends to present pluralism as normative (or PUT).  
 
Put simply, the point to observe here is that while Berlin presents the three 
thinkers as superior to all other groups of intellectuals, does he intend to present 
them as pluralists? If he does intend that, it would lead to the conclusion that 
Berlin intends to present pluralism as a normative theory or PUT – through his 
description of the position of the three thinkers.  
 
This chapter will discuss Berlin’s descriptions of Russian history (how he 
interprets and/or decodes it) and his descriptions of the three thinkers (how he 
interprets their ideas). There will also be some inconsistencies between Berlin’s 
interpretation of Russian history and the interpretation of other historians. All 
observations in this chapter will be the background for analysing the position that 
Berlin actually gives to the three thinkers in the next chapter.  
 
Berlin’s writings on Russian history 
 
Most of Berlin’s writings on Russian history concentrate on the mid-nineteenth 
century. In his writings, Berlin does not refer to any theoretical or philosophical 
approach. He describes only some important incidents in the period and the roles 
of some Russian intellectuals. Most scholars therefore do not pay much attention 
to this historical piece of Berlin’s work as they consider them to be of little value 
to philosophy. However, if we read Berlin’s historical writings more carefully, 
we might realize that they do have some philosophical elements hidden in the 
historical contents.  
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Berlin starts describing Russian history from around 1840 in terms of various 
groups of ideas incompatible with one another spreading around the country.61 
Most of them came from a small group of Russian intellectuals (Berlin refers to 
them as the ‘intelligentsia’) who had the opportunity to get an education in the 
West, such as those who studied in France and Germany before returning to 
Russia with Western ideas (or ideals) in their heads. Later on, it became possible 
to divide these intellectuals and their followers into two groups: first were those 
who believed deeply in the ideals of Hegel and Marx and dedicated their life to 
achieving those ideals since they believed those ideals could resolve the 
problems in Russia. Second were those who opposed the first group by rejecting 
all socialist ideals and dedicated their life to achieving liberal ideals. Sometimes, 
Berlin categorises these intellectuals as of the ‘left’ and the ‘right’. By dedicating 
their life to their ideals, both sides are considered by Berlin as extremist groups. 
And it is obvious that these opposed sets of ideals circulating in Russia at that 
time were in conflict with one another.  
 
While he claims the ideas were in conflict in Russia at that time, his narrative 
seems to suggest that there are different levels among them which are as follows:  
 
First, the Russian empire of Tsar Nicolas I is at the lowest level as Berlin 
claims that the Tsar’s government did many harmful things to the people, 
including the impact of widespread corruption and the rejection of all freedom of 
speech. For example, he says 
 
[the year 1848] the gigantic straitjacket of bureaucratic and military control which, if not devised, 
was reinforced and pulled tighter by Nicolas I, appeared, despite frequent cases of stupidity or 
corruption, to be conspicuously successful.62  
 
                                                
61
 All references to Berlin’s Russian historical writing are taken from RT - Russian Thinkers 
(2008) and POI - The Power of Ideas (2000). 
62
 RT, 1 
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Or he seems desperate about the oppression on the part of the Tsar. He quotes 
Uspensky to describe the atmosphere of Russia at the time:  
 
‘one could not move, one could not even dream; it was dangerous to give any sign of thought 
[…] there was not a single point of light on the horizon…’
63
 
 
In general, Berlin seems deeply dissatisfied with the Russian government and 
believes that they are the cause of Russian’s backward condition at the time.  
 
Second, Berlin seems to put the two opposed sets of extremists, consisting of 
both left and right, on a higher level than the Tsar, while both seem to exist on 
the same level as one another. In this case, he seems to believe that the two 
groups aimed for  progress in Russia or tried to change the country for the better. 
Yet they were both limited as a result of the extremity of their beliefs and actions 
which finally resulted in violence. As Kelly points out:  
 
[for Berlin], both determinism [the left] and relativism [the right], he argues, are founded on 
fallacious, because one-sided, interpretations of experience.64  
 
The reason why their ideas led to violence was because they exaggerate Western 
ideas and make them more serious and/or extreme than the original. These 
extreme ideas were considered by Berlin as having their own unique style, or 
some people described them as in the ‘Russian style’. Berlin explains:  
 
Whatever the reasons, there is no doubt that ideas were taken more seriously and played a greater 
and more peculiar role, in Russian history than anywhere else.65  
 
And he says 
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 Kelly, LIB, 8.  
65
 POI, 70  
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…Chaadaev drew them: the weapons were ideas which whatever their origins, in Russia became 
matters of the deepest concern – often of life and death – as they never were in England or 
France…
66 
 
Berlin therefore sometimes calls them the ‘exaggerated westerners’.67 Kelly 
claims that they did not only exaggerate Western ideas to make them more 
extreme, they also distorted and misused them. Kelly says:  
 
[They] borrowed from the west and often misunderstood and misapplied. 
68  
 
In this case, they could agree with radical revolution or violent activities if that 
was the only way to achieve their ideals. Berlin explains the extremists:  
 
If violence was the only means to a given end, then there might be circumstances in which it was 
right to employ it…69 
 
This can also be seen as their ‘fanatical passion’ in ideals. It belonged to 
extremists of both sides and later became the characteristic of the Russian 
intelligentsia.  
 
Third, according to the negative effects of the extremists, Berlin situates the 
other group of Russian intellectuals, who were moderate in their ideas, at the 
highest level of all. Most notable among these intellectuals are three in particular 
– Herzen, Tolstoy and Turgenev – whose ideas, according to some of Berlin’s 
followers, have aspects in common with pluralism. Kelly, for example, 
understands that the three thinkers are pluralists as she mentioned Herzen:  
 
[for Berlin] only a consistent pluralism can protect human freedom from the depredations of the 
systematizers. Such a pluralism, he has pointed out, was fully articulated in the ideas of a thinker 
whose originality had hitherto been largely overlooked: Herzen’. 
70
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These three thinkers seemed to have similar ideas to one another which were, for 
example, to reject universal ideals, to refuse to join in with both extreme groups 
and to strongly disagree with the sacrifice of people’s lives for ideals.  
 
Herzen believed that there was no universal ideal or solution to all the problems 
in Russian society and that the search for a universal solution could lead to the 
destruction of people’s individual liberty.71 Tolstoy denied all the existing 
universal ideals since he believed that human beings had too limited a capacity to 
discover them and the existing knowledge that we all had so far was insufficient 
to conclude that anything was a universal ideal. Therefore, Tolstoy denied 
committing to any ideals at all.72 Turgenev  always asked all groups of the 
intelligentsia to compromise with one another and sometimes to compromise 
with the authoritarian order. He rejected all actions that could lead to radical 
revolutions or violence. These three intellects are Berlin’s heroes in his narrative 
of Russian history. He once refers to them as the ‘three moral preachers of 
genius’.73   
 
While it is clear that different levels exist in Berlin’s historical writings, there is 
no indication that he takes into account the contexts of each political group, the 
incommensurability or the parity of positions between them. What he does is to 
arrange them at different levels in relation to his own selected heroes.  
 
If we put Berlin’s historical narrative onto a chart, it would be as follows:  
 
[1 The final end] the moderate three thinkers  
[2 The middle rank] the extreme left – [on-a-par] – the extreme right  
[3 The lowest rank] the Russian empire, Tsar Nicolas I  
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It looks like Berlin intends to suggest that in the period there was also a group of 
moderate intellectuals who were independent from the two extremist groups and 
this moderate group was better or superior to all other groups.  
 
And by presenting the moderate group as the final end, if Berlin actually believes 
them to be pluralists as Kelly and some of Berlin’s followers claim, this would 
make it look like Berlin tries to present pluralism a normative or PUT.  
 
Before analysing whether Berlin intends to present the three thinkers as 
pluralists, it is worth turning to Berlin’s descriptions of each of them to see their 
main ideas and which Berlin emphasizes first, so we can analyse the exact 
position that Berlin gives them thereafter.  
 
Berlin’s three heroes  
 
While Berlin interprets the three thinkers as the leading group of the 
intelligentsia, it is not yet very clear if Berlin interprets them as pluralists. 
Sometimes the way Berlin describes them leads to the suggestion that they are 
pluralists, while other times he calls them liberals. Berlin is not consistent. The 
following will consider Berlin’s descriptions of each of them; how he reads 
them; and the elements that Berlin believes to be their main ideas.  
 
Berlin’s Herzen: a revolutionist without fanaticism  
 
For Berlin, Herzen seems to be the first hero (among the three) whom Berlin 
admires the most. Berlin says that Herzen always had in his mind the motivation 
to do something for the people or the country. He had a negative attitude towards 
the Tsar, in the same way as the rest of the intelligentsia. So he had performed a 
number of revolutionist activities to oppose the Tsar. For example, he established 
the first free anti-tsarist Russian paper ‘The Bell’. Although it was officially 
prohibited, it was very popular in Russia. And it was told that even the Emperor 
himself read it. He also wrote a number of novels. His most famous one was 
‘From the Other Shore’, which showed his opinions on the European revolutions 
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of 1848 and 1849. Herzen also supported Russian populism and supported the 
socialist peasant commune. As a result of these activities, he was considered a 
socialist. However, his first value was individual liberty rather than social 
welfare or community. Herzen admired Hegel greatly but interpreted Hegel in a 
different way from others. That is, he interpreted Hegel in his own unique way. 
Berlin says: ‘he turned his Hegelianism into something peculiar, personal to 
himself’.74 As a result, Herzen might not be a socialist as understood in the 
general term but had his own way of being a socialist. Berlin claims that, 
although Herzen was a close friend with Bakunin, he was not a socialist in the 
same way as Bakunin. He had his own way.  
 
Herzen’s most outstanding characteristic is that he refused to support all violent 
rebellions and this made him disagree with his close friend Bakunin. Berlin says: 
‘ [he was] even more against his own close friend Bakunin, who persisted in 
trying to stir up violent rebellion, involving torture and martyrdom, for the sake 
of a dim, confused and distant goal’.75 The following elements are what Berlin 
describes to be Herzen’s main ideas as a unique socialist:  
 
Liberty  
 
Herzen distrusted despotism the most so he distrusted the Russian regime the 
most as well. He says that people need freedom especially for self-realisation. 
Herzen says (according to Berlin’s description):   
 
Why is liberty valuable? Because it is an end in itself, because it is what it is. 76 
 
He believed freedom was an end. Therefore, his political goal was people’s 
freedom. And he seemed to have only one goal. Herzen says (according to 
Berlin’s description):  
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Herzen’s most constant goal is the preservation of individual liberty. 77 
 
Although Herzen was committed to freedom, he did not allow people to sacrifice 
their life for it. That is, for Herzen, freedom was not an absolute ideal. It was not 
superior to life and it was not worth giving up people’s life for. If we need to 
choose between freedom and life, Herzen certainly recommended choosing life 
over freedom. Herzen says (according to Berlin):  
 
The purpose of the struggle for liberty is not liberty tomorrow, it is liberty today, the liberty of 
living individuals with their own individual ends…
78 
 
In this case, we can interpret Herzen’s freedom as a particular value which could 
be sacrificed in some necessary cases especially to preserve people’s life.  
 
Therefore, although Herzen had performed some revolutionist activities in order 
to promote freedom, he did them very carefully so as not to sacrifice people’s life 
for it. The revolutions he had participated in can be seen as ‘careful revolutions’ 
which gave priority to people’s life over freedom.  
  
No absolute/ the subjectivity of values  
 
While Herzen was committed to freedom as his only political goal, he did not 
claim it was an absolute value; he always allowed the possibility of choosing 
other values apart from freedom in some cases. And this belief in the non-
absolute character of freedom makes him come closer to pluralism. Kelly 
explains Herzen’s idea:  
 
…given that individuals and cultures have frequently chosen values incompatible with political 
freedom, one cannot assert that liberal forms of life will always provide the optimal framework 
for human self-creation. One can answer only for one’s own culture and for oneself. 
79
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Herzen believed that the absolute character of values that the extremists of both 
sides believed in was just a dream or an illusion. There was no value prior to 
human beings. In other words, he did not believe in a priori values. What he 
believed was that human beings should create values for themselves. Kelly 
explains:  
  
He believed that values were not found in an impersonal, objective realm, but were created by 
human beings…
80
 
 
He even did not believe the peasant commune that he consistently supported  to 
be absolute. He said that it was the best political activity for achieving freedom 
but it might turn out to be ineffective in the future.  
 
…even the peasant commune did not, after all, as he pointed out, preserve Russia from slavery 
[…] we must try to do out best; and it is always possible that we shall fail. 81 
 
Particularity or contexuality  
 
Since Herzen rejected absolute ideals, he seemed to believe that all values were 
dependent on contexts or situations.   
 
Herzen wrote a novel called ‘Who is to Blame?’ […] the main point and what is most 
characteristic of Herzen is that the situation possesses, in principle, no solution.
82 
 
…for many it [contingency in nature] is a source of pessimism. Berlin, like Herzen, celebrated it 
as the ground of moral freedom. 
83
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He stressed the issue of contexts or situations quite often in his writings and 
claimed that the conception of freedom should be changed according to 
situations as well as one’s own experiences. That is, the conception of freedom 
should be changed if the environment in the world changed. Gavin explains 
Herzen’s idea:   
 
Man’s freedom then was not atomistic but rather consisted in the process of responding to the 
press of experience. 
84
 
 
Contexts or situations also influenced Herzen’s perspectives. That is, he changed 
his perspectives according to the situations or experiences in his life which 
frequently changed. Confino says:  
 
Life experience was this paramount in the formation of Herzen’s ideas, for they were always 
intimately connected to existential issues. The centrality of existential factors in the formation of 
Herzen’s ideas explains also, to a certain extent, the changes and fluctuations of his views over 
time and from one period to the next in connection with his personal and political life 
experiences.85  
 
No final solution  
 
As a result of his belief in contexts or situations, he claimed that there was no 
final solution to all the problems. Or, if there were solutions, they were many and 
none was the best solution of all. This was the aspect of Herzen’s ideas that was 
different from Hegel’s despite the fact that he admired Hegel greatly.  
 
The chief effect upon him of Hegelianism seems to have been the belief that no specific theory or 
single doctrine, no one interpretation of life, above all, no simple coherent well constructed 
schema […] could conceivably be true solutions to real problems…’ and ‘he was sceptical if only 
because he believed (whether or not he derived this view from Hegel) that there could not in 
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principle be any simple or final answer to any genuine human problem […] the answer could 
never be clear cut and neat.86  
 
Understanding  
 
Herzen tried to understand the ideas or groups of people who were opposed to 
him, and tried to see the positive side of opposed ideas or groups even though he 
did not accept them.  
 
…he had a unique insight into the inner feel of social and political predicaments and with it a 
remarkable power of analysis and exposition.87  
 
Compromise/no sacrifice  
 
Since he tried to understand opposing groups’ every idea, he suggested that we 
should compromise between all opposing ideas and tried to find the middle way 
between them. Berlin tells Herzen’s story of dilettantism [representing the 
liberals] and Buddhism [representing the extreme left] and says:  
 
Between these two poles it is necessary to find some compromise and Herzen believed that if one 
studied life in a sober detached and objective manner, one might perhaps be able to create some 
kind of tension, a sort of dialectical compromise between these opposite ideals.88  
 
In situations where there were conflicts between the extreme left and right, he 
rejected them both. He declared himself clearly not to support both of them but 
stayed in the middle ground between them.  
 
He is terrified of the oppressors, but he is terrified of the liberators too. 89 
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While staying in the middle, he encouraged both sides to enact revolutions or to 
change the country for the better by non-violent means. He distrusted violence 
and rejected radical revolutions that demanded people sacrifice their life. Berlin 
quotes Herzen:   
 
‘one must open men’s eyes not tear them out’
90
 
 
As mentioned earlier, Herzen was a close friend with Bakunin but he wrote a 
letter to Bakunin warning him not to use violent means to achieve his goal.  
 
His response […] addressed to Bakunin where he affirms the absurdity of the primitive faith in 
absolutes that had led in the past to emancipation by means of the guillotine, enlightenment 
through the whip.
91  
 
For Herzen, there was nothing more valuable than life itself. We should protect 
our  and the lives of others and not sacrifice them to any values or ideals. He 
admired the idea of egoism which asked people to value their life more than any 
other thing. Berlin explains Herzen:   
 
For Herzen ‘the goal of life is life itself’. 92  
 
And 
 
…he utters a great appeal for what he calls the value of egoism. He declares that one of the great 
dangers to our society is that individuals will be tamed and suppressed disinterestedly by idealists 
in the name of altruism, in the name of measures designed to make the majority happy.93 
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He claimed that the death of one person was equal to the death of a whole group 
of people. And the sacrifice of people’s life did not change the country for the 
better but for worse.  
 
The death of a single man is no less absurd and unintelligible than the death of the entire human 
race. 
94
 
 
And  
 
…[the sacrifice of life for ideals is] the replacing of an old tyranny with a new and sometimes far 
more hideous one…
95
 
 
Overall, he believed in the opposite approach to that favoured by most of the 
intelligentsia including the socialists who encouraged people to sacrifice their life 
for ideals.  
 
And this he maintains not merely against the Western socialists and liberals among whom he 
lived but even more against his own close friend…
96
  
 
Sense of reality  
 
Herzen had committed to a sense of reality so for him all the political activities 
that he performed must not serve abstract (or distant) ideals or the life (and 
liberty) of people in the next generations. Instead they should  improve the life 
(or liberty) of people in the present.  
 
Herzen embodies his central principle – that the goal of life is life itself, that to sacrifice the 
present to some vague and unpredictable future is a form of delusion.
97 
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And  
 
..one generation must not be condemned to the role of being a mere means to the welfare of its 
remote descendants.
98 
 
Berlin claims that Herzen was committed to a sense of reality more than other 
members of the intelligentsia at the time or even more than all other philosophers 
in general. So Herzen encourages other activists to enact change gradually and/or 
in a peaceful way.  
  
Herzen’s sense of reality, in particular of the need for, and the price of, revolution, is unique in 
his own, and perhaps in any, age.99 
 
And 
 
Progress must adjust itself to the actual pace of historical change…
100 
 
Other counter-enlightenment elements  
 
Apart from all the above, there seem to be other elements which Herzen was 
committed to which were close to counter-enlightenment ideas. The elements 
were for example the belief that there was no system or pattern to all things. 
There was no objective law but only passion.   
 
There are no timetable, no cosmic patterns; there is only the ‘fire of life’, passion, will, 
improvisation…
101
 
 
Herzen believed that rationality was false. Actually, Herzen used to believe in 
rationality. But when the revolution in 1849 broke out and people died, he 
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realised that the incident resulted from the intelligentsia’s deep commitment to 
rationality – the intelligentsia included him at the time – so he felt guilty and 
disappointed. Thereafter, he rejected rationality.  
 
Herzen had himself once believed in these foundations (although never with simple and absolute 
faith) and because this belief came toppling down and was utterly destroyed in the fearful 
cataclysms of 1848 and 1849 in which almost every one of his idols proved to have feet of 
clay...102 
 
Herzen also rejected all knowledge that came from metaphysical or philosophical 
theories. In fact, he rejected all academic doctrines as he believed that they could 
not help to resolve problems in the real world. There was no clear solution for all 
the world’s problems. His rejection of academic knowledge partly came from his 
sense of reality which preferred real life over distant ideals, doctrines or theories.  
 
My past and thought is dominated by no single clear purpose, it is not committed to a thesis; its 
author was not enslaved by any formula or any political doctrine […] he was among the very few 
thinkers of his time who in principle rejected all general solutions…103   
 
And  
 
…ethical doctrines [are] not fitted to the chaos of life.104 
 
To conclude, it seems that Herzen was a liberal in socialist’s clothes since 
individual liberty was his only political goal but he relied on socialist activities to 
achieve the goal. His position therefore can be either liberal or socialist or both. 
However, according to Berlin’s writings, apart from liberty, Herzen had also 
committed himself to subjectivity of values, contexts, compromise, a sense of 
reality and some counter-enlightenment elements. Some of these elements such 
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as contexts and compromise are close to Berlin’s pluralism. So Herzen can be a 
pluralist as well.  
  
Berlin does not make it clear what he believes him to be. We still cannot 
conclude now as to the position that Berlin gives him. That analysis will come in 
the next chapter.   
 
Berlin’s Tolstoy: a fox who wants to be a hedgehog 
 
Tolstoy is Berlin’s second preference among the three. Berlin admires Tolstoy to 
a large extent but seems to admire him less than Herzen. This might be because 
Tolstoy had conflict in his mind all the time. Berlin says that actually Tolstoy 
believed in a diversity of values (as close to pluralism) but he still wished there 
were an absolute truth somewhere. So he tried all his life to search for it.  
 
His famous novel was War and Peace. It was very well-known but received a 
number of criticisms as well. For example, Vasily Botkin says Tolstoy’s novel 
was ‘superficial’. And the critic Nikolay Akhsharumov says ‘it is fortunate for us 
that the author is a better artist than thinker’. 105 
 
Berlin seems to disagree with those critics. He admires Tolstoy’s works 
immensely and claims that they had a great influence on society and people. He 
says that there are two distinct parts in Tolstoy life. The first part concerns his 
role as an author while the second part is as the prophet of ‘personal and social 
regeneration’. It is his second part that is ‘regarded as important’. Berlin says 
‘there are philosophical theological ethical psychological political economic 
studies of the later Tolstoy in all his aspects’. 106  
 
For his personality, Tolstoy seemed to be reserved. He was not open to others. 
Moreover, he was sometimes aggressive. So he did not have many friends – 
especially writer friends.  
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According to Berlin, Tolstoy’s main ideas are:  
 
Liberty  
 
Tolstoy, like most of the intelligentsia, distrusted the Tsar’s regime. He was 
committed to individual liberty. Liberty seemed to be his ultimate value. But 
sometimes he claimed to admire some other values as well such as equality, 
justice and duty.   
 
…that men have a right to be free and also equal, are all eternal and absolute truths. 
107
 
 
The liberty that he was committed to however did not have a general sense. He 
had his own unique definition of freedom. It tends to be the freedom from all 
knowledge (Herzen seemed to have this definition as well since he also rejected 
abstract doctrines) and/or freedom to go back to nature.  
 
He believed in individual liberty and, indeed, in progress too, but in a queer sense of his own.
108 
 
Subjectivity  
 
Tolstoy also did not believe in absolute truths. He claimed that all truths were 
relative to contexts or situations. This is similar to Herzen. However, Tolstoy 
seemed to be more extreme than Herzen in that he rejected the existence of 
almost everything. Sometimes, he looked like a nihilist.  
 
We do not ourselves claim to base our education (or other forms of interference with human 
beings) on the knowledge of absolute truth, we must at least stop torturing others in the name of 
what we do not know.109  
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And  
 
…to see the truth […] as varying in different circumstances and times and places…
110  
Rejection of universal ideals, rationality, science, philosophy, and all theories  
 
Since he seemed to reject everything, Tolstoy claimed to reject all academic 
knowledge no matter whether universal ideals in philosophy or rationality and 
sciences. In fact, he rejected all existing knowledge of all subjects.  
 
But his conversations with the most advanced Western authorities on education, and observation 
of their methods, had convinced him that these methods were at best worthless, at worse 
harmful…111 
 
And  
 
…try to create rational patterns of life in accordance with rational theories is to swim against the 
stream of nature […] and torture human beings to fit social and economic systems against which 
their natures cry out.112  
 
For Tolstoy, knowledge especially from the West was worse. He believed that 
they taught in a way that distorted truths from what they were (in nature). He 
made fun of Western education in his novel – War and Peace.  
 
They have a confused and perfectly correct feeling that the schoolmaster wants them to say 
something unintelligible – that the fish is not a sigh – that whatever it is he wants them to say, is 
something they will never think of.
113  
 
Apart from the distortion of knowledge, Tolstoy believed that knowledge often 
dominated people’s minds or forced them to think and behave in specific ways. 
For Tolstoy, it was as bad as despotism. Since he distrusted despotism the most, 
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he distrusted academic knowledge at the same rate as well. In this case, he also 
distrusted  progressivists (such as the extreme left and right) who relied on their 
knowledge to develop the country.  
 
Certainly, the people’s condition will never be improved until not only the tsarist bureaucracy, 
but the ‘progressists’, as Tolstoy called them, the vain and doctrinaire intelligentsia, are prised off 
the people’s necks. 
114
 
 
Because of his rejection of knowledge, he believed that actual freedom of the 
individual consisted in being free from those doctrines or theories and went back 
to nature. By doing this, individuals would liberate their inner nature, realise 
their goodness and live in a complete harmony with the world. This is how his 
conception of freedom is different from the general one.  
 
Back to nature  
 
To say that Tolstoy distrusted the progressists is in fact to say he distrusted the 
intellectuals (who were likely to become the progressivists thereafter) since they 
acted as if they were superior to normal people. Moreover, Tolstoy believed that 
they taught people in the wrong way – to separate their life from nature or to live 
far away from nature and to find truths in knowledge or philosophy. In fact, all 
truths were in nature and we should return to live in nature in order to find them.  
 
The enemy is always the same: experts, professionals, men who claim special authority over 
other men.115  
 
And  
 
…simple people (peasants, Cossacks and so on) have a more natural and correct attitude towards 
these basic values than civilised men.116  
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No laws in history 
 
Tolstoy was interested in history and the problem of historical truths. He studied 
history to its root and realised that there was no such thing as the general laws of 
history as Hegel believed. That is, he did not agree with Hegel and Marx on the 
general laws that govern historical evolution.  
 
…in one of his letters he described Hegel’s writings as unintelligible…
117 
 
For him, history was unscientific and unsystematic. Things happened by accident 
rather than according to any laws of nature. But the historians tried to make them 
systematic so that they could fit them into the laws of nature. In this case, 
Tolstoy claimed that history was something historians made up. It was unreal.  
 
Everything is forced into a standard mould invented by the historian. 118 
 
And  
 
[He had] a feeling that history as it is written by historians makes claims which it cannot satisfy 
because like metaphysical philosophy it pretends to be something it is not – namely a science 
capable of arriving at conclusions which are certain. 119  
 
Tolstoy showed his view on the inauthenticity of history in his novel where the 
narrative was about the contrast between individual life and an unreal historical 
narrative. For him, history merely consisted in the narratives which historians 
created. For example, there were always heroes in history – some people who 
made incredible things happen – while Tolstoy claimed that in reality those 
heroes did not actually make the incidents happen. The incidents happened by 
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themselves; they happened accidentally, not by the actions or the decisions of 
heroes.   
 
The greater the claim, the greater the lie: Napoleon is consequently the most pitiable, the most 
contemptible of all the actors in the great tragedy. 
120
 
 
Self contradiction  
 
For Berlin, Tolstoy was a fox who wanted to be a hedgehog. That is he refused to 
believe in any absolute truths or the existence of them but at the same time he 
tried to search for them all his life. There was a contradiction inside him between 
the pluralist vision of reality and monist vision of reality. He seemed to be 
struggling with this contradiction all his life. Kelly says:  
 
He was thus constantly in contradiction with himself, perceiving reality in its multiplicity but 
believing only in ‘one vast, unitary whole’. 
121
  
 
Probably, Tolstoy was not aware of the contradiction. He probably did not know 
that he was a fox or he probably knew but did not accept it. He always believed 
himself to be a hedgehog.  
 
Tolstoy was himself not unaware of the problem, and did his best to falsify the answer. The 
hypothesis I wish to offer is that Tolstoy was by nature a fox, but believed in being a hedgehog; 
that his gifts and achievement are one thing and his beliefs and consequently his interpretation of 
his own achievement, another.
122 
 
Another reason why Berlin claims Tolstoy is a fox is because Tolstoy supported 
the idea of contextual or particular incidents rather than absolute or universal 
ones.  
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His genius lay in the perception of specific properties, the almost inexpressive individual quality 
in virtue of which the given object is uniquely different from all others. Nevertheless, he longed 
for a universal explanatory principle that is, the perception of resemblances or common origins, 
or single purpose…123 
 
With his intention to find truths, he believed that, if he rejected all the unreal 
properties in history and in knowledge (such as philosophy and sciences), he 
would finally discover the truths hidden in it. The result was that he destroyed or 
rejected everything but still could not find any truth in it.  
 
He certainly had no desire to destroy for the sake of destruction. What he desired, more than 
anything else in the world was to know the truth.
124  
 
And  
 
…always hoping that the desperately-sought-for real unity would presently emerge from the 
destruction of the shams and frauds. 125 
 
That was the reason why he does not believe in anything at all including history 
and philosophy or all the knowledge discovered previously. Tolstoy claimed that 
all existing knowledge was either false or insufficient to lead to truth. But he still 
believed, deep in his heart, that there might be absolute truths somewhere in the 
universe, and we might be able to know them one day in the future. This 
confirms the contradiction that his final goal – which was to find truths – was at 
odds with his dedication or his hard work which proved that there were no truths 
at all.  
 
Another contradiction was that, on the one hand, he was committed to individual 
liberty (and sometimes some other values such as equality, duty and justice) and 
he claimed it is necessary to educate people about this. But, on the other hand, he 
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claimed that we should throw away all values, theories and knowledge and go 
back to intuition and/or nature in which there should not be any teaching at all. 
Berlin questions:  
 
What there should be; on one side innocence, on the other education […] Tolstoy wavered and 
struggled all his life. 
126
 
 
It looks like Tolstoy had two contrasting opinions. He could be the dualist who 
was committed to 1) absolute truths at the same time as particular truths and 
committed to 2) education for people at the same time as rejection of education 
and a return to nature.  
  
Sense of reality  
 
Similarly to Herzen, Tolstoy had a sense of reality. But, for Tolstoy, the meaning 
seemed to be different from Herzen’s. That is, Tolstoy’s sense of reality was 
concerned more with life in nature over life in ideals or theories while, for 
Herzen, a sense of reality was concerned with the value of people’s life (in 
general, not necessarily in nature) over ideals.   
 
He had far more respect for all forms of real life […] than for the world of books, reviews, critics, 
professors, political discussions and talk about ideals…127  
 
With his admiration in natural life, Tolstoy believed that the only way to acquire 
knowledge was by observation (of nature) rather than by scientific method or 
rationality.  
 
The answer is about us everywhere […] if only we would not close our eyes or look everywhere 
but at what is there, staring us in the face, the clear, simple, irresistible truth. 
128
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And 
 
He believed that only by patient empirical observation could any knowledge be obtained; that this 
knowledge (through theories) is always inadequate, that simple people often know the truth better 
than learned men because their observation of men and nature is less clouded by empty 
theories…129  
 
Again, his belief in the sense of reality (and/or the observation of nature to 
acquire truths) was too strong to be compatible with his goal to search for 
unknown abstract ideals which tend to be beyond observation. There was no 
harmony between his belief and his goal but he seemed to be committed to them 
both.  
 
Compromise  
 
Like Herzen, Tolstoy hated wars and killing. Although some of his characters 
and ideas were similar to Maistre, he differed from him in that he did not support 
wars and killing while Maistre did support them.  
 
It is true that both Maistre and Tolstoy attach the greatest possible importance to war and conflict 
but Maistre, like Proudhon after him, glorifies war, and declares it to be mysterious and divine, 
while Tolstoy detests it…
130
 
 
Like Herzen again, he did not like the extremists. He denied joining in with them 
and condemned them in their political repression and violence.  
 
He paid visits to the literary salons, both right and left wing, but he seemed at ease in none of 
them. 
131
 
 
To conclude, it seems that Tolstoy held the positions of both pluralist and monist 
at the same time. He was a pluralist (according to Berlin) by his effort to show 
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that truths are particular while he was a monist by his deep belief in the existence 
of absolute truths hidden somewhere. Some people however might read him to 
be a nihilist due to his rejection of almost all knowledge and theories.  
 
According to Berlin’s writings, as presented above, Tolstoy was committed to 
liberty as his ultimate value. And he was also committed to the subjectivity (or 
the particularity) of values, the natural life (or intuition), a sense of reality (with 
respect to the life in nature) and compromise. He rejected all academic 
knowledge and the laws of nature (especially in history). This showed that 
Tolstoy’s main ideas were very close to Herzen’s. And some of them, such as the 
subjectivity (or particularity) of values, and compromise, are close to Berlin’s 
pluralism. While Berlin claims that Tolstoy occupied both positions (the pluralist 
and the monist) at the same time, we will analyse his real position, according to 
Berlin’s writings, in the next chapter.   
 
Berlin’s Turgenev: A compromise liberal  
 
Flexibility and compromise are the characteristics which Berlin stresses the most 
in his description of Turgenev. Turgenev was a gentle, charming and agreeable 
writer. He was also very cautious and frightened of all critical opinions on him. 
His friend, the poet Yakov Polosky, described him as ‘kind and soft as wax, 
feminine and without character’.132  
 
Turgenev did not want to get involved with politics but somehow his novels such 
as Fathers and Children had a significant influence on people’s political 
opinions including those of the intelligentsia. Berlin says: 
 
Turgenev as a pure artist drawn into political strife against his will…133  
 
His novel also influenced the political opinions of the extremists of both right 
and left. Berlin says: 
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This is enough in the first half of the century of what came to be known as the ‘superfluous man’, 
the hero of the new literature of protest… 134 
 
And because of his influence, the Russian government prevented him from 
entering the country for a period of time. 
 
Turgenev was in the same position as Herzen and Tolstoy in that he preferred to 
stand aside from the extremists and their extreme activities and preferred merely 
to observe situations rather than participating with either of them. Berlin 
describes the main ideas of Turgenev as follows:   
 
Liberty  
 
Turgenev admired Belinsky, a moralist who was committed to the unity of 
theory. Belinsky was the first and foremost seeker after liberty, justice and truth. 
Turgenev admired him so much that, whenever he felt discouraged in the fight 
for liberty, the spirit of Belinsky called him back to keep on fighting.  
 
The most passionate and influential voice of his generation was that of the radical critic Vissarion 
Belinsky. 
135
 
 
Following Belinsky, and similarly to Herzen and Tolstoy, Turgenev’s first value 
was liberty.  
 
James Bryce, who presented him, described him as a champion of freedom. 
136
 
 
And Turgenev himself claimed that he was a liberal.  
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I’m and have always been a ‘gradualist’, an old-fashioned liberal in the English dynastic 
sense…
137 
  
However he was a liberal in quite a different way from the Western ones. He was 
less confident in the value of freedom and he sometimes became critical or raised 
questions as to liberal values.  
 
His major novels from the middle 1850s onwards are deeply concerned with the central social 
and political questions that troubled the liberals of his generation.
138  
 
To judge by his less confident and more critical attitude to the value of freedom, 
Turgenev’s conception of freedom seems different from the general one – and it 
seems to be similar to Herzen’s and Tolstoy’s. That is, his conception of freedom 
seems to be the freedom acquired from the rejection of all doctrines, rationality 
and knowledge rather than a freedom based on them. That is, his freedom was 
the freedom from knowledge and rationality. This made him close to a nihilist. 
Turgenev says:  
 
Aristocracy, liberalism, progress, principles […] what a lot of foreign…and useless words. A 
Russian would not want them as a gift.
139
 
 
Moreover, like Tolstoy, Turgenev had the perspective that in order to establish 
any new things, we must first destroy everything. That is, we must clear the 
ground before building up new things. This was the revolutionist idea which he 
seemed to receive from Bakunin. Turgenev says:  
 
It is not our business [to build], first one must clear the ground [from his novel].
140  
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The revolutionist idea seemed to support the conception of freedom mentioned 
above. That is for Turgenev freedom meant to be free from all existing 
knowledge and rationality.  
 
Open minded/empathy  
 
Turgenev was fair to all groups of the intelligentsia including the groups that he 
did not agree with. He tried to understand them all and feel empathy for them all.  
 
Turgenev surpasses even Herzen in his dedication to understanding and empathy with different 
ideals and personalities, including those of the conservatives and the radicals whose views collide 
with his own. 
141
 
 
No absolute truth/the rejection of all knowledge  
 
Turgenev was sceptical about everything. He did not believe in any absolute 
ideal, truth or final solution to problems. For him, problems were complex and 
insoluble. Apart from the absolute ideal and solution, he also rejected all 
doctrines, theories, philosophy and religions. He seemed to believe like Tolstoy 
that knowledge was equally dangerous as despotism.  
  
…he could not rest comfortably in any doctrine or ideological system. All that was general, 
abstract, absolute repelled him.142  
 
Every thesis must be weighted against its antithesis, that systems and absolutes of every kind – 
social and political no less than religion – were a form of dangerous idolatry…143 
 
Turgenev also rejected Western ideas and knowledge. He believed that they 
could not fit in Russian society. For example, he says about socialism:  
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socialism is just as unreal and abstract as any other of the ‘isms’ imported from abroad
144 
 
And  
 
Aristocracy, liberalism, progress, principles […] what a lot of foreign and useless words. A 
Russian would not want them as a gift.
145  
 
Rejection of science and rationality  
 
The figure in Turgenev’s novel Fathers and Children who was called Bazarov 
had the character of a positivist who rejected everything that could not be proved 
by scientific and rational methods. For Bazarov, truth can be found only by 
observation and experiment. Other methods such as literature and philosophy 
were useless. Bazarov believed that we could not find any truths through them. 
Moreover, Bazarov believed that passion which was the core value in 
romanticism was ‘rubbish’.  
 
Truth alone matters: what cannot be established by observation and experiment is useless or 
harmful ballast – ‘romantic rubbish’ – which an intelligent man will ruthlessly eliminate.146  
 
Some readers infer from this novel that Turgenev was committed to science and 
rationality as the method to attain absolute truths. But later in the novel Bazarov 
falls in love and realises that sciences and rationality do not help him at all in his 
life but passion which he denied was more real (since it hurt him). 
 
In the end, he is incurably wounded by a love, by a human passion that he suppresses and denies 
within himself, a crisis by which he is humiliated and humanised. 
147 
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Therefore it was more likely that Turgenev did not agree with Bazarov’s 
commitment to science and rationality. Turgenev in fact rejected them and 
showed his rejection through the failure of Bazarov. As Katkov says: 
  
‘It is as if the author didn’t like him, felt lost before him and more than this was terrified of 
him’.
148  
 
And Berlin seems to know it as he says:  
 
Bazarov and his friends will discover nothing; they are not researchers, they are mere ranters, 
men who declaim in the name of science which they do not trouble to master; in the end they are 
no better than the ignorant...
149
 
 
Therefore, we can say that some of the intelligentsia was wrong in interpreting 
Turgenev as supporting science and rationality or as being a positivist while in 
fact he rejected them and showed this rejection in his novel.  
 
Compromise and moderation 
 
Compromise and moderation are the characters which Berlin stresses the most in 
his writing on Turgenev. It is as if they are his most outstanding characteristics.  
 
Like Herzen and Tolstoy, Turgenev rejected all actions that led to violence. He 
resisted all radical revolutions and suggested a slow progress to liberty instead. 
Crowder says:  
 
He went on telling the radicals that they were mistaken […] he said over and over again that he 
loathed revolution, violence, barbarism. He believed in slow progress made only by minorities, if 
only they do not destroy each other.150  
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As a result, he did not take sides with any of the extremists. He was a moderate; 
his position was somewhere between them. And he also held an intermediate 
position between the Tsar and the extremists. For his moderate position, he was 
criticised by both sides.  
 
he enjoyed remaining in an intermediate position, he enjoyed almost too much his lack of will to 
believe…151 
 
And  
 
He tried to please everyone.152  
 
And  
 
…no one in the entire history of Russian literature, perhaps literature in general, has been so 
ferociously and continuously attacked both from the right and from the left as Turgenev.153  
 
When he was criticised, he was upset. He could not tolerate the criticism. So he 
changed his opinions from time to time to please everyone. In fact, he never 
agreed with any of them since he had never agreed with the extreme views.  
 
He did, no doubt, adopt a different tone in writing to different correspondents.154  
 
And 
 
He wished to march with the progressives, with the party of liberty and protest. But in the end, he 
could not bring himself to accept their brutal contempt for art, civilised behavior…155 
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Berlin sometimes criticises Turgenev as well. For example, he says that 
Turgenev always wanted the young extremists to accept and respect him. So he 
sometimes wanted to fight against the Tsar together with them but he had lack of 
courage to do so. Also, he could not bring himself to accept their violent 
attitudes. Berlin says:  
 
he knew that he was accused of lack of depth or seriousness or courage.
156  
 
In this case, Turgenev also experienced conflict in himself. On the one hand, he 
wanted to join the extremists especially the right wing while on the other hand he 
resisted them.  
 
Sense of reality  
 
Turgenev also had a sense of reality as well. His sense of reality was more like 
Herzen’s than Tolstoy’s in that he valued real life over distant or abstract ideals. 
He did not support the sacrifice of life for ideals. And he did not believe in the 
absolute character or the certainty of anything, even of liberty. For him, values 
were relative to contexts or situations.   
 
His vision remained delicate, sharp concrete and incurably realistic.157  
 
To conclude, for Berlin, Turgenev was a very moderate person. He sometimes 
had problems both within himself and with others because of these 
characteristics. Regarding his position, it is quite clear from his own words that 
he was a liberal who had liberty as his first value. However, it seems that he was 
a liberal in a different way from the general definition of the term. That is, he 
was a liberal who often criticised the value of freedom for its failure to  be an 
absolute truth. And he aimed instead at freedom as being away from distant 
ideals and rationality rather than freedom that is based on them. In this case, like 
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Tolstoy, some people might read him as a nihilist due to his rejection of absolute 
truths and all knowledge, especially science and rationality.  
 
According to Berlin’s writings, Turgenev was committed to liberty, empathy, 
compromise and a sense of reality (with respect to the value of real life over 
ideals). And he rejected the existence of absolute truths and academic knowledge 
especially science and rationality. This showed that Turgenev’s main ideas were 
very close to Herzen’s and Tolstoy’s. And some of them, such as the lack of 
absolute values, empathy and compromise, are close to Berlin’s pluralism. We 
will take this information to analyse his real position, together with the positions 
of Herzen and Tolstoy, in the next chapter.   
 
The opinions of Berlin’s followers  
 
Berlin claims that the three thinkers are his ‘heroes’. For example, in his 
writings, he refers to them as ‘three moral preachers of genius’.158 Whether or 
not Berlin believes them to be pluralists, he deeply admires them or their ideas.  
 
Kelly claims that what Berlin admires in them is the fact that they did not join in 
with any of the extremists but were sensitive to both sides. Kelly says:  
 
The Russian thinkers whom Berlin most admired were strangers to this kind of one-sidedness. He 
shows how, for historical reasons, they shared a pressing concern with the application of moral 
principles to concrete situations, which made them unusually sensitive to the competing claims of 
reason and feeling…’
159 
 
As mentioned earlier, some of the main ideas of the three thinkers are close to 
pluralism. So Berlin’s followers such as Kelly, Crowder and Confino interpret 
the three thinkers as pluralists. Kelly  believes that Berlin writes Russian history 
as a sample to show the conflicting relationship between the monists (represented 
by the extremists of both sides) and the pluralists (represented by the three 
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thinkers) while he concludes in the narratives that the pluralists are superior to 
the monists. Kelly says: 
 
…they give him a way of discussing hedgehogs and foxes that avoided the risk of reductiveness. 
[…] hence their value as a rich source of concrete examples for Berlin’s discussion of the 
motives and consequences of monist and pluralist approaches to history and human life. 
160
 
 
Crowder believes that Berlin writes Russian history in order to express his own 
opinion in political philosophy. That is, Berlin wants to say that radical 
revolutions or any activities that could lead to violence are all unacceptable while 
a moderate attitude or peaceful revolutions such as those of the three thinkers 
should be encouraged.  
 
It is there that he works out or confirms some of his most characteristic themes […] the rejection 
of both reaction and revolution in favour of gradualism, and the idea that the liberal modes of 
caution, moderation and compromise should be seen not as weakness in politics but as 
strengths…
161
 
 
Confino believes that Berlin describes himself or his own position through his 
descriptions of Herzen. That is, for Confino, Herzen’s position is what Berlin 
wants people (or his readers) to understand in himself. Confino says:  
 
One has the impression that very often in writing about Herzen, Berlin is speaking about himself, 
or at least indicating how he would like to be perceived by others. 
 
And 
 
Similar passages abound in Berlin’s writings, and I wonder if in some of them, Sir Isaiah was 
providing food for the thought that he, perhaps unconsciously, was depicting himself’.162  
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Despite the above opinions from his followers, Berlin himself does not make it 
clear that he intends to present the three thinkers as pluralists or as his 
representatives. But if Kelly, Crowder and Condino are right; if Berlin intends to 
make them pluralists (or his representatives) and puts them on top of the ranking, 
this would make it look like Berlin tries to present pluralism as a universal theory 
or PUT through them.  
 
However, Berlin does not make it clear so it might or might not be true. Perhaps, 
Kelly, Crowder and Confino misinterpret Berlin since they see some overlapping 
ideas between the three thinkers and Berlin’s pluralism. The analysis of Berlin’s 
actual view will be in the next chapter. So far, what is clear is only that Berlin 
admires the three thinkers (especially Herzen) deeply and ranks them as superior 
to all other groups of the intelligentsia.  
 
Russian history by other historians – main focus: Gary Saul Morson 
 
The other historian who describes Russian history in the same period as Berlin 
(19th century), Gary Saul Morson, however interprets Russian history quite 
differently from Berlin. Among the differences, there are some similarities as 
well. For example, like Berlin, Morson believes that Russian writers such as 
Tolstoy and Turgenev rejected the existence of universal ideals and believed 
instead that all values are particular or subjective to contexts or situations.  
 
The novel (of Chekhov) is above all a genre that deals with the particulars of experience, and so it 
became a tool directed at the abstractions of ideological thinking. 
163
 
 
Like Berlin, Morson also claims that these writers rejected any actions that could 
lead to violence and/or the sacrifice of people’s life for ideals.  
 
[for Herzen] Willing to sacrifice real people for the sake of a theoretical goal, the intelligent 
becomes the cruelest tyrant of all. 
164
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However, there are some main differences between Morson and Berlin which 
are:   
 
1) For Morson, the three thinkers (as well as some other writers with similar 
roles to them such as Chekhov, Bakhtin, Fyodor Dostoyevsky and so on) are 
merely the novel writers and/or the sceptics who are sceptical about the ideas of 
the intelligentsia but they themselves are not the intelligentsia. The intelligentsia 
and/or the Russian philosophers, for Morson, are the extremists of both sides 
who are committed to the universal ideals, philosophy and theories such as those 
of Hegel and Marx. And, for Morson, the three thinkers are not the heroes in 
Russian history. They are just the sceptics who are equal in their dignity to the 
intelligentsia. Morson says:  
 
An intelligent was expected to adhere to a particular set of beliefs.
165
  
 
If we put Morson’s historical narrative onto a chart, it would be as follows:  
 
[1 The superior rank] the extreme left and right [on-a-par] the sceptic three 
thinkers  
[2 The lower rank] the Russian empire, Tsar Nicolas I  
 
Apart from Morson, in addition, Russian people in general seem to believe in the 
opposite approach to Berlin’s. That is, they believe that the extremists, especially 
the left, were heroes who attempted to rescue Russian people from the Tsar and 
proposed a new socialist theory which brought enlightenment to Russian people. 
Kelly says:  
 
Berlin approach to Russian thought contrasts sharply with the dominant tendency in the 1950s 
and 1960s […] Soviet historians exalted the pre-revolutionary radical intelligentsia as 
enlighteners and precursors of scientific socialism…166 
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2) While Berlin focuses on the three thinkers’ political roles, Morson does not 
mention their political roles. He claims that their main roles were to present their 
philosophy of life (personal, non-political) through their novels. For example, 
Morson says that the three thinkers tried to show in their novels that real life is 
meaningless in the same way as life in the novels. It has a lack of purpose and it 
cannot be planned or plotted. Therefore, it always surprises us. Even the authors 
who write the novels (whom we can compare to the people who try to navigate 
their life) do not know where and how life will end. The authors such as Tolstoy 
and Turgenev claimed that instead of the big goals or the universal ideals, it is 
the small incidents or the small experiences that navigate life. Morson writes of 
Zosima, the figure in The Brother Karamazov:  
 
Zosima explains that one does not have to know the consequences of good acts to believe in 
them, for each small act of good or evil shapes another small act in an endlessly complex 
concatenation of causes and influences beyond human view. 
167
 
 
Moreover, every part of life does not necessarily connect with one another nor is 
it necessarily consistent. They are often independent and sometimes conflicting 
with one another.  
 
Tolstoy promised that he would write so that each part of the work would have ‘an independent 
interest…which would consist not in the development of events but in development [itself]. 
168
 
 
There are no key events or key persons in real life. All are equally important to 
one another. This is different from the historical narratives in which the 
historians always invent the key events or key persons (i.e. heroes) in their 
narratives. Morson says:     
 
His (Dostoyevsky) novels proceed by allowing for many possible stories, a sea of rumors and as 
in the Devils, the refusal to specify even the key events, what did actually happen. 
169
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Overall, for Morson, the three thinkers (and some other writers) do not have 
political roles so much as concerns with the philosophy (of life) and history. This 
is quite different from Berlin’s view.  
 
3) Berlin focuses only on the three thinkers (classifying them as the leading 
group among the intelligentsia) while Morson does not select only these three. 
He mentions the works of Tolstoy and Turgenev but also Chekhov, Bakhtin, 
Fyodor Dostoyevsky (and some more) while mentioning very little of Herzen. It 
is as if Herzen were less significant in comparison with other Russian writers. 
This shows that Berlin’s selection of heroes is his personal view rather than a 
general view.  
 
4) While Berlin’s reading of the three thinkers focuses mostly on their political 
ideas and this makes his followers such as Kelly, Crowder and Confino 
understand them as pluralists, Morson on the other hand compares the three 
thinkers to the existentialists rather than pluralists. He claims that the three 
thinkers’ ideas are close to the existentialists.  
 
[the intelligentsia] are closer to Edmund Burke than to Hegel. Among Western thinkers, some 
existentialists and especially Wittgenstein were closest in spirit to the Russian novelists they 
admired.
170
  
 
There are other historians who also claim that the three thinkers are 
existentialists. For example, Davidson also claims Herzen as an existentialist by 
his emphasis on passion. He says:  
 
[Herzen] could not see that being right depended on anything other than believing what one did 
with the utmost passion
171  
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He quotes Herzen:  
 
‘does the mind need any other criterion than itself?’
172  
  
So he believes that Herzen was an existentialist.  
 
There has not previously been sufficient emphasis on the existentialist nature of these ideas in 
Herzen. Although his place in the history of Russian political thought is secure enough, he 
deserves a place also in any account of existentialism.173 
 
Lavrin claims that Tolstoy was like Nietzsche. He was an existentialist who 
relied on philosophy to cure his inner suffering from self-division. His self-
division was that he wanted to believe in something (such as God) and he had a 
strong will to believe in it but at the same time he refused to believe in anything 
at all in order to have freedom of mind. His philosophy is used to cure this self-
division. It was therefore more about psychology than politics. In other words, 
his philosophy is more about private issues rather than public issues.  
 
Their [Tolstoy and Nietzsche’s] principles were important to them not in so far as they were 
‘true’, but in so far as they proved an efficient means against their own self-division. 
174
  
  
Berlin however does not analyse Tolstoy as being similar to existentialists such 
as Nietzsche or analyse him in this psychological way but only in a political way. 
As to personal issues, he mentions only that Tolstoy became a Christian when he 
wanted to search for the truths in nature.  
 
This shows how differently (from Berlin) the other historians read Russian 
history in the 19th century. Morson’s reading is only an example to show that 
Berlin’s view of Russian history is quite personal. It is not the general view, 
firstly, to select the three thinkers to be on top of the ranking or to be the heroes 
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of the intelligentsia. For some historians, the three thinkers might not even be 
considered as the intelligentsia at all. Or, they might be existentialists who did 
not have any political roles at all. Finally, some of Berlin’s selected thinkers such 
as Herzen might not have any significant roles (even in literature) in other 
historians’ views. The interpretation of Russian history and the intelligentsia can 
vary.   
 
The overall picture of Berlin’s Russian history  
 
From all the above, the overall picture of Berlin’s Russian history is that there 
are hierarchical rankings among the groups of intelligentsia and the supreme one 
is the moderate group represented by the three thinkers. Berlin interprets the 
three thinkers quite similarly to one another. That is, they are all committed to 
elements such as liberty, subjectivity or particularity of values, compromise, the 
sense of reality, the rejection of knowledge, doctrines and theories.  
 
The other historians on the other hand interpret them quite differently. For 
example, they interpret them merely as writers or sceptics, not as among the 
intelligentsia and having significant roles in Russian politics. They rank them as 
equal to the extremists of the left and the right. Some historians classify them in 
the group of the existentialists (and/or the nihilists) who are more concerned with 
personal issues, passions and cultures than politics. The differences between 
Berlin’s reading and other historians’ readings mean that Berlin’s reading is 
more of a personal view than a general view. This might be because he is 
personally interested in ethics or politics so he interprets them in an ethical or 
political way while the other historians interpret them more straightforwardly.  
 
Or, it might be because Berlin selects only some of their main ideas that he 
personally admires to present in his writings, such as their rejection of a single 
universal ideal and their rejection of extreme beliefs that could lead to radical 
revolutions and violence. His selection of their main ideas which he presents in 
his writings portrays them as closer to pluralists. But does Berlin actually intend 
to present them as pluralists? It is not clear if he does intend that. And it is not 
necessary that he should intend that.  
 89 
 
His followers such as Crowder and Confino claim that Berlin intends to explain 
his own position through these three thinkers. That is, he does not intend to 
explain the real them or the real incidents in Russia. History is merely the 
medium that he uses to explain himself instead of using himself (or his writings) 
as the medium for history to pass through the readers. And, if this is true, it 
means that Berlin presents the three thinkers as pluralists. And it means that he 
intends to present pluralism (through the three thinkers) as a universal theory or 
PUT.  
 
To conclude, this chapter presents Berlin’s interpretation of Russian history and 
the three thinkers – the way he reads and decodes them and how they appear 
different from their depiction by other historians. And if he means that the three 
thinkers are pluralists, pluralism (as on top of the ranking) would become a norm 
or PUT. But does he actually mean that? Do his descriptions of the three 
thinkers’ ideas all correspond to his descriptions of pluralism? These questions 
will be clarified in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 3 Analysing the three thinkers 
 
This chapter will analyse the positions that Berlin gives to the three thinkers – 
Herzen, Turgenev and Tolstoy – whose philosophical ideas were discussed in the 
previous chapter. The analysis will be preformed by comparing Berlin’s ideas of 
pluralism with his descriptions of the three thinkers. The result will turn out to be 
contrary to the claims made by Berlin’s followers. That is, Berlin does not 
believe them to be pluralists, and he in fact holds them to be liberals.  Although 
he admires them enough to position them beyond the other groups of the 
intelligentsia, his account is not intended to make them the representatives of 
pluralists or of himself.  
 
The analysis will also show that Berlin seems to categorize the three thinkers in 
the counter-enlightenment group as being similar to Vico and Herder: figures 
that Berlin admires, but whose positions are not entirely commensurable with 
pluralism. Overall, this chapter will show that the three thinkers are ‘counter-
enlightenment liberals’ who are significantly distinct from Berlin’s account of 
pluralists. And when Berlin does not present them as pluralists but as counter-
enlightenment liberals, it means that Berlin does not intend to present pluralism 
as the norm or PUT in his Russian history.       
 
Analysing the three thinkers’ position 
 
As we saw in the previous chapter, the works of Herzen, Tolstoy and Turgenev, 
according to Berlin, possess some different elements from one another, but 
nonetheless share similar core ideas. These similarities render it tenable to 
analyse their positions together with one another.  
 
In order to do so, it is worthwhile to first recall the claims made by other 
historians, such as R.M. Davidson, who claim that the three thinkers are either 
similar to or in fact are existentialists. It is true that the three thinkers share some 
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common ground with the existentialists. For example, the latter175 make claims 
as to the insufficiency of such forms of human knowledge as natural science, 
philosophy and morality, including rationality. The existentialists ask us instead 
to focus on the inwardness of human existence, such as intuition and passion, in 
order to judge the right or wrong of a specific situation. That is, they ask us to 
avoid the use of philosophical and or moral reasoning, and recommend that we 
rely instead on intuition and passion. Kierkegaard, for example, provides the 
conception of ‘the single individual’176 which asks us to reflect the true self by 
ignoring traditional philosophy. He says that to follow philosophy, such as 
morality and religions, or to follow the rule of ‘what I ought to be’ in order to 
have a meaningful life, is to sacrifice the true self; the results of such a sacrifice, 
he claims, are not worth the loss that it requires. The true self, for Kierkegaard, is 
within the inwardness and must come before any philosophical or moral 
knowledge. The 'single individual', he claims, is 'higher than the universal’, and 
the ‘subjective is the truth’.177 If we now consider Herzen, Tolstoy and 
Turgenev, we can see that they also make claims as to the insufficiency of such 
forms of human knowledge as natural science and philosophy. Actually, they go 
so far as to reject all (intellectual) knowledge: Tolstoy, for example, claims 
(through Berlin’s description) that ‘men crave for truth by nature; therefore true 
education must be of such a kind that children and unsophisticated, ignorant 
people will absorb it readily and eagerly. But to understand this, and to discover 
how to apply this knowledge, the educated must put away their intellectual 
arrogance, and make a new beginning’.178 The three thinkers also make claims 
as to the inwardness of human existence and the reflection of the self. It thus 
seems that the three thinkers share a number of ideas with the existentialists. 
However, Berlin does not describe their positions as existentialist in his writings. 
This is probably because his interest is more in ethics and politics, whilst 
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existentialism is more of a cultural movement (around 1940s to 1950s) that was 
initially restricted to Sartre's philosophy alone. Although in later years the term 
was extended to include other philosophers as well, such as Simone de Beauvoir, 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Albert Camus, it is still not an identifiable 
philosophical position. This might be the reason why Berlin does not make any 
claim to connect the three thinkers with existentialism.  
 
Setting aside the existentialist position, Berlin seems to provide his readers with 
only two ways of interpreting the three thinkers: that is, they are either pluralists 
or liberals. In his writings, he sometimes calls them ‘pluralists’; at others, he calls 
them ‘liberals’. The positions that he gives them, in this case, are inconsistent. 
For example, Berlin sometimes describes Herzen as a liberal when pointing out 
that Herzen’s final goal is liberty. He describes Herzen’s position as follows: 
‘why is liberty valuable? Because it is an end in itself, because it is what it is’.179 
And Berlin sometimes says that Tolstoy is a pluralist (he uses the term ‘fox’) as 
he says: ‘the hypothesis I wish to offer is that Tolstoy was by nature a fox, but 
believed in being a hedgehog’.180 As regards Turgenev, he is, in Berlin’s view, a 
liberal most of the time, since Berlin quotes Turgenev’s words in his writings as 
follows: ‘I am, and have always been, a ‘gradualist’, an old-fashioned liberal in 
the English dynastic sense…’. 181 However, throughout his descriptions of the 
three thinkers, Berlin inconsistently refers to them as ‘pluralists’ and ‘liberals’ 
substitutively. It seems that he invites his readers to adopt both ways of 
interpreting them, and that he casts both interpretations as being equally valid. 
 
When looking closely at Berlin’s descriptions of the three thinkers, however, we 
will see that although the three thinkers share some similar elements with 
pluralism (for example, they also believe that values are contextually dependent, 
and recommend the compromise between values), these similarities are not 
sufficient for us to classify them as pluralists. There are a number of differences 
between the three thinkers’ main ideas and those of the pluralists, and these 
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differences are irreconcilable. The following section will attempt to make the 
differences more obvious. It will do so by contrasting the main ideas of pluralism 
with those of the three thinkers. The pluralist ideas will be presented first.  
 
Berlin’s explanation of pluralism  
 
Actually, the ideas of pluralism have been explained and discussed fully in 
chapter 1, but I will present some key points here as they can be contrasted with 
the positions taken by the three thinkers under discussion here. These points are 
a) the diversity of ultimate values; and b) the compromise between them.  
 
a) The diversity of ultimate values – in pluralism, there must be at least two 
ultimate values (or a greater diversity of them) judged as ultimate by the different 
contextual rankings. Ultimate values can be either the neutral values judged as 
ultimate in different contexts, such as the two concepts of liberty, or they can be 
cultural values judged as ultimate in the different cultures. 
 
These ultimate values are often incompatible with one another in the sense that 
we cannot reduce them, by ignoring their different roles in the different contexts, 
into the same group or category. Berlin says: 
 
…two incompatible outlooks; […] which differed, not in all respects – for they were all human, 
but in some profound irreconcilable ways, [were] not combinable in any final synthesis. 182  
 
Not only are they incompatible and irreconcilable, they are often 
incommensurable, in the sense that there is no universal criteria as agreed by all 
cultures to compare and judge one value as being better than another. Regarding 
their incommensurability, Berlin explains:  
 
Each (society/culture) has its own gifts, values, modes of creation, incommensurable with one 
another: each must be understood in its own terms. 183 
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Since the ultimate values are incommensurable due to the lack of universal 
criteria, they can be judged only relatively in the different contexts. And although 
they are judged relatively as ultimate in the different contexts, Berlin seems to 
deem it sufficient that they are equally worthy of pursuit, or equally ultimate to 
one another. Berlin says:  
 
We are urged to look upon life as affording a plurality of values, equally genuine, equally 
ultimate, above all equally objective; incapable, therefore, of being ordered in a timeless 
hierarchy, or judged in terms of some one absolute standard.
184 
 
There are three different ways to explain how it is possible for two values to be 
‘equally ultimate’. One way is to say that the two values are equally ultimate by 
their conceptions. That is, the conceptions of values in themselves are equally 
ultimate to one another. For example, negative liberty and positive liberty are 
equally ultimate to one another by their conceptions. We cannot refer to any 
universal reasons to judge one as better than the other. The role of universal 
reasoning is limited in this case. Even if we are in the Original Position where all 
biased factors are excluded, we still cannot refer to any universal reasons to 
judge between them. Chang calls this ‘equally ultimate’ position between the two 
values as ‘on-a-par’. She explains that even if we put a small improvement in 
one, we still cannot make it better than the other. In this case, they are on-a-par.  
 
If items are neither better nor worse than one another, and yet a small improvement in one does 
not make it better than the other, the items are on a par.
185
  
 
Consider the two concepts of liberty: even if we increase a small amount in one, 
we still cannot make it better than the other. The same result would happen with 
the comparison between freedom and equality.  
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Another way to explain how two values can be equally ultimate is that they are 
equally ultimate by their cultures. That is, they are judged relatively as ultimate 
in their cultures. And even though we might be able, in some ways, to compare 
between them, we avoid doing so since we respect both cultures equally. That is, 
the cultures are what we respect and this prevents us from comparing the values 
belonging to them. And, by avoid comparing them on any ranking, we just grant 
them as equally ultimate to one another.  
 
By Berlin’s own explanation, he claims that values can be equally ultimate to one 
another by mutual understanding. That is, for Berlin, we all have the ability to 
‘enter into’ the life of other people (by using imagination) and to thereby 
understand and feel empathy for them, no matter how different those lives are 
from our own. And when we can understand the life of another, we can also 
justify their values as being ultimate in the same way that they do. It follows 
from this that we can justify others’ values as equally ultimate to our values. This 
process of understanding between people makes it possible for values that derive 
from different cultures to become ‘equally ultimate’ to one another. Berlin says:  
 
…the way of life which, no matter how different from our own, normal men could find it natural 
to pursue, such ways of life as we, armed as we are, with the capacity to perceive the 
(objectively) good, beautiful and just, in all their guises and transformations, should not find it 
too strange to pursue in similar conditions, even if we do not ourselves accept them.
186
      
  
It is clear from the above that for Berlin, the ultimate values, judged relatively as 
ultimate in the different contexts/cultures, can be approved as ‘equally ultimate’ 
to one another, without the need to refer to any universal ranking. And the 
reasons why he approves the equally ultimate status between them can be one of 
the three reasons mentioned above or all of them. As a result there are at least 
two (but up to a diversity) of ultimate values, judged relatively in the different 
contexts or cultures, but justified as equally ultimate to one another in pluralism.   
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However, he does not accept everything and adopts a relativist position. From the 
above quotation, Berlin does not only describe values as equally ‘ultimate’, but 
equally ‘objective’ as well. And this ‘objective’ status of values comes from the 
objective part in pluralism. That is, for Berlin, all justified values in pluralism, no 
matter how diverse and relative to contexts/cultures they are, must be within the 
scope of ‘the human horizon’. This human horizon, from Berlin’s claims, seems 
to consist of two necessary conditions: the first one is the moral ‘central core’; 
the second is the psychological conditions.  
 
1) Berlin just plainly claims that there is a ‘central core’ of moral conception in 
which all human beings share, and contends that all justified values in pluralism 
must satisfy this conception. Berlin says:  
 
There are, if not universal values, at any rate a minimum without which societies could scarcely 
survive. 
187 
 
We might be able to understand Berlin’s central core by investigating the values 
that he excludes. They are, as Berlin seems to distress, extremism, violence, 
killing and war. Berlin says:   
 
Few today would wish to defend slavery or ritual murder or Nazi gas chambers or the torture of 
human beings for the sake of pleasure or profit or even political good […], or mindless 
killing.188 
 
The quotations show that the values that belong to totalitarianism, despotism, 
Nazism, Cannibalism or other violent groups and cultures do not satisfy the 
central core conception, and as a result they are not justified by Berlin’s 
pluralism.  
 
Therefore the central core or the minimum morality means, to put it simply, 
‘non-violence’. Apart from the ‘non-violent’ elements, there seems to be no other 
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values even freedom or equality that all or most people have accepted 
historically.   
 
2) Values in pluralism are not only required to satisfy the moral core conception, 
but must in addition fall within the scope of human psychological conditions, and 
thus not beyond them. The psychological conditions that restrict the values in 
pluralism seem to consist of ‘imagination, understanding and empathy’. That is, 
the values in pluralism must be something that we can imagine, understand and 
feel empathy for. Berlin explains the latter as follows:   
 
Both thinkers [Vico and Herder] advocate the use of the historical imagination, which can enable 
us to ‘descend to’ or ‘enter’ or ‘feel oneself into’ the mentality of remote societies; thereby we 
understand them…
189 
 
If we cannot do so, then these values will not be justified. In this case, the values 
such as the cultural ones which appear to be illusions or to be too fantastical, 
such as that of the Nazis or the Cannibals, would not be justified in pluralism.      
 
We are called upon to exercise our imaginative powers to the utmost; but not to go beyond them; 
not to accept as authentic values anything that we cannot understand, imaginatively ‘enter’ into. 
190 
 
Or Hardy explains them as the psychopath:  
 
The psychopath or ‘pin-picker’ is the figure Berlin often used to illustrate what he meant by 
attitude and/or behaviour that would fall outside the human horizon.
191
  
 
These two conditions help pluralists screen out the unacceptable values such as 
the extreme, violent values, and make the doctrine distinct from relativism as 
Berlin says:  
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I believe relativism to be false on both grounds…
192
  
 
Taking the two conditions (or the human horizon) into account, the diversity of 
ultimate values which are contextually or culturally relative must, as mentioned 
earlier, satisfy the central core of non violence, and must be within the scope of 
the psychological conditions of understanding and empathy. Put simply, those 
contextually and culturally relative values must satisfy the conditions of Berlin’s 
objective human horizon. This is why Berlin says they are all ‘objective’.   
 
With this objective part, it means there is, to some extent, the use of a universal 
criteria (i.e. a reference to the human horizon) which results in some rankings of 
values within pluralism. That is, the universal criterion of the human horizon 
divides values into two levels: the ‘acceptable values’ (the ones which satisfy the 
moral and psychological conditions), and the ‘unacceptable values’ (the ones 
which do not satisfy them). Among the acceptable ones, some, if not all, are 
judged independently or relatively as ‘ultimate’ in the different cultures. All of 
them, Berlin claims, are equally worthy as one another. As a result, there is 
another ranking – that of ultimate values – beyond the acceptable values.   
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The implication of the explanations set out above is that there must be at least 
two ultimate values (but up to a diversity of them) on the ‘ultimate’ rank within 
pluralism.     
 
2) The compromise and sacrifice between ultimate values – while there are at 
least two ultimate values in pluralism, usually conflicting with one another, it is 
necessary for pluralists to compromise between them. The compromise is that of 
moderating the conception of each ultimate value, so that they are able to exist 
together. For example, if we modify the definitions of liberty, equality and 
democracy, then we could locate them in parallel with one another.  
 
However, if in some cases we cannot compromise and/or modify their 
conceptions – as would perhaps be the case if they were religious or sacred 
values, which require the adherents of this religion to preserve the conceptions as 
they are – then Berlin suggests that we should choose by referring to the situation 
at hand, and without appealing to the universal criteria (since it is absent at this 
stage). Berlin says:   
 
The concrete situation is almost everything.193 
 
Since Berlin encourages us to choose between the conflicting values, it is also 
alright if we promote one value over the other, since values are promoted here 
for the sake of resolving conflicts, and not with a view towards approving one 
value as being intrinsically better than the other.  
 
Consider Berlin’s claims that the ultimate values are ‘equally ultimate’ or 
‘equally objective’ to one another, so that to choose and promote one value 
always results in the sacrifice and/or the loss of another equally worthy one. 
Berlin says:   
 
Some among the great goods cannot live together. That is a conceptual truth. We are doomed to 
choose and every choice may entail an irreparable loss. 
194 
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In this case, if the values in pluralism are not ‘ultimate’ or ‘objective’, when 
pluralists choose or promote one over the other it would not generate a loss of the 
other. It would be only a trade-off between conflicting choices. But Berlin 
stresses the ‘ultimate’ or ‘objective’ status of values in pluralism (as justified by 
the human horizon), which means that there is as a result always a loss in 
pluralism.      
 
The positions set out above are the main ideas in pluralism. They are presented 
here in order to contrast them with the ideas of the three thinkers, who will not be 
categorized as pluralists unless 1) they have the idea of a diversity of ultimate 
values which consists of at least two ultimate values that are incompatible, 
incommensurable but equally ultimate (or equally objective) to one another. If 
freedom is their ultimate value, there must be at least another ultimate value that 
is equally ultimate to freedom. In other words, the three thinkers must be 
committed to more than one ultimate value. And 2) they must have the idea of 
compromise and sacrifice between those ultimate values.  
 
Berlin on the three thinkers 
 
As mentioned in chapter 2, Berlin’s followers such as Kelly and Crowder believe 
that Berlin interprets the three thinkers as pluralists, and that he uses them to 
represent his own position and ideas. For example, Kelly says:  
 
Herzen’s vision of the self and the world, based on a radical rejection of monistic systems, is so 
close to Berlin’s own outlook (he often referred to Herzen in conversation as ‘my hero’ that his 
exposition of Herzen’s thought provides answers to some of the most debated questions about his 
own pluralism.195 
 
However, after investigating Berlin’s descriptions of the three thinkers more 
closely, it does not seem true that Berlin has that intention. His descriptions of 
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the three thinkers contain a number of ideas which are in contrast to his pluralist 
ideas.    
 
Firstly, Berlin describes them in a way as to present as having only one ultimate 
value: freedom (of the will). For example, Berlin says that freedom is their 
ultimate political goal, and that all their political activities are conducted in order 
to achieve the goal. Berlin does not state in his works that the three thinkers are 
committed to any other ultimate values which might, in their view, be equally 
ultimate to freedom. It seems that they are not committed to a diversity of 
ultimate values but only to freedom. Herzen says (through Berlin’s description):   
 
The purpose of the struggle for liberty is not liberty tomorrow, it is liberty today, the liberty of 
living individuals with their own individual ends.
196
  
 
And Tolstoy:  
 
Tolstoy believed in individual liberty and in deed in progress too but in a queer sense of his own. 
197 
 
For Turgenev, Berlin explains:  
 
Jame Bryce, who presented him [Turgenev], described him as a champion of freedom. This 
delighted him.
198
  
 
If we consider that Berlin stresses the diversity of ultimate values in pluralism 
and omits to present it as the idea of the three thinkers, it might be sufficient 
from this observation alone that the three thinkers are not pluralists. As 
mentioned earlier, Berlin leads his readers to only two possible interpretations of 
the three thinkers: pluralists or liberals. Their commitment to only one ultimate 
value and/or their lack of commitment to other ultimate values might be 
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sufficient to undermine their position as pluralists, and we might be able to 
conclude right now that they are liberals. However, the ideas of the three thinkers 
such as their ranking of values, their conception of values in general and their 
reason for sacrificing freedom might require a bit more explanation.  
 
1) Freedom on top of the ranking – as mentioned, the three thinkers seem to have 
only one ultimate value: freedom of the will. Herzen, for example, has been 
committed to freedom as his political and final goal. He conducted all the 
socialist activities such as the activities with The Bell and the peasant commune 
in order to achieve freedom for the people. Berlin says:  
 
For men acted as they did each for the sake of his own personal ends. […] It is for this reason that 
Herzen so seriously and passionately believed in the independence and freedom of 
individuals…
199 
 
The other two, Tolstoy and Turgenev, also have freedom as their only ultimate 
value. Therefore, if they were to rank values, freedom would be the only one at 
the top. Below freedom, they seem to put other incompatible values such as those 
of the radical left and right on the second rung, and those of the Russian 
government on the lowest rank below. For example, Berlin describes Herzen’s 
view on Russian government (which is assumed to be the view of the other two 
thinkers as well) as follows:  
 
For all his hatred of despotism, and in particular of the Russian regime…200 
 
Russian government is therefore for the three thinkers on the lowest ranking. But 
as regards the radical left and right, the three thinkers seem to admire them to 
some extent, but prefer not to support them because of their extreme and/or 
violent ideas. Therefore, the three thinkers seem to put them on the second level: 
that is, above the Russian government, but below freedom of the will. Berlin 
describes Turgenev’s view on the radicals:  
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All his [Turgenev] life he wished to march with the progressives with the party of liberty and 
protest. But in the end he could not bring himself to accept their brutal contempt for art, civilized 
behaviour, for everything that he held dear in European culture.
201
 […] He went on telling the 
radicals [of both sides] that they were mistaken. […] He said over and over again that he loathed 
revolution, violence, barbarism. He believed in slow progress, made only by minorities, if only 
they do not destroy each other.
202
   
 
The ranking of the three thinkers in this case would appear different from that of 
Berlin’s pluralism (especially on the top ranking): as follows:  
 
The three thinkers’ ranking  
 
 
ranking of Berlin’s pluralism  
 
The two pictures show that there is only freedom as the ultimate value for the 
three thinkers while for Berlin there are a diversity of cultural values on top of 
the ranking (freedom might be one among them). Moreover, the ultimate value of 
the three thinkers (or freedom) has not been justified by any universal criteria at 
all; it is completely subjective, while the ultimate values of Berlin have been 
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justified by the human horizon before reaching the ultimate ranking. The 
explanation for this will be presented in the following part of the chapter.    
 
2) The subjectivity of values including freedom: the values for the three thinkers 
seem to lack a basis, as they are judged subjectively by their personal judgment 
and/or according to their will. The three thinkers do not believe in any theories, 
sciences or philosophical knowledge, so they do not justify their values based on 
any of them.  Moreover, unlike Berlin, they do not believe in cultures, so they 
cannot make recourse to the latter as a foundation either. With nothing as a basis 
for justifying values apart from their own will, their values are completely 
subjective. In Berlin’s explanation, the three thinkers explicitly reject the claims 
for values to be ‘objective’ or ‘universal’. Berlin describes Turgenev’s ideas:  
 
All that was general, abstract, absolute, repelled him…
203
  
 
The ultimate values in Berlin’s pluralism, as described above, are subjective in 
the sense that they are judged as ultimate in the different contexts, and there is no 
requirement at this stage for the universal criteria. However, they are at the same 
time objective or universal in the sense that they are all within the scope of 
Berlin’s human horizon; that is, they satisfy the moral requirement of non-
violence and psychological conditions of understanding and empathy. The 
pluralist judgment of ultimate values therefore contains an objective or universal 
dimension that is different from the views of the three thinkers, insofar as the 
latter’s work is based upon the merely subjective, and relies totally upon their 
personal judgment.  
 
3) Freedom as a subjective value can be sacrificed but this does not imply 
diversity:  the three thinkers claim that their ultimate value – freedom – can be 
sacrificed in necessary cases. For example, Herzen first claims (on Berlin’s 
reading) that freedom is not absolute, and that not all people want to have 
freedom:   
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Men in general do not seek freedom, despite Rousseau’s celebrated exclamation that they are 
born free, that remarks Herzen is, as if you were to say, ‘fishes are born to fly, yet everywhere 
they swim’. Icthyophiles may seek to prove that fish are ‘by nature’ made to fly; but they are 
not…
204
  
 
Then Herzen says that freedom can be sacrificed in the necessary cases and/or 
for the survival of people:  
 
…what they [people] need was food, shelter, clothing…
205
 
 
And 
 
His [Herzen’s] central principle – that the goal of life is life itself, that to sacrifice the present [or 
life] to some vague and unpredictable future [such as for freedom] is a form of delusion….
206 
 
One might imply that if freedom can be sacrificed for other values, then the three 
thinkers might justify some other values as being equally ultimate to freedom; 
one could then argue that this could lead to the further implication that they have 
a conception of the diversity of values. However, Berlin’s descriptions do not 
support this implication. In Berlin’s writings, the three thinkers have never 
presented any values as being equal to freedom, and nor do they ever mention 
values that they believe to be worthy enough to sacrifice freedom for. If freedom 
can be sacrificed, but there is no justification and/or suggestion from them at all 
as regards equally worthy values, then this indicates rather that for the three 
thinkers, freedom can be sacrificed for ANY values, or rather for whatever 
values are necessitated by the case at hand.   
 
The sacrifice of freedom for ANY values (without the justification of equally 
worthy values to freedom) could not imply the diversity of values in the three 
thinkers but only the subjectivity of value (that is of freedom).  
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Considering Berlin’s pluralism, there is the objective extent in which pluralists 
refer to the human horizon to justify values. So the diversity of ultimate values in 
pluralism, as all of which are justified by the human horizon, are all objective. 
When pluralists sacrifice one value, it must always be for the other equally 
ultimate and/or equally objective values (such as to sacrifice some freedom for 
equality, or to sacrifice some positive liberty for more negative liberty), not for 
ANY (unjustified) values, as would seem to be the case with the three thinkers.  
Since the three thinkers have only one subjective value which can be sacrificed 
in some necessary cases for any (unjustified) values, this alone cannot in anyway 
imply the diversity of values.   
 
4) Sacrifice to prevent violence – the sacrifice of freedom for any values in the 
necessary cases by the three thinkers indicates that they have the idea of 
compromise, which probably makes them look similar to pluralists. However, it 
is likely that they would compromise or sacrifice their ultimate value – freedom 
– only for one reason, which is that of preserving life, and/or preventing forms of 
violence (that lead to the sacrifice of life) from occurring. As Berlin says, human 
life is the most valuable thing for Herzen:  
 
The death of a single human being is no less absurd and unintelligible than the death of the entire 
human race…
207 
 
The three thinkers are realists (with the sense of reality) who reject all theoretical 
ideals. They believe that human life, no matter whose life, no matter how 
numerous, is more valuable than any ideals or values, including that of freedom. 
Freedom is not worth so much that it is justifiable to sacrifice life for it; in 
consequence, it is justifiable to sacrifice freedom for life.  
 
Herzen declares that any attempt to explain human conduct in terms of or to dedicate human 
beings to the service of any abstraction, be it never so noble – justice, progress, nationality – even 
                                                
207
  RT, 222 
 107 
if preached by impeccable altruists like Mazzini or Louis Blanc or Mill, always leads in the end 
to victimization and human sacrifice. 
208 
 
And Berlin says:  
 
Herzen understood his opponents (such as the radical left), and declined to compromise…
209 
 
As mentioned above, they say that freedom can be sacrificed in the necessary 
cases. The ‘necessary cases’ must therefore be the radical situations that involve 
the sacrifice of life for ideals, such as, for example, radical revolutions or wars 
that lead to violence and killing. The three thinkers would sacrifice freedom to 
preserve people’s life in these necessary cases. But apart from this, there does not 
seem to be any other motivation for the three thinkers to sacrifice freedom.  
 
Consider Berlin’s pluralism: one of the main elements within it is compromising 
between incompatible ultimate values by sacrificing some for others. This 
pluralist sacrifice is different from that of the three thinkers in at least two points:  
 
aa) The sacrifice of the ultimate values in pluralism is undertaken not only for the 
purposes of preserving life and/or preventing violence (although this is one of the 
main reasons for Berlin) but the sacrifice is always necessary for pluralists to 
deal with conflicts between the diversity of ultimate values. For example, when 
humility and pride or freedom and equality or negative and positive forms of 
freedom are in conflict, pluralists might not always be able to resolve them (e.g. 
compromise or balance between them). Often, they need to sacrifice one for the 
other. The sacrifice is therefore necessary in pluralism, regardless of whether the 
conflicts between values lead to violence or not.  
 
bb) Considering that the ultimate values in pluralism are equally ultimate and 
equally objective within the scope of the human horizon, the sacrifice of some 
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ultimate values is tragic or a loss. This loss would happen in pluralism all the 
time. Berlin says:   
 
The world that we encounter in ordinary experience is one in which we are faced with choices 
between ends equally ultimate, and claims equally absolute, the realization of some of which 
must inevitably involve the sacrifice of others
210 
 
The sacrifice of freedom of the three thinkers, on the other hand, would not 
create a tragedy or loss since the value (including all other values of the three 
thinkers) is subjective and has not gone through any justification, such as that 
afforded by the human horizon, or even by cultural criteria.  
 
The analysis of the three thinkers presented above leads to three conclusions: 
firstly, the three thinkers are not pluralists since their ideas, as Berlin describes, 
appear different from Berlin’s pluralism. I) The three thinkers have freedom as 
their only ultimate value (on top of the ranking) while Berlin’s pluralism requires 
a diversity of ultimate values that are equal to one another at the top of the 
ranking. II) The three thinkers’ ultimate value – freedom – is subjective, whilst 
the ultimate values in pluralism are to some extent objective, insofar as they are 
all justified by the human horizon. III) The three thinkers claim that their 
ultimate value such as freedom can be sacrificed in some necessary cases but do 
not justify any other values to be chosen instead of freedom. They are in this case 
committed only to the subjectivity of value, and not to the diversity of values. 
Berlin, on the other hand, justifies the diversity of values by the human horizon, 
so they are to some extent objective. And when it is necessary to sacrifice one 
value, it must always be so for the other objective values. They would not 
sacrifice freedom for ANY values. Berlin is, therefore, committed not to the 
subjectivity of values, but rather to the diversity of objective values. IV) The 
three thinkers allow the sacrifice of freedom only for the preservation of people’s 
life; Berlin however claims that the sacrifice of some ultimate values is necessary 
for resolving the conflicts between them. In other words, the sacrifice is a normal 
practice, in that it is required as a means of resolving conflicts in pluralism. It is 
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necessary whether or not the conflicts would lead to violence. With all these 
differences, the three thinkers are not pluralists and/or the representatives of 
Berlin as some scholars believe them to be.  
 
Of the differences set out here, the most important one is that the three thinkers 
have liberty as their only ultimate value. This leads to the second conclusion, 
which is that the three thinkers are liberals. However, it is quite clear that they 
are not liberals in the same sense as Mill or Rawls, given their claims on the 
subjectivity of value and their rejection of all metaphysical foundations, such as 
that of theoretical and philosophical knowledge. These indications seem to 
correspond with the counter-enlightenment, such as the romantics, who also have 
the same ideas. Considering that the three thinkers are liberals who share the 
main ideas with the counter-enlightenment, this leads to the third conclusion: 
their actual position is that of counter-enlightenment liberals. This position of 
the three thinkers will be investigated further in the next section.  
 
The three thinkers as counter-enlightenment liberals 
 
Before saying that the three thinkers are counter-enlightenment liberals, we 
should first ask quite what the counter-enlightenment position actually is. It 
seems that the ideas of the counter-enlightenment extend far and wide from the 
mid eighteenth century to the present, yet all of them share the same objective: 
namely, that of rejecting the enlightenment’s central cores, such as the permanent 
universal laws, natural science and reasoning, the universality of human nature, 
progress towards perfection, absolute permanent truth, and the one harmonious 
ideal world. The counter-enlightenment thinkers, by contrast, believe in what 
they see in reality, such as the particularity of truths and values, intuition or 
instinct, and the imperfections, negative aspects, conflicts and sufferings of 
human beings. Apart from these central core concerns, counter-enlightenment 
thinkers extend their thoughts further and wider, leading to a variety of positions. 
As Garrard puts it:  
 
 110 
counter-enlightenment thought extends far and wide […] it comes from all points of the 
ideological compass, from conservative Catholics and German romantics to liberals, neo-
Marxists, feminists, environmentalists and postmodernists’.
211  
 
There are different levels between them as well. Some counter-enlightenment 
thinkers are extreme, such as those who reject all of the enlightenment ideas (for 
example, Berlin describes the young French romantics as performing a 
‘revolution against everything’212) while others are moderate, such as those who 
accept rational foundations but reject other elements. Crowder says:  
 
the notion of a unitary counter-enlightenment [as described by Berlin] has been criticized for not 
distinguishing between mere ‘critics’ and outright ‘enemies’ of the enlightenment, the former 
accepting the basic framework of rational inquiry, the latter rejecting it’.
213 
 
For the three thinkers, they also share the central cores of the counter-
enlightenment. For example, they also reject the permanent universal laws. 
Herzen says (through Berlin’s description):  
 
There are no timetables, no cosmic patterns: there is only the ‘fire of life’, passion, will, 
improvisation…214 
 
And for Tolstoy, Berlin says:  
 
Tolstoy declares that he cannot admit even small exceptions to the universal law.215 
 
They also reject the optimism of human nature, the natural science and 
reasoning, the absolute permanent truth, the progress towards perfection, and the 
one harmonious ideal world. For example, Tolstoy claims (through Berlin):  
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The Russian are…against liberal optimism concerning human goodness, human reason, and the 
value or inevitability of material progress: both furiously denounce the notion that mankind can 
be made eternally happy and virtuous by rational and scientific means.216  
 
And  
 
Both [Maistre and Tolstoy] preserve the same sardonic, almost cynical, disbelief in the 
improvement of society by rational means, by the enactment of good laws or the propagation of 
scientific knowledge…
217 
 
In the same way as the counter-enlightenment thinkers, such as the German 
Romantics Vico and Herder, whom Berlin deeply admires, the three thinkers are 
realists who believe in what they see in reality; especially the particularity of 
truths and values and the imperfections of human nature. 
 
Considering the level of their disagreement with the enlightenment, the three 
thinkers seem to be more ‘enemies’ than mere ‘critics’, since they do not only 
reject natural science and reasoning (which are the basis of the enlightenment) 
but reject the whole intellectual knowledge. Because of this, the values in the 
views of the three thinkers lack a basis, and become a – as argued above – 
completely subjective. Tolstoy, for example, suggests that we should throw away 
the sciences, reasoning and all intellectual knowledge since they would make our 
mind unfree, and consequently prevent us from reaching the true knowledge 
which is in nature. Berlin describes Tolstoy’s idea as follows:  
 
…to plan, organized, rely on science, try to create rational patterns of life in accordance with 
rational theories, is to swim against the stream of nature, to close one’s eyes to the saving truth 
within us…218  
 
For Tolstoy, we should be free from knowledge and return to our pure mind, 
which is to rely on intuition and/or pure perception. Only in this way, he says, 
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can we acquire true knowledge. Berlin thus describes Tolstoy’s view with the 
following: 
 
…the answer is about us everywhere, like the light of day, if only we would not close our eyes or 
look everywhere but at what is there, staring us in the face, the clear, simple, irresistible truth.219 
 
The three thinkers seem to apply their rejection of knowledge (especially 
sciences and reasoning) to their conception of freedom. So their freedom is to 
throw away knowledge and acquire the truth from pure intuition or instinct (like 
children do). In other words, their freedom is freedom from knowledge and/or its 
foundations. This conception of freedom is expressed through Bazarov: the 
central figure in Turgenev’s novel Father and Children. Berlin thus writes:  
 
Bazarov is in revolt; he is the prisoner of no theory; that is his attractive strength; that is what 
makes for progress and freedom.220 
 
This kind of freedom is parallel with the idea of many counter-enlightenment 
thinkers, such as the romantics Vico and Herder, and it might also be parallel 
with the idea of the nihilists for whom all knowledge should be rejected.  
 
These views are however in contrast to those of the enlightenment liberals who 
base their freedom on scientific and/or rational method, such as the practical 
reasons achieved objectively in the constructive procedure. Freeman explains this 
procedure as follows:  
 
Constructivism says that the correctness of moral judgment depends on their basis in principles 
that are the product of an objective procedure of construction that embodies all the requirements 
of practical reasoning.221 
 
However, considering the three thinkers’ opinions, if we have interpreted them 
correctly, then they would believe that the liberal constructive procedure which is 
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established by liberal experts or intellectuals (or, in this case, by Kant or Rawls) 
to be the only procedure towards the universal truth (and/or Rawls later claims 
towards universal reasoning222) possibly leads to despotism. This can be 
interpreted from their views on the despotism of all knowledge. For example, 
Tolstoy, according to Berlin, says:  
 
But what is the basis of ‘liberal education’ in schools and universities, staffed by men who do not 
even claim to be sure that what they teach is true? […] the only lesson that history teaches us is 
that all previous educational systems have proved to be despotisms founded on falsehoods, and 
later roundly condemned.223  
 
In their views, perhaps the enlightenment liberals, through their constructive 
procedure (e.g. hypothetical situation), could force people to accept the 
conception of freedom by claiming that their procedure is the only procedure 
towards the truth or towards universal moral reasoning.  
 
The three thinkers, by asking to be free from all knowledge, seem to believe that 
their conception of freedom is more precise than the enlightenment one. Garrard 
claims that the counter-enlightenment thinkers (he might or might not include the 
three thinkers within this) appear to be more liberal than the enlightenment 
liberals who attach their conception of freedom and their procedure to only one 
universal form. Garrard says:  
 
…so many of the thinkers of the pluralistic counter-enlightenment inadvertently promoted liberal 
ends…224 
 
The three thinkers perhaps are, in Garrard’s view, the liberals who are more 
liberal than the enlightenment liberals. In this case, their freedom from 
knowledge is not only in contrast to that of the enlightenment liberals: it also 
rejects the enlightenment liberals’ foundational principle of (practical) reason.  
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When we combine the elements of the three thinkers’ counter-enlightenment 
views (such as their rejection of the permanent universal law and the objective 
truths) into their conception of a freedom that rejects the enlightenment’s basis, 
we can be assured that their positions are those of counter-enlightenment liberals.  
 
While we can see that the three thinkers are the counter-enlightenment liberals 
who are the enemies of the enlightenment ones, such as Mill or Rawls, it is 
interesting to know Berlin’s conception of freedom. Does it collapse into an 
enlightenment position, or into a counter-enlightenment view of freedom?  
 
Berlin seems to agree with the three thinkers and with the counter-enlightenment 
thinkers in many respects, especially as regards the rejection of knowledge, 
natural sciences and reasoning. Berlin says:  
 
These models [absolute knowledge and universal intelligible reason] invariably begin by 
liberating people from error. […] But they almost invariably end by enslaving those very same 
people. […] They begin as liberators and end in some sort of despotism. 
225
  
 
However, his conception of freedom is not similar to the three thinkers. For 
Berlin, freedom is a contextual and cultural value which belongs to liberal 
contexts and cultures, just like humility belongs to the Christians and pride 
belongs to the Republicans. While freedom is a cultural value that belongs to the 
liberals, it is equally worthy or equally ultimate to some illiberal values (that are 
within the scope of the human horizon) such as the moral restrictions and/or the 
rules of some cultures. As Garrard says:  
 
Both political conclusions – liberal and illiberal – are logically compatible with pluralist 
assumptions…226  
 
In fact, Berlin’s conception of positive liberty is closer to an illiberal position, 
and has been frequently claimed as such. As Garrard says:  
                                                
225
  Berlin, ROR, 3 
226
  Garrard, OAM, 155 
 115 
 
Positive liberty rests on assumptions that have historically proved to be extremely tempting to 
well-meaning despots who have sought to ‘liberate’ humans through force. 227 
 
And Berlin justifies this notion of positive freedom (if the form it takes is not too 
extreme, and falls within the scope of the human horizon) in his work on the two 
concepts of liberty, claiming it to be on a par with the negative freedom of the 
liberals. With all values cast as contextual and cultural values, Berlin asks us to 
use the practical method of the ‘inside view’ (or imagination, which Berlin 
claims we all possess) to enter into the different cultures, to understand the 
worthiness of their values, and to judge them as equivalent to one another. 
Therefore, freedom for Berlin is not freedom from knowledge (and/or the 
freedom of an empty mind), as is the case with the three thinkers, and nor is it the 
freedom achieved objectively from practical reasons, as in Rawls; instead, it is 
freedom achieved from the inside view into the liberal culture.  
 
Since Berlin rejects scientific and rational methods, it is consistent that his basis 
for freedom is culture. Cultures can be known merely by practical method: this 
includes the psychological inside view that he suggests and the historical method 
(such as to see how worthy the value of freedom was for people in the different 
cultures in the past) that he often uses in order to justify his claims.228 Since 
Berlin does not appeal to the objective method, as do the enlightenment liberals 
(he in fact rejects it), his conception of freedom cannot in anyway be similar to 
the enlightenment one.  
 
So far, it has been shown that the three thinkers are counter-enlightenment 
liberals who define freedom as freedom from knowledge (and reasoning). They 
are the enemies of the enlightenment liberals, who base their freedom on 
universal reasoning. Berlin – a pluralist who sees freedom as a contextual and 
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cultural value – seems to be different from both. Is he an enlightenment thinker 
or a counter-enlightenment one?   
 
Berlin’s pluralism as partly enlightenment and partly counter-enlightenment  
 
The answer is that Berlin is a half-blood (or eclectic). He shares some elements 
with the counter-enlightenment position, and yet also shares other elements with 
the enlightenment one. As a result of this mixed character, there are two different 
opinions on his work. Some scholars such as Robert Wokler, Steven Lukes, 
Claude Galipeau, Michael Rosen and Roger Hausheer believe that he is one of 
the enlightenment thinkers; others, such as Mark Lilla, John Gray and Richard 
Rorty, believe the opposite. For example, Wokler says:   
 
…by far his most substantial essays on eighteenth and nineteenth century thought display his 
deep affinities to enlightenment thinkers and his emulation of their style…
229
 
 
On the other hand, John Gray says:  
 
The idea that animates all of Berlin’s work […] is one which , if true, as I take it to be, strikes a 
deathblow to the central classical Western tradition – and it must be added, to the project of the 
enlightenment.
230 
 
In fact, despite his own claim that ‘I am on their [the enlightenment] side’231, 
Berlin’s pluralism shares elements with both sides. With the counter-
enlightenment, and thus with the three thinkers, he shares, firstly, the rejection of 
metaphysics, sciences and reasoning. In fact, Berlin does not reject these 
methods in other subjects per se, but rather only when they are to be applied in 
the social sciences. For example, he rejects logic and mathematics if they are to 
be grounds for a priori positions in ethics and politics. Berlin asks:  
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Why should not the same methods [used by Galileo, Newton and the work of other 
mathematicians and physicists and biologists] be applied to human matters, to morals, to politics, 
to the organization of society, with equal success? 
232 
 
His real targets are however natural sciences and reasoning, which Berlin 
completely rejects as viable methods for judging or choosing ethical and political 
values (this should include Rawls’s liberalism). One reason for this is probably 
that Berlin believes that the subjective natures of human beings, such as personal 
identities, commitments and cultures are important elements that should be taken 
into account when we judge the values of others, and also when we choose 
values for ourselves. That is, when we judge the values of others, Berlin says we 
need to know their subjective natures, such as their identities, commitments and 
cultures; if we do so, we can know if we will understand and feel empathy for 
them. If we can know this, we would then be able to justify their values as being 
on-a-par with our own values. In this way, Berlin says, we can justify the values 
of different cultures as being equally ultimate to one another. Moreover, when 
we choose values for ourselves, we need to know our own subjective natures so 
that we can choose values that accord with our natures. To exclude these 
subjective natures (both of ourselves and others), and to use only objective 
reasoning as in liberalism, would prevent us from understanding and feeling 
empathy for others (e.g. other cultures). It would also make us unable to choose 
the right values for ourselves (e.g. the right values for our cultures). Berlin says:  
 
The ways in which men live, think, feel, speak to one another, the clothes they wear, the songs 
they sing, the gods they worship, the food they eat, the assumptions, customs, habits which are 
intrinsic to them…each of which has its own lifestyle.
233  
 
In other words, Berlin does not agree with scientific methods and reasoning 
because he believes that the subjective natures (and/or the relation between the 
persons and values) are necessary for making judgments and choices in ethics 
and politics.  
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He also believes that the answer in ethics/politics is not like that in mathematics, 
logic or the sciences, in which there can be only one necessary answer. In ethics 
and politics, on the other hand, there can be more than one answer: for example, 
the right answer for one culture can be different to that of another. With the 
diversity of answers in ethics and politics, to allege that someone – an intellectual 
or an expert, perhaps – knows the only true answer (or the way to achieve it), no 
matter how reasonable or good it is, could lead to despotism. This position 
corresponds to the views of the three thinkers’ view. Berlin says:  
 
They [the enlightenment monist] begin as liberators and end in some sort of despotism. 
234
  
 
Secondly, as a result of his rejection of sciences and reasoning, Berlin shares 
with the counter-enlightenment thinkers and the three thinkers the rejection of 
the universality of values that results from scientific and rational methods (which 
excludes the subjective natures of human beings from consideration).  
 
Overall, it can be said that because Berlin rejects metaphysical knowledge, he 
certainly rejects a priori truth. But apart from that, he also rejects the non-priori 
truth that results from scientific and rational methods. Therefore, he would reject 
the liberal values that result from the constructive procedure as well.    
 
Thirdly, and in contrast to the above, instead of the scientific and rational method 
he shares with counter-enlightenment writers such as Vico and Herder (but not 
the three thinkers) the ‘inside view’, which is, as explained above, a practical 
means of acquiring  knowledge about human beings by entering into other 
people’s lives. As Crowder says, Vico and Herder also use this method: 
 
For Vico […] the way to understand such men and their worlds is by trying to enter their minds, 
by finding out what they are at, by learning the rules and significance of their methods of 
expression…
235 
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The inside view of the counter-enlightenment is certainly different from the 
objective scientific and rational methods of the enlightenment, since the person 
who operates it takes into account the subjective aspects of human natures when 
they enter into the lives of others, such as their personal identities, commitments 
and cultures (he does not forget them as in the O.P), and justifies values based on 
these natures. This method does not rule out all kinds of reasoning. There might 
be the use of historical or cultural reasoning, but it does rule out the 
enlightenment’s objective reasoning.      
 
Fourthly, as a result of the inside view, Berlin believes we can understand the 
worthiness of others’ values (based on their cultures) and justify them as equally 
worthy to our own values (albeit in different ways). This connects Berlin to 
another element of the counter-enlightenment thinkers: the particularity of 
values. This element is shared by Vico and Herder, as Crowder says:  
 
Particularism of another kind is the central theme of the last of Berlin’s counter-enlightenment 
masters, Hamann’s disciple Johann Gottfried Herder. Like Vico and Hamann, Herder rejects 
what he sees as the scientism and heavy-handed moral universalism of the enlightenment, and 
celebrates the variety of human experience.
236
  
 
The four counter-enlightenment elements noted above are the main ones that 
Berlin stresses in pluralism. There are some further counter-enlightenment 
elements as well. For example, Berlin also rejects the idea of utopia in the same 
way as the romantics.237 This rejection of utopia actually follows from his 
rejection of a priori truth and of the assumption that there can be one final 
answer; he instead believes in a diversity of them. The diversity of values from 
the different cultures implies that there will always be conflicts between them, 
and that there is no chance for a perfect and harmonious society as in the utopia. 
Moreover, he seems to admit that he is a realist in the same vein as that of the 
three thinkers. The ideas that reflect his realist position are, for example, his 
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rejection of a priori truth and of the ideal, his views on the uncertainty of all 
values and truths, and his belief in the moderation (or compromise) of all values 
and actions including those for freedom. All are the ideas of the realists. Crowder 
says:  
 
…Berlin has in mind when he calls for moderation, but he makes the same point in relation to 
liberal policies too.
238
  
 
The last element of the work of the counter-enlightenment thinkers that Berlin 
shares with them is a commitment to cultures. This is similar to Vico and Herder, 
but not to the three thinkers. Garrard says:  
 
Berlin’s sensitivity to cultural diversity and his Herderian belief in the importance of language to 
the formation of identity have led him to sympathize with some of the communitarian and 
nationalist critics of both enlightenment cosmopolitanism and liberalism. 
239 
 
His commitment to cultures leads him to the acceptance of some illiberal cultural 
values. This is parallel with some counter-enlightenment thinkers, such as Joseph 
de Maistre, who claim to accept illiberal values as well.  
 
Considering Berlin’s counter-enlightenment elements, especially 1-4, they seem 
to support the subjective part of pluralism, i.e. the diversity of values. That is, 
because he rejects the objective scientific and rational methods and the universal 
values that arise out of them, and because he refers instead to the practical 
method of the inside view as a means of justifying cultural values as being 
equally ultimate to one another, he has grounds for his idea of the diversity of 
values. It can be said that his thought’s counter-enlightenment elements are the 
grounds for his diversity of values, which is the core idea in pluralism.   
 
Given the counter-enlightenment elements discussed above, it might look as if 
Berlin is himself a counter-enlightenment thinker (as some scholars believe him 
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to be). However one of the elements in Berlin’s pluralism prevents him from 
collapsing into the counter-enlightenment group. It is the idea that the human 
horizon is universal. Although Berlin rejects the metaphysical, scientific and 
rational methods and also the universal values that arise out of them, he does not 
reject all conceptions of universality, and especially not the universality of 
human natures. As mentioned, he believes firstly that all human beings deny 
violence, and secondly that they all have the ability to understand and feel 
empathy for others. Berlin believes that these are characteristics that all people 
share at all times (although the level of these conditions might vary from one 
period to another). For example, he says:   
 
[People] can always if they are sufficiently imaginative and try hard enough contrive to 
understand – that is, see to be intelligible ends of life for human beings situated as these men 
were.
240
  
 
Another universal human nature in Berlin’s view might be the need for belonging 
(or the importance of cultures), which Berlin also believes to be shared by all. 
Crowder writes: 
 
A sense of belonging, of feeling at home in your surroundings among people who understand 
you, is for Berlin a basic good for all human beings. 
241 
 
It should be noted that Berlin does not justify the universality of human nature by 
referring to any metaphysical knowledge or particular foundations (as does the 
enlightenment), but by referring to his historical cultural and psychological 
observations (as does the counter-enlightenment). The metaphysical knowledge 
and foundations of the enlightenment are not the tools that Berlin uses to justify 
any of his claims. Gray comments on Berlin’s method of observation to justify 
the universal human nature as follows:  
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Berlin’s references to the common human horizon would be understood, not as claims about 
generically human modes of thought and practice [as a priori anthropology], but instead as claims 
about resemblances within a very large and extended family of cultural forms.
242
  
 
The universality of human natures seems to be one of the enlightenment ideas. 
For example, Berlin says:  
 
The central doctrines of the progressive French thinkers, whatever their disagreement among 
themselves, rested on the belief […] that human nature was fundamentally the same in all 
times.243  
 
And it is this idea that the counter-enlightenment thinkers strongly disagree with. 
For example, Edmund Burkes claims that the nature of human beings is diverse: 
Berlin says:  
 
There is for Burke no such thing as a universal human nature. 244  
 
Berlin seems to say that he rejects the assumption that there is indeed such a 
thing as a universal human nature. However, what he rejects is merely the 
universal human nature which derives from the metaphysical methods, and not 
the one that derives from observations. This is implied by his conception of the 
human horizon, which is also a universal one, but which derives from historical 
and cultural observations (i.e. the resemblances between people of different 
cultures).  
 
Therefore, it can be said that although the method that Berlin uses to justify the 
universality of human nature (the observations) is not that employed by the 
enlightenment, the notion of universality that he derives from it does nonetheless 
correspond to an enlightenment position.   
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The universal human nature that is consistent with the enlightenment idea is the 
ground for the objective part (or the judgment of values) in pluralism. This is 
because Berlin refers to the human horizon to justify values (i.e. he accepts only 
values that are within the scope of the human horizon) and limits the number of 
values in pluralism.   
 
For the reasons set out above, it can be concluded that Berlin is a half-blood (or 
eclectic), and that he stands between the two sides. The subjective part of 
pluralism is shared with the counter-enlightenment, while its objective part is 
shared with the enlightenment. Berlin has never been fully aligned to either 
faction. Although most scholars disagree with one another on Berlin’s exact 
position, some notice this half-blood character. For example, Kelly says:  
 
I emphasize the importance of Berlin’s remark at the end of his essay ‘the Pursuit of the Ideal’ 
that whether we like it or not, we are now heirs to two traditions.
245 
 
She might take it from Berlin’s own claims, for as he himself once said:   
 
We are children of both worlds. 
246 
 
As an eclectic, Berlin’s opinions on the two sides are probably that the counter-
enlightenment ideas – such as the rejection of scientific and rational methods, the 
support of the inside view and the particularity of values – might result in the 
lack of any judgment of values whatsoever. That is, all values will always be 
justified. With this subjective character, it seems that the counter-enlightenment 
do not see the conflicts of values despite the fact that they always exist. Or, they 
might say that the conflicts are not real, when they in fact are indeed real.  
 
On the other hand, the moral judgment of the enlightenment is too deeply 
attached to its objective methods (and to its concern with a final truth); as a 
result, it is blinded to conflicts of values. Exponents of enlightenment positions 
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believe that if people were able to reach the truth or the correct answer through 
using the objective method of reasonably deciding between values, then there 
would no longer be conflicts of values anymore. However, in reality, not all 
people agree with the procedure of attaining truth through objective reasoning. In 
consequence, the conflicts always remain. Berlin is located on a middle path 
between the two sides. He believes that values are particular and subject to 
contexts and cultures (as the counter-enlightenment), yet he also encompasses 
these values within the scope of a universal restriction (derived from the human 
horizon) into which they all fall (as in the enlightenment). And, amongst the 
particular values that he permits, he sees the conflicts between them as real and 
unavoidable. He suggests that these conflicts should be resolved on a case by 
case basis.  
 
To conclude the analysis: the analysis of the three thinkers undertaken here has 
been performed solely upon the basis of Berlin’s own descriptions. It proves that 
the three thinkers are liberals, since they have freedom as their only ultimate 
value. And they are counter-enlightenment thinkers, since their freedom has 
counter-enlightenment characteristics. These ideas and positions, when compared 
to Berlin’s pluralism, are significantly different. Berlin as a pluralist does not 
take freedom to be the only ultimate value, but allows a diversity of values, 
including illiberal ones. His pluralism appears to be half informed by the 
counter-enlightenment, and half by the enlightenment; it is thus not completely 
aligned with the counter-enlightenment, as are the three thinkers. These 
differences between Berlin and the three thinkers serve to clarify that Berlin does 
not intend to interpret them as pluralists. Instead, he describes them as counter-
enlightenment liberals. The analysis of Berlin’s followers, who claim that three 
thinkers are pluralists, or that Berlin explains his pluralist position through these 
thinkers, is therefore false.    
 
To conclude the chapter, the first piece of Berlin’s writing on Russian history 
which seems to present the three thinkers as pluralists is however proved in this 
chapter that they are more akin to the counter-enlightenment liberals whose main 
ideas and elements are different from pluralism. When they are not pluralists, it 
means that Berlin does not use his Russian history to present pluralism as the 
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norm or PUT. But he seems merely to present his admiration for the three 
thinkers or for the counter-enlightenment ideas, some of which he shares in 
pluralism. According to his deep admiration for the three thinkers, it is possible 
that Berlin might rank the counter-enlightenment ideas as equally worthy to 
pluralism.   
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Chapter 4: Pluralism and traditional liberalism  
 
The second piece of Berlin’s writing is on moral and political philosophy, and is 
mainly focused on his idea of pluralism. In this piece of writing, many scholars 
believe that Berlin connects his pluralism with (the enlightenment or) 
traditional liberalism. So they believe he is stating that pluralism is part of, or 
another version of, traditional liberalism. Crowder (one of Berlin’s followers), 
for example, claims that Berlin connects his pluralism with liberalism by the 
characteristic of anti-utopianism, and the value of negative liberty:  
 
…pluralism imperfectability brings with it a positive recommendation: only those forms of 
politics are plausible which acknowledge and accommodate the effects of imperfection, in 
particular dissatisfaction, alienation and significant social conflict. Prominent among political 
forms that meet this description is liberalism […] In short, pluralism recommends liberalism by 
way of anti-utopianism.247   
 
And  
 
Berlin says now one thing, now another. In some places he denies any necessary connection 
between pluralism and liberalism. But elsewhere he asserts that pluralism does indeed imply 
liberalism, as when he refers to ‘pluralism, with the measure of negative liberty it entails’.
248
   
 
John Gray, in contrast to Crowder, says that pluralism, despite some overlapping 
elements, is different in its main ideas from the traditional liberalism. For 
example, he says that pluralism does not claim liberal values, such as liberty, as 
absolute or universal:  
 
In the pluralistic view, it is the recognition of the ultimate validity of conflicting claim, rather 
than the special claims of liberty (or liberalism), that is most stressed.
249
 
 
And 
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Liberalism universalism is at odds with value pluralism and must be rejected.
250
 
 
The analysis in this chapter will observe if pluralism is, or can be, another 
version of traditional liberalism. This will proceed by taking the main ideas of 
pluralism, and will compare them with the main ideas of traditional liberalism. 
The analysis will aim to show that the two theories are distinct from one another. 
They have different frameworks, different methods to achieve the universal 
values, different conceptions of the universal values, and different purposes of 
freedom of choice. Due to these differences, pluralism cannot be part of, or 
another version of, traditional liberalism.    
 
When they are independent from one another, it shows that Berlin does not 
intend to write about pluralism in such a way as to present it as another version 
of traditional liberalism, nor to make it a normative theory or PUT by combining 
it with traditional liberalism. Instead he appears to merely present his idea of 
pluralism, which may have some overlapping elements with liberalism.  
 
The frameworks: liberalism as priority monism VS pluralism   
 
It is likely, based on the description of priority monism in the first chapter, that 
liberalism’s framework is similar to priority monism, which is obviously distinct 
from pluralism. The main elements in the framework of liberalism, which 
indicate liberalism as priority monism, and make it distinct from pluralism, are:  
 
1) Liberalism has only one set of compatible ultimate values (such as liberty, 
autonomy, equality and rights251) while pluralism has at least two (but possibly a 
higher number of) ultimate values that are incompatible, incommensurable but 
considered equally worthy to one another. For example, pluralism can have both 
freedom and non-freedom values at the same time.    
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2) Liberalism refers to the universal ranking, such as practical reasoning, to 
compare between ultimate values, so there is a hierarchy ranking and as a result 
there is no conflict between them. For example, in Rawls’s two principles of 
justice, the value of equal right and freedom are at the top of the ranking, which 
is superior to the value of distributive justice. In this case, there is no conflict 
between them. Dworkin says: 
 
…perhaps, after all, the most attractive conceptions of the leading liberal values do hand together 
in the right way.
252
 
 
It is necessary to have the hierarchy ranking, Nagel says, since liberals need to 
prevent or resolve conflicts between the ultimate values:  
 
…the [liberal] search for higher-order values, or for methods that permit the conflicts to be 
resolved, is a reasonable one.
253 
 
On the other hand, pluralism does not refer to any universal ranking to compare 
between the ultimate values, and as a result there is no hierarchy ranking. 
Pluralists justify all of them as equally worthy to one another. Consequently there 
are always conflicts between the ultimate values in pluralism.  
 
3) Liberalism does not have to compromise between the ultimate values since 
there is no conflict between them. They do not have to choose values in order to 
compromise between them. They choose them following the suggestion of the 
hierarchy ranking. And when they choose one over the others, the ones that they 
do not choose are normally less valuable on the ranking. The sacrifice of the less 
valuable values is considered as trading-off (as justified by the universal ranking) 
rather than a loss. For example, if they need to choose between freedom and 
distribution, they would choose the first and sacrifice the latter following the 
hierarchy ranking. And this sacrifice is not considered as their loss but only the 
trading off of the less valuable value for the more valuable one.  
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On the other hand, pluralism always needs to compromise between their ultimate 
values since they are always conflicting. The compromise is necessary since the 
conflicts need to be resolved. And in order to compromise, they always need to 
choose one ultimate value over the other. Consequently, because pluralists justify 
their ultimate values as equally worthy or equally objective to one another, to 
sacrifice one for the other always creates the feeling of loss. For example, 
suppose they justify freedom and distribution as equally worthy to one another. 
When they need to choose between them, the one they sacrifice always create the 
feeling of loss for them.     
 
As the framework set out above shows, liberalism has one set of compatible 
ultimate values at the top of the ranking, with the incompatible ones ranked 
beneath. So there is no conflict between them, and also no need to compromise.  
This framework is similar to that of priority monism (as referred to the 
description in the first chapter), which is significantly different from pluralism. 
The frameworks of liberalism and pluralism are therefore so clearly distinct from 
each other that it would be hard to reduce them into one and the same theory. 
Therefore it is unlikely that Berlin intends to write about pluralism in a way that 
presents it as part of, or another version of, liberalism.  
 
The methods to achieve the universal values  
 
Another main difference between pluralism and traditional liberalism, as outlined 
roughly in chapter 3, can be found in the methods that they use to achieve the 
universal values. Liberalism (Rawls’s is the version mainly referred to here) uses 
the method of the enlightenment, which relies on science and rationality to 
achieve their universal values. Pluralism, on the other hand, uses the method of 
the counter-enlightenment, which relies on psychology (i.e. the inside view) to 
achieve the universal values. The methods can be explained as follows:  
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The liberal method of science and rationality  
 
1) Environment controlled: As liberals rely on the enlightenment’s scientific 
and rational concept of judgment, they try to make their procedure most 
impartial. So they exclude all particular contexts of the persons judging values, 
and the particular contexts of their society. They put the persons involved behind 
the ‘veil of ignorance’ (in Rawls’s term) where they are unaware of those 
particular contexts. There are a few contexts left behind the veil which are the 
primary goods (i.e. they know that they desire liberties, opportunities, wealth, 
income, and self-respect), the general conditions of society (moderate scarcity), 
and the general facts about human social life. However, liberals believe that these 
general facts would not affect the impartiality of the procedure or they would not 
create any bias in the judgment of values. Freeman says:  
 
…the veil of ignorance excludes this information; the veil and other conditions of the OP are 
designed to focus our attention upon the reasons that are morally relevant and to exclude those 
that are not…
254
  
 
And Wenar says:  
 
Were actual citizens to get together in real time to try to agree to principles of justice for their 
society the bargaining among them would be influenced by all sorts of factors irrelevant to 
justice, such as who could appear most threatening or who could hold out longest. The original 
position abstracts from all such irrelevant factors. 
255
 
 
2) No identity: Within the particular contexts that are excluded, there is the 
identity of the persons as well. That is, in the veil of ignorance, the persons do 
not know their place in society, their class, their income, their gender, their age, 
their cultures, their personal interests, their special psychological propensities 
and their natural assets. As mentioned, liberals want the persons in the 
hypothetical position or the OP to be most impartial in their decisions so they 
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make them forgetting who they are when they enter the OP And by not knowing 
who they are, liberals believe that the persons would merely refer to their 
practical reasoning (or pure reasons) to choose values. Their choices would not 
involve with any of their particular self-interests. Liberals believe that this is the 
most appropriate conditions for the persons to be impartial in their reasoning and 
in their choices of values. Rawls says:  
 
The idea of the OP is to set up a fair procedure so that any principles agreed to will be just.
256
 
 
Freeman says:    
 
What is distinctive about this agreement is that the persons do not know any particular facts about 
themselves or anyone else in society. The veil of ignorance has the effect of requiring the persons 
to make a strictly impartial choice, one that does not favor persons in their position.
257
  
 
The OP conditions for the persons, and their environment, could be compared to 
the scientific laboratories where all elements of the environment are controlled. 
In these labs only elements considered relevant are left, so that there is nothing to 
interfere with the scientists’ experiments. The scientists then can achieve the 
most precise scientific results. 
 
3) One set of universal values: The results from the OP is, according to the 
liberals (i.e. Rawls’), one set of universal values (the two principles of justice in 
Rawls’) which they believe everyone who enters into the OP would produce. 
That is, the result is the most impartial one which tends to be chosen by all 
impartial and rational persons. Wolff says:  
 
Rawls says that any of us can think our way into the OP at any time. If we do, we will see for 
ourselves whether or not we would, in fact, choose his principles of justice. 
258
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The pluralist method of psychological inside view    
 
The pluralist method, which relies on the counter-enlightenment psychological 
idea, appears to be in contrast to the above liberal method. The procedure is as 
follows:  
 
1) Environment uncontrolled: As pluralists rely on psychological method, 
rather than scientific and rational method, they do not need to construct an 
impartial procedure. They do not exclude any particular contexts of the persons 
but instead take into account all of them, such as their identity, cultures, respect, 
commitments and all knowledge about their particular society. An indication that 
Berlin would certainly not exclude the particular contexts of the persons and their 
society can be found, for example, when he refers to Vico on the importance of 
cultures:   
 
Vico seemed to be concerned with the succession of human cultures – every society had, for him, 
its own vision of reality, of the world in which it lived, and of itself and its relations to its own 
past, to nature, to what it strove for. 
259
 
 
2) Inside view: With all the particular information, the persons in the pluralist 
method proceed the inside view into other people’s mind and learn how they live 
in the different cultures or places or times. They do this by using their 
imagination such as to imagine if they were them how they would feel; if they 
have their identity how they would live their life, or if they have their respect and 
commitment how they would believe. It is to imagine other people’s 
environment, try to understand their ways of life, share their perspectives and 
feelings and feel empathy for them. In this case, the persons take all the 
particular information into consideration rather than excluding them. Pluralists 
such as Berlin believe that the particular information is useful (rather than 
disturbing) for the persons to understand and to justify values than to justify them 
in the lab (or in the hypothetical situation) as the liberals. Berlin explains the 
process of the inside view as:   
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Both thinkers [Herder and Vico] advocate the use of the historical imagination, which can enable 
us to ‘descend to’ or ‘enter’ or ‘feel oneself into’ the mentality of remote societies, thereby we 
understand them.
260
  
 
As a result, they will be able to understand and feel empathy for others:  
 
…if they open their minds sufficiently they can grasp how one might be a full human being, with 
whom one could communicate, and at the same time live in the light of values widely different 
from one’s own, but which nevertheless one can see to be values, ends of life, by the realization 
of which men could be fulfilled.
261
   
 
3) Many universal values: The result from the psychological method is that the 
persons could approve the values of others as equally worthy or equally objective 
to their own. So they could approve many values as universal values at the same 
time, even though those values are conflicting with one another. And the 
approval of many universal values at the same time could be agreed by all, if all 
cultures use the same method to understand one another. Berlin says:         
 
And, of course, we must not dramatize the incompatibility of values – there is a great deal of 
broad agreement among people in different societies over long stretches of time about what is 
right and wrong, good and evil. 
262
 
 
The above are the steps of the psychological method (or the inside view) used by 
pluralism to achieve the universal values, which is in contrast to the rational 
method (or the OP) of liberalism. Put simply, the pluralist psychological method 
is partial and emotional (to create empathy) while the liberal rational method is 
impartial and rational (to create justice).   
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The comparison of the inside view with the secondary qualities  
 
Despite the partial and emotional characteristics of the inside view, Berlin insists 
that the universal values that result from the inside view are objective. In this 
case, one might explain the objectivity of the inside view by comparing it with 
the judgment of colors (the idea of McDowell). That is, in order to see a color, 
such as red, the persons need to have some particular conditions, such as their 
perception, or their sense organs, and they need to be in some particular 
conditions; for example, being in a place that has enough light to see by. In this 
instance, it is necessary that the persons’ perception must respond correctly to the 
world in order for them to see a color such as red. Their judgment of red is 
subjective, since it depends on their perception, while it is at the same time 
objective, since every person with the same perceptive qualities would see the 
same color. The inside view tends to have the same nature as the secondary 
qualities; in order to justify ethical values such as cultural or religious values, the 
persons need to have some particular psychological conditions, such as the 
ability to understand, imagine and feel empathy for others. They also need to 
enter into the perspectives of others (or the worlds of others) in order to 
understand the meaning of ethical values clearly. Similarly, it is also necessary 
that the persons’ psychological conditions must respond to the perspectives of 
others in order for them to be able to justify the values of others. In this case, as 
similar to the judgment of colors, the inside view is subjective since it depends 
on the persons’ psychological conditions, while it is at the same time objective 
since every person with the same nature (of psychological conditions) would 
justify values in the same way. If we presented this in a diagram, we would then 
have the following:       
 
The judgment of colors  
The persons’ perception à respond to à the conditions of the world  
 
The judgment of values by the inside view 
The persons’ psychological conditions à respond to à the worlds of others   
 
Rovane explains the process:  
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In both cases [ethics and colors], the phenomena at issue would not exist were it not for our 
subjective ways of responding to the world – evaluation in one case and color vision in the 
other.
263
  
 
Put simply, pluralists believe that if the persons involved have the same 
psychological conditions (such as the ability to feel empathy for others) and are 
entering into particular perspectives (such as into the worlds of others), then they 
would judge values in the same way, which is either to accept them as equally 
worthy, or not to accept them. This makes the justification of values objective, 
without creating the hypothetical situation such as the OP, and without appealing 
to universal reasoning. It is the universal nature of psychological conditions that 
make the judgment of values objective.  
 
McDowell compares the judgment of ethical values with the judgment of colors, 
and says that it is objective since there can be ‘error’. Rovane explains 
McDowell:  
 
[for McDowell] there is still room for objectivity because there is still room for error. […] 
According to him, even if there is no scientific explanation of what makes our ethical judgments 
true and false, we can still make sense of the possibility of error insofar as our judgments can still 
be fitting or not as ethical responses to the social reality around us.
264
   
 
This should be consistent with Berlin’s view since, for him, the judgment of 
values is not relative. It does not depend on personal beliefs, but requires 
people’s nature of understanding and empathy to respond to some particular 
perspectives. There can be some unacceptable values (or the ‘errors’) which are 
the ones beyond people’s ability to understand and feel empathy.     
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The influences  
 
As mentioned earlier, the liberal method comes from the enlightenment’s 
attachment to science and rationality, and the pluralist method comes from the 
counter-enlightenment’s attachment to psychology. Although Berlin is eclectic, 
as mentioned in the previous chapter, and takes some ideas from the counter-
enlightenment and others from the enlightenment, the method that he uses to 
achieve the universal values in pluralism derives entirely from the counter-
enlightenment.  
 
Berlin mentions in his writings that the enlightenment method of acquiring truths 
(including social and ethical truths) relies mainly on science and rationality. And 
they also believe that the truths achieved from this method are the laws of nature, 
(which means they are objective). Crowder explains:  
 
The third pillar of the French Enlightenment is for Berlin the most significant of all: scientism. 
The same modern scientific methods that have laid bare the hidden patterns of the natural world 
must produce the same results in the social world. From a secure basis either in self-evident 
axioms or in empirical observation, we can formulate, by way of logical deduction or induction 
respectively, the laws of nature. 
265
    
 
Regarding logical deduction, the liberal rational method comes from the idea that 
people’s moral reasoning can be deduced from their shared abstract moral 
principles (i.e. reflective equilibrium). This deductive idea of liberalism is 
obviously a product of the enlightenment. Freeman explains Rawls’s idea:  
 
[Rawls] also believes in moral judgments’ capacity for correctness, including truth or falsity. […] 
A longstanding position on the justification of moral judgment and principles, which perhaps 
goes back to Plato is that they are inferable in some way (ideally by logical deduction) from the 
most abstract moral principles… 
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While using the ideas of rationality and deduction taken from the enlightenment, 
Rawls comes up with his own unique way of deducing, reasoning and justifying 
the universal values (which is the OP), as mentioned earlier.  
 
Berlin, on the other hand, agrees with the counter-enlightenment’s rejection of 
science and rationality and also the rejection of the objectivity of truths (or the 
laws of nature) derived from it. He agrees instead with the counter-enlightenment 
in the methodology of the inside view, and the particularity of the truths derived 
from it. Crowder says:  
 
When it comes to the human world he insists that the methods of the natural sciences have 
serious limitations. They can describe the outward behavior of human beings, but they cannot 
account for the inner purposes which make that behavior human; for that we need the inside view 
of the historical and cultural imagination. 
266
 
 
Berlin derives these counter-enlightenment ideas especially from the work of 
Joseph de Maistre, who rejects human reason. Berlin is also influenced by Vico, 
Hamman and Herder, whose ideas he discusses in Three Critics of the 
Enlightenment (2000). These three critics reject natural sciences as the method to 
find the truths. Instead they claim, similarly to Crowder’s quotation above, that 
science is for the study of only external subjects. It cannot be used to study 
internal subjects, such as social sciences and ethics. Moreover, the truths of those 
internal subjects are usually not objective, but particular, and we can study them 
only through the inside view or through experience alone.      
 
Considering the above ideas of the counter-enlightenment, which influence 
Berlin, it appears that he derives them not only from Joseph de Maistre, Vico, 
Hamman and Herder but also from the three Russian thinkers – Herzen, Tolstoy 
and Turgenev – as mentioned in the previous chapters. These thinkers appear to 
have the same ideas as the three critics.        
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Liberal inside view and pluralist inside view  
 
While the methods between the two theories are clearly different and derive 
influence from the opposite groups of ideas, one might argue that Rawls’s OP 
also has some extent of the inside view in the same way as Berlin’s. For 
example, in the OP he asks the persons to forget their identities and then to 
imagine that they can be any person in society. In this case, the persons in the OP 
have to try to understand all people in society – the talented, the rich, the poor 
and the disabled – and to feel empathy for them. After all the imagination and 
understanding, there then comes the task of deciding the best value for all.  
 
In this case, Rawls might agree with Mill’s claim that to understand oneself is to 
understand others267, so he asks the persons in the OP to proceed with the inside 
view into all people in society, to understand all of them as if these people are 
themselves. This method of understanding themselves in all positions, for Rawls, 
could be considered the equivalent to the understanding of others.  
 
This understanding of all people as themselves in the OP appears to be similar to 
the pluralists’ inside view into other people’s life. However, in the OP, the 
people know only a few contexts, and all of them are neutral and general. They 
do not know any specific details of society, such as the number of cultures or 
religions, and the number of the minority groups. As Wolff says:  
 
There are just a few more pieces to add before the picture of the OP is complete. Rawls assumes 
that people are ignorant of certain facts about their society. They do not know its economic and 
political situation, its level of civilization or culture or the generation to which they belong. 
268
 
 
It could be said that the society used as the basis in the OP is too neutral and 
general. And the inside view into other people’s lives that the persons in the OP 
use seem to be limited to only some general types of people, such as the talented, 
the rich, the poor and the disabled. As a result, the process of the inside view in 
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the OP is limited; it does not cover all groups of people, especially the minority 
ones. Therefore, it does not fully work. For example, when the persons do not 
know any cultures, religions and minority groups in their society, they might not 
choose values that support them, and instead choose the ones that support only 
the majority, the general types of people and the formal institutions in society 
instead. For example, Barber says:  
 
In brief, because men in the OP cannot determine who they will actually be they can be counted 
on to make disinterested and thus fair rules; but because they also anticipate living as actual 
particular men they will reject rules which sacrifice the welfare of particular men to the general 
good. 
269
 
 
Moreover, the persons in the OP use the inside view in order to protect 
themselves. That is, they try to understand the lives of other people in the OP, 
and choose values that are fair to all in order to ensure that if they were them 
outside the OP they would be fine. Their inside view into other people’s life 
therefore aims merely at protecting their own life or interests. This can be 
supported by Rawls’s claims that the persons in the OP care only for their own 
interests. They are disinterested in others.  
 
This is different from Berlin’s inside view in which the persons use it in order to 
genuinely understand other people who are different from them and to recognize 
their life and values. All the particular natures that the pluralist method of inside 
view take into account (but which liberals exclude from the OP), such as other 
people’s desires, interests, cultures, ways of life, attitude and so on, help them to 
understand and feel empathy for others. Therefore, the inside view procedure 
used by the two theories are different in that the liberal one is for protecting their 
own life, or their own interests, while the pluralist one is for genuinely 
understanding one another.     
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Apart from the above, by using these different methods, the liberal rational 
method and the pluralist psychological method lead to a number of other 
differences. 
  
The different conceptions of universal values  
 
The different methods between liberalism and pluralism also results in their 
universal values having different conceptions. With the liberal rational method, 
their universal values are the production of the (impartial) practical reasoning 
that all people share. On the other hand, by the pluralist psychological method, 
their universal values are the production of the feeling of empathy that all people 
share. These create different conceptions of their universal values. For example, 
freedom is the production of the practical reasoning that all people share (in the 
OP), while a diversity of cultures are the production of the shared empathy. Their 
universal values therefore have the different conceptions from one another. 
Freeman explains Rawls’s idea:  
 
Doctrinal autonomy assumes only that free and equal citizens share certain reasonable 
moral/political beliefs, in spite of their many differences. 
270
 
 
And Hardy and Crowder explain Berlin’s idea that we can all share the feeling of 
empathy. Hardy says:  
 
How is our capacity to empathize with other cultures whose particular values we do not share 
evidence (as Berlin thinks it is) of universal values that we share or ought to share? Crowder’s 
answer is that we are able to empathize with the values of other cultures because they are specific 
interpretations of more generic values that we do share…
271
 
 
With this capacity to feel empathy with the values of others, the universal values 
in pluralism are the production of the empathy that all people share. 
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In other words, we can say that liberalism and pluralism have different grounds 
for justifying the universality of values – for liberals it is the shared practical 
reasoning that justifies the universality of values while for pluralists it is the 
shared empathy that justified the universality of values.   
 
The prejudice elimination  
 
Whether it is the shared practical reasoning or the shared empathy, it seems that 
both theories need some kind of agreement from all people in order to justify the 
universal values. And that agreement appears to be only possible when people 
are without prejudice. The different methods between liberalism and pluralism in 
this case can be seen as their different ways to eliminate people’s prejudice. 
Prejudice has a different meaning from partiality. The first means negative 
feelings towards something, such as some groups of people in society. These 
negative feelings could lead to, for example, discrimination against some groups 
or races. The latter on the other hand involves positive feelings towards 
something, such as their commitment to, or respect for their cultures. These 
positive feelings lead to, for example, favoritism for some groups or races. Susan 
Wolff stresses the positive feelings of the term partiality by giving example of 
the relationship with friends and family. She says:  
 
Surely, relationships with friends and family have a different and deeper kind of value. It is not 
just alright but positively good that a person goes hiking with a friend, that she helps a neighbor 
start his car, that she brings her children presents, bakes them cookies, teaches them songs, More 
generally, it is not just alright but positively good that such relationships form part of a person’s 
life. […] For these reasons, the impartialist, like the partialist, will not only praise the person who 
does help her friends, but on some occasions, morally criticize the person who fails to do so. 
272
 
 
While the two terms – prejudice and partiality – have opposite meanings, it does 
not follow that to eliminate prejudice partiality needs to be eliminated too. 
Pluralism seems to eliminate only the prejudice (or the discrimination against 
some groups or races), but keep the partiality (or the persons’ commitment to 
their cultures) in their method.  
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As mentioned, both liberals and pluralists need to eliminate people’s prejudice 
since it might prevent them from reaching agreement. For example, in liberal OP, 
if the persons hate the disabled, they might not agree with the values that assist 
them. So liberals set up the procedure so that there is a chance that the persons 
may become disabled outside the OP. In this situation, their hatred would be 
eliminated (by the chance of themselves being disabled) and the persons become 
willing to agree with the values that assist the disabled. In the pluralist procedure, 
using the inside view, if the persons hate some particular religions, say, 
Buddhism, they might not then agree with Buddhist values being universal 
values. So the pluralists ask them to imagine if they were Buddhists, to 
understand their lives and values, and then to feel empathy for them. In this case, 
their hatred is eliminated by understanding and empathy, and the persons can 
agree with the Buddhist values as universal values.    
 
Those are two different ways to eliminate people’s prejudice in order to make an 
agreement possible so that the universal values can be justified. To explain 
further, liberals eliminate people’s prejudice by eliminating the division between 
‘me and them’. This is because, if there is the division, the persons might agree 
only for the interest of ‘me’, and might not think about the interests of ‘them’ (as 
Rawls claims that they are disinterested in others). This is especially relevant in 
the situation in which they hate ‘them’. Liberals eliminate the division by saying 
that there is an equal chance for every group of people in society to turn out to be 
‘me’ (outside the OP) so the prejudice is consequently eliminated. Pluralists, on 
the other hand, eliminate people’s prejudice by enhancing the understanding of 
‘them’. Pluralists are also aware that people often agree with only the interests of 
‘me’, i.e. themselves, and do not think about the interests of ‘them’.  They 
however solve this problem in the opposite way, by asking people to enter into 
‘them’, and to look more closely into the life and feelings of ‘them’ so that they 
come to understand ‘them’ more, and consequently become more concerned in 
the interests of ‘them’ as well. In this case, pluralists reduce prejudice by 
enhancing understanding and empathy. As Berlin says:    
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[they] can always, if they are sufficiently imaginative and try hard enough, contrive to understand 
– that is, see to be intelligible ends of life for human beings situated as these men were…
273
 
 
In other words, the above contrast between the two theories seems to be that 
liberals use self-interest to eliminate prejudice while pluralists use empathy to 
eliminate prejudice. But this does not mean that liberals do not have the idea of 
empathy at all. As mentioned earlier, Mill claims that ‘if you can get a person 
interested in himself, by contrast, you need apply little more than a gentle nudge 
to get him interested in others as well’.274 So liberals also have the idea of 
empathy but seem to believe that it follows from self-interest.  
 
The application to the real world  
 
From the liberal rational method explained above, it seems that liberals try to 
avoid the metaphysical ideals or truths in which philosophers or religions claim 
to believe. They seem to hold that those metaphysical truths are something we 
cannot observe or prove by ourselves; that they are beyond our ability to know or 
to prove. For example, Freeman explains that Rawls tries to avoid the 
metaphysical truths as follows:   
 
[Rawls] wants to avoid the use of ‘true’ within Political Liberalism […] it is because the concept 
of truth applied to moral principles is a metaphysical concept...
275
  
 
Richardson claims that Rawls’s avoidance of metaphysical truths derives from 
Kant’s idea of autonomy. He says:  
 
Kant held that the true principles of morality are not imposed on us by our psyches or by eternal 
conceptual relations that hold true independently of us; rather, Kant argued, the moral law is a 
law that our reason gives to itself. It is, in this sense, self-chosen or autonomous law.
276
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In this case, Rawls says:  
 
[The OP] may be viewed as a procedural interpretation of Kant’s conception of autonomy…
277
 
 
Liberals therefore rely instead on the scientific and rational methods (as 
mentioned above) since they believe it is within our ability to observe and to 
prove. For example, they say we all can enter into the OP (through imagination, 
through example) and use our own rationality to observe the values in the OP and 
come to agree on the ones fair to all. We all can do this by ourselves. Freeman 
explains:  
 
It might be said that principles uniformly derived therein are given to us by our own practical 
reason. To act for the sake of these principles is to be morally autonomous. 
278
 
 
The OP is therefore constructed in order to encourage us to use our rationality to 
the full. This way, we do not need to appeal to anything outside or beyond our 
own observation and consideration. As mentioned, the liberal OP can be 
compared to the scientist’s lab, which is constructed (through controlling the 
environment and elements) in order to let the scientists do the best experiments 
so that they can achieve the results. Liberals seem to adapt the method from 
sciences but use it with moral issues.   
 
And, since the method of the liberals does not refer to anything beyond our 
ability to observe and to know but all within our own rationality, scholars claim 
that the theory can certainly be applied to the real world. Freeman says:  
 
[In Rawls’s method] it says moral principles are constituted out of the activity of practical reason, 
and do not have their origins in an independent moral order (such as God’s will). 
279
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However, the above claim on the application of the liberal rational method to the 
real world seems to be in doubt, since the OP is the hypothetical situation 
wherein the elements are unreal. The persons in the OP are the ideal men who 
have a lack of knowledge about themselves and about their society. This is 
certainly different from the real world where there are a diversity of groups and 
cultures. And the ideal men are certainly different from the real men who have 
particular interests, irrational thoughts and the full knowledge about themselves 
and their society. The values that the ideal men choose in the OP, therefore, are 
naturally not similar to the ones the real men will choose in the real world. From 
Barber’s claim it seems that Rawls acknowledges this point:  
 
Rawls knows that while he can strip men in the OP of particular interests and particular desires he 
cannot leave them bereft of interest and desire altogether or they will cease to be men at all. 
“Human actions” do, after all, ‘spring from existing desires’. 
280
 
 
The unreal situation and persons in the OP seems to be according to Rawls’s 
intention which is to encourage the persons to use their rationality to the full. As 
Wolff says 
 
We end up with a view of people in the OP who are very unlike real people. But this is not a 
criticism of the theory. The conditions of the OP, behind the veil of ignorance, are not meant to 
describe the nature of a person but to act as a methodological device, a device which helps us 
come to a view about the correct principles of justice. 
281
 
 
And Rawls believes that, despite the unreal situation in the OP, it can be applied 
to the real (non-ideal) world. As Wenar says:  
 
Completing ideal theory first, Rawls says, yields a systematic understanding of how to reform our 
non-ideal world, and fixes a vision of what is the best that can be hoped for.
282
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However, it is criticized that the ideal characters of the persons (such as without 
any particular desires and interests at all) are way too much so that they become 
‘inhuman’. And this inhuman condition might make the result in the OP unreal 
and cannot be applied in the real world. That is, the persons in the OP tend to 
choose something they would not choose in the real world. For example, as 
mentioned earlier, they would choose the general rules over the particular rules 
while they would not do so if they have all the particular desires and interests. On 
the other hand, the unreal nature of the persons in the OP does not seem to be 
consistent with Rawls’s results (the two principles of justice) or it would not lead 
to the results. For example, the persons in the OP who do not have desires and 
particular interests tend not to choose liberty as Rawls claims, since it is not 
likely that they would want liberty in order to enhance their interests further. 
According to Barber, without particularity (or particular interests) the concept of 
self-interest has no meaning:   
 
At the level of psychology it seems possible that particularity is built into the notion of interest 
and that it cannot be cut away without rendering interest unintelligible. 
283
 
 
So the persons involved probably choose social welfare instead of liberty. In this 
case, even if Rawls’s two principles are real (i.e. being the most rational ones in 
the real world), they tend not to result from the unreal persons in the OP 
 
Barber claims that if Rawls includes the particular contexts into the OP and 
makes the OP more real, then the OP would be more consistent with his results. 
In other words, the OP, if it was more real, would lead to Rawls’s results to a 
greater extent than if it was unreal. Barber says:    
 
I believe that […] additional assumptions about men that contaminate the OP need to be made if 
the rules of justice as fairness are to be regarded as the inevitable choice of rational men in the 
OP.
284  
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Moreover, Rawls claims that because the persons in the OP do not know who 
they are in the real world, they therefore obtain the special psychological 
condition which is to avoid as much risk as possible. As a result, they will choose 
the maximin rule in the OP. This special psychological condition is criticized by 
many scholars as unreal (or untrue). The persons in the OP do not necessarily 
have this condition. They might, if the context were more real, obtain other kinds 
of attitude towards risk: they might for example take medium risk or even high 
risk (and choose the maximax rule) if those risks would give them more pleasure. 
Barber says:  
 
It is no less rational, although suggestive of a different and less conservative temperament to be 
sure, for men to pursue, say, a moderate risk strategy whose aim would be to create the 
possibility of somewhat greater gains than afforded by maximin even at the risk of somewhat 
greater possible losses.
285
 
 
From all the above, although the liberals claim that their rational method can be 
applied to the real world, their claim is in doubt since the unreal conditions in 
their hypothetical procedure might make it difficult for the method to be applied 
to the real world.   
 
Pluralists do not believe in any metaphysical ideals or truths, such as those 
claimed in philosophy or religion as well. In fact pluralists do not believe in 
anything beyond observation at all. For example, Berlin says:   
 
The subject with which I myself wish to deal is confined in time. I do not wish to deal with a 
permanent human attitude, but with a particular transformation which occurred historically and 
affects us today. 
286
 
 
It seems that Berlin and other pluralists follow the realist idea of the counter-
enlightenment on this issue. Crowder explains the counter-enlightenment’s idea 
on truth as: 
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Truth, for human beings, is intensely particular, accessible through concrete experience alone. 
287
 
 
While pluralists agree with liberals on the rejection of the metaphysical ideals, 
their method is more real (i.e. more consistent with the real world) than that of 
the liberals. This is according to the inside view (as mentioned above), which 
takes into account all the particular contexts of the persons and societies such as 
their particular interest, respect and commitment on values and all the particular 
groups and cultures in societies. As a result, according to the pluralist method 
individuals take into account everything in the real world, or everything they 
observe in real society; they then justify the universal values based on the real 
world that they observe. There is no appeal to the hypothetical situation where all 
factors in the society are controlled as in the OP; the focus rests instead on real 
particular situations in the real world. In this case, pluralists might follow the 
counter enlightenment’s idea of the ‘sense of reality’, which gives more value to 
real life than to any hypothetical situation and impartial reasoning. Referring to 
Tolstoy as a counter-enlightenment thinker, Berlin says:  
 
[Tolstoy] had far more respect for all forms of real life […] than for the world of books, reviews, 
critics, professors, political discussions and talk about ideals…288  
 
The sense of reality that pluralists admire in the counter-enlightenment thinkers 
might be the main reason why they avoid using the hypothetical situation favored 
by liberals.  
 
Put simply, liberals seem to be certain that their rational method can be applied 
to the real world, by virtue of their appeal to rationality (which is shared by all 
men in the real world) for the justification of values. But they need a strict 
control over the elements taken into account in order to use rationality to the full. 
As a result of this strict control, their method might be limited in the possibility 
to be applied to the real world as compared with pluralist method, which appeals 
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to psychology to justify values. The psychological method does not require 
pluralists to control or limit the elements taken into account, so their method 
obtains more possibility to be applied to the real world.  
 
Different perspectives on resolving conflicts in practice   
 
The difference between the methods of liberalism and pluralism, moreover, 
reflect their different means of resolving conflicts in society. That is, liberals 
seem to believe that to rely on universal rationality and moral truths is the way 
to resolve conflicts in societies, whilst pluralists seem to rely instead on a 
psychological method (such as understanding and empathy) as the way to resolve 
conflicts in society. It seems to be Berlin’s opinion that, in practice, the 
psychological method of the pluralists seems to be more effective. Berlin says:  
 
The collisions, even if they cannot be avoided, can be softened. Claims can be balanced, 
compromised can be reached. 
289
 
 
The process of liberalism is this: when conflicts arise, liberals refer to universal 
rationality and moral truths (such as freedom and equality) to resolve conflicts; 
they then tend to give priority to the group that agrees with the moral truths 
(according to the universal rationality) over the group that is against those same 
moral truths. Or they might accept the demand of the first while rejecting the 
demand of the latter. For example, liberals who are committed to the truths of 
freedom and equality tend not to accept the demand of the illiberal groups. 
Grayling, for example, says that some traditions that abuse individual freedom – 
such as wearing the burqa or a full veil in some religions – should be banned. 
 
…in principle I’m very much with laïcité, the idea of having a neutral, equal public domain, 
where you’re not going to listen to attempts by people to say, “look, I’m wearing a big crucifix” 
or, “look I’m covering my head” so, “you’ve got to treat me differently.
290
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In this case, liberals do not give illiberal groups an equal weight or respect 
compared with the respect they give to the liberal groups. As regards this issue, 
Rawls denies that he refers to liberal values in order to resolve conflicts in 
society. He claims that all conflicts (especially regarding cultures or religions) 
must be open to the negotiations between all groups or cultures. He says: 
 
The correct regulative principle for anything depends on the nature of that thing.291 
 
However, his principles turn out to be in contrast to his claim. Rawls (like all 
liberals) does give more weight (or priority) to liberal values than he does to 
cultural or religious differences, even within the overlapping consensus. As 
Kymlicka says:  
 
[Rawls] says that one essential part of the overlapping consensus is an agreement to conceive of 
citizens as having the ‘moral power’ to ‘form, revise and pursued’ a conception of the good. This 
is in fact one of our two basic moral powers along with a sense of justice. 
292
 
 
He might believe that all groups or cultures naturally agree with the value of 
freedom and equality even when they refer to their own moral beliefs or their 
religious beliefs. As Wenar says:  
 
Citizens within an overlapping consensus work out for themselves how the liberal “module” fits 
into their own worldviews. Some citizens may see liberalism as derived directly from their 
deepest beliefs…
293
 
 
However, in reality, not all groups or religions would agree with liberal values, 
especially in relation to their religious beliefs. That is, many illiberal groups do 
not share the liberals’ notions of universal rationality and liberal moral truths 
(such as freedom and equality). As a result, they cannot take part in the 
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overlapping consensus. And when liberals give priority to liberal values (even in 
the overlapping consensus) and liberal groups by accepting their demands and by 
denying those of illiberal groups, the latter will feel that they are discriminated 
against by the majority. They will consequently deny coming to an agreement 
with the majority in society. This is because apart from the fact that they do not 
hold the same moral rationality, they might also feel that they do not receive a 
fair treatment in the first place. They might not understand why the government 
gives priority to liberal values over their own values. So they tend to deny any 
co-operation or agreement required by the government. Their denial might lead 
to more conflicts in society or in some cases it could lead to violence. The events 
of September 11th 2001 can be seen as an example of this problem. 
 
The process of pluralism, on the other hand, is this: when conflicts arise, 
pluralists do not resort to any universal rationality or any moral truths, since they 
do not have any; instead, they resolve conflicts by asking each group to 
understand each other’s problems and to feel empathy for one another. In this 
case, as they do not decide the right and wrong (or truth and false) for them, and 
nor do they take sides; instead, they give both sides an equal weight or respect. 
None would feel discriminated. The intended result seems to be that both groups, 
by receiving an equal treatment and by understanding one another to a more 
extent, would agree to sacrifice some of their beliefs or demands, and thereby 
finally come to an agreement with one another. Violent actions can be prevented. 
This is possible because Berlin believes that people can always understand one 
another even if they do not agree. He says:       
 
I am not blind to what the Greeks valued – their values may not be mine but I can grasp what it 
would be like to live by their light, I can admire and respect them, and even imagine myself as 
pursuing them, although I do not – and do not wish to, and perhaps could not if I wished.
294
  
 
This way of resolving conflicts might look like the ‘modus vivendi’. However, it 
does not depend on the political power of each side in order to come to an 
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agreement. It rather depends on the feeling of empathy of both sides in order to 
come to an agreement.   
 
If the results mentioned above are true, then the universal rationality and moral 
truths which seemed to be the effective means towards finding solutions to 
conflicts turn out to be less effective in practice, since it seems difficult, by 
referring to the universal rationality and moral truths, for the different groups to 
come to an agreement with one another if they do not share the same rationality 
and truths. While the psychological method of understanding one another seems 
to be a less effective way of finding solutions to conflicts, for example, people 
believe it deals only with feelings and emotions, and that it cannot in 
consequence be used to find any solutions; yet it turns out to be more effective in 
practice since it is easier for the different groups to agree with one another when 
they understand and feel empathy for one another.     
 
For all the above reasons – especially the different frameworks and the different 
methods to justify the universal values – it is clear that pluralism is a distinct 
theory from traditional (or enlightenment) liberalism (especially Rawls’ version).  
 
John Gray  
 
John Gray also believes that pluralism is a distinct theory from traditional 
liberalism. For example, he says:  
 
All the dominant liberalisms of our time, whether they be variations on Hobbesian or Lockean, 
Kantian or Millian themes, have conception of rational choice at their heart which Berlin’s value 
pluralism subverts. 
295
 
 
However, he says that the necessity of negative liberty (or the freedom to choose 
between the conflicting ultimate values) in pluralism entails that pluralism is 
liberalism. As mentioned, there are at least two ultimate values in pluralism, so 
pluralists need to compromise between them, and to thereby choose one and 
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sacrifice the other. To choose between and to sacrifice ultimate values requires 
pluralists to have freedom of choice and this, according to Gray, makes pluralism 
collapse into liberalism. Gray says: 
 
Value-pluralism supports liberalism here in that it is by the choices protected by negative 
freedom that we negotiate our way among incommensurable values.
296
    
 
With the belief that pluralism is a distinct theory from traditional liberalism, but 
whilst holding that it inevitably implies liberalism by its emphasis on the value of 
freedom of choice, Gray proposes his idea of pluralism as ‘agonist liberalism’ 
or a particular (non-absolute) liberalism. It is the liberal theory that does not 
always attach to the liberal core values, but which allows people in liberal 
societies to choose illiberal values and cultures. Gray explains agonist liberalism:  
 
It is manifest, first of all, that conceptions of the priority of the right over the good in political 
philosophy, of justice as the fist virtue of social institutions and of the neutrality of justice (and of 
the liberal state) with respect to specific conceptions of the good life, must all be abandoned. 
297
 
 
And if pluralism is liberalism such as in Gray’s version, pluralism tends to be a 
normative theory (PUT). And Gray seems to believe that pluralism is PUT. Gray 
says:  
 
Berlin’s central idea of pluralism in ultimate values denies human beings the metaphysical 
comfort, itself answering to a nearly universal human need, whereby their particular forms of life 
are accorded a universal authority…
298
 
 
However, it seems that if pluralism is another version of liberalism, as proposed 
by Gray, then it will be self-defeating. This will be explained in the following 
section.  
 
Gray’s agonist liberalism 
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Before claiming that Gray’s theory is self-defeating, it is worth observing the 
main ideas of his theory. Gray’s ‘agonist liberalism’ (elsewhere referred to as 
‘the other liberalism’ or ‘post-Enlightenment liberalism’) is a new liberal theory 
that he develops from his reading of Berlin’s pluralism. The overall ideas of 
Gray’s theory are that the cultural identity and cultural differences are important 
and should be taken into account.  Gray says: 
 
On the alternative view that I shall develop, the propensity to cultural difference is a primordial 
attribute of the human species; human identities are plural and diverse in their very natures, a 
natural languages are plural and diverse and they are always variations on particular forms of 
common life, never exemplars of universal humanity. 
299
 
 
As a result, Gray suggests that the demand for identity or cultural recognition 
should be accepted.  
 
Similar to Berlin, Gray rejects the notion of the absolute truth of all values; even 
the liberal core values. And he also rejects the aim of striving for perfection by 
attempting to realize a harmonious society. Like Berlin, he claims that values are 
incommensurable, but he seems to put it in an extreme way, in which the 
comparison of values from different contexts is completely impossible, and in 
which choosing between them is totally irrational. He says: 
 
[Agonist liberalism] consists in making a decision or a commitment that is groundless.300  
 
From the above, it seems that the agonist liberalism is very close to pluralism. 
The difference might be that Berlin’s pluralism does not rule out all the 
comparability of values and the rationality of choices. The ultimate values in 
pluralism (as mentioned in my first chapter) are comparable insofar as they are 
equally worthy as one another, and the choices between them can be made based 
upon people’s cultural reasons or identity. The facts that ultimate values are 
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equally worthy, and that choices between them can be made by appealing to 
cultural reasons, insist that there is some level of comparability and rationality in 
pluralism. It is not all groundless.  
 
The most important idea in Gray’s theory is that the liberal core values are not 
absolute, but can be sacrificed in some cases. By viewing the liberal values as 
non-absolute, Gray claims that liberal values belong merely to liberal culture, 
which is not universal but local. It is only one culture or one form of life among 
many others. Gray says: 
 
This has the large implication that allegiance to a liberal form of life must always be a matter of 
cultural solidarity, not of universalizing rationality.301  
 
And Crowder explains Gray’s idea:  
 
… [for Gray] liberal values are always in competition with others on an equal footing rather than 
always superior. They are locally valid, not universally. 
302
 
 
Therefore, his agonist liberalism is open to the illiberal values and cultures as 
well. He says that we should not exclude illiberal cultures on the grounds that 
their quality of life is worse or is not within the minimum universal requirement. 
On the contrary, some illiberal cultures are equally good or sometimes better off 
in their quality of life compared with liberal cultures. For example, Gray says: 
 
Liberal regimes may sometimes satisfy the minimum universal requirements of morality [such as 
freedom from the threat of violent death, human sympathy and fairness] less well than some non-
liberal or post liberal regimes.303  
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In this case, Gray seems to justify the illiberal cultures as equally worthy in their 
own contexts vis a vis liberal cultures. He also accepts their availability in his 
agonist liberalism. As Crowder explains:  
 
For Gray, the best possible world under pluralism is one in which there is a wide variety of ways 
of life and political regimes, some liberal, some not.
304
     
 
From all the above, whilst Gray’s agonist liberalism or his reading of Berlin’s 
pluralism is quite close to Berlin’s own view, his attempt to make it another 
version of liberalism seems failed. This is because while he tries to establish a 
liberalism that accepts its values as particular and/or does not attach itself to 
liberal core values all the time, it is hard for his version liberalism to retain the 
status of liberalism per se. His theory is thus forced to:   
 
Either 1) sacrifice the priority of the liberal core values: because Gray 
suggests that priority should be removed from liberal core values, he wants his 
theory to be without any such priority, or as mentioned, he wants it to be open to 
illiberal values as much as possible. However this is hardly possible, since 
liberalism without core values or with no priority at all will make it collapse into 
pluralism (which commits it to the equal worth of the ultimate values). It 
therefore cannot retain its status as liberalism in this case.     
 
Or 2) to retain the liberal core values: on the other hand, if Gray wants to hold 
onto the status of liberalism, he has to maintain the liberal core values and their 
hierarchical rank. But in order to retain them, his theory cannot be open to 
illiberal values to the extent that he desires. The illiberal cultures that he wants 
his agonist liberalism to accept would face difficulties in liberal societies where 
liberal values are still superior. As Gray says: 
 
They will be conflicts in which at least some non liberal regimes and cultural forms possess 
genuine virtues and harbor authentic excellences that are weak or lacking in liberal regimes.
305  
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Moreover, if Gray decides to retain liberal core values (in order to maintain its 
status as liberalism) his theory would become similar to the traditional liberalism 
which he himself rejects.  
 
According to the above, either way Gray’s agonist liberalism as liberalism would 
fail.  It is self-defeating. But if Gray proposes his theory as a form of pluralism, 
rather than maintaining its position as liberalism, his claim would be consistent.  
 
Freedom of choice 
 
When Gray’s agonist liberalism is self defeating and pluralism cannot be 
liberalism by his idea, there is still the issue that the freedom of choice that 
pluralism seems to require might entail liberalism. That is, pluralism might 
collapse into liberalism by having this value as a core value.  
 
However, the nature of choices and the purpose of freedom of choice in 
pluralism are different from those in liberalism. The differences will be spelled 
out as follows:  
 
1) The different natures of choices  
 
Choices in liberalism are limited. There are only liberal values and liberal 
cultures and some other cultures that have their ideas as consistent with liberal 
values such as freedom and equality. The illiberal values or cultures that restrict 
freedom of their members are not allowed in liberalism. As Kymlicka says:   
 
Yet Rawls does not allow traditionalist communitarian groups to establish millet-like systems. 
His definition of freedom of conscience is the full liberal one...
306
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Gray says that liberalism restricts the right based values such as freedom and 
equality as to be absolute while leaving the choices open only for the good based 
values such as the conceptions of the good. Gray says:  
 
In this standard liberal view, principles of justice or liberty are not substantive goods to be traded 
off against other goods, but regulative principles, principles of right which set terms on which 
competing goods and conceptions of the good can be pursued. 
307
 
   
Choices in pluralism on the other hand are more open. They do not limit only 
liberal values and cultures, but allow the illiberal values and cultures as well. 
Gray says that pluralism leaves the choices open for the alternatives of the right 
based values as well. In other words, pluralists accept the illiberal values as well. 
Gray claims:  
 
This argument presupposes the truth of precisely those conventional liberalisms which Berlin’s 
value pluralism challenges and that his claim that liberties may embody rivalrous and 
incommensurable values, if it is at all valid, destroys.
308
  
 
The only restriction in pluralism is that the values or cultures must be within the 
human horizon of non-violence and psychological conditions. In this case, many 
illiberal values and cultures do not have any problems to fit in. For example, 
Gray says:  
 
The likely prospect, on all current trends, is not only of the East Asian societies overtaking 
Western liberal individualist societies in the economic terms of growth, investment, saving and 
living standard; it is also of their doing so while preserving and enhancing common cultural 
forms which assure to their subjects personal security in their everyday lives and a public 
environment that is rich in choice worthy options. 
309
 
 
Because of the open choices in pluralism, Gray claims that pluralism is a more 
genuine liberal theory. That is, the welcoming of illiberal cultures entails greater 
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freedom of choice. On the other hand, the limitation of choices to only liberal 
values and cultures in traditional liberalism means the suppression of values. Or, 
it can mean that liberalism imposes their values on people. So between 
traditional liberalism and pluralism, pluralism, in Gray’s view, is a more genuine 
liberal theory.  
 
It is likely that Gray believes that the diversity of choices in pluralism (the 
welcome of the illiberal values) entails more freedom. However, while the 
choices in pluralism are not limited to only liberal values and cultures, it is 
possible that in some situations or contexts there might be no liberal choices for 
people to choose at all. There might be only illiberal choices for them to choose. 
This is because although Berlin supports negative liberty, he does not claim it to 
be absolute, and nor does he impose it on people as liberals do. For Berlin, 
negative liberty can be sacrificed in some necessary situations. And in the 
situations where pluralists decide to sacrifice negative liberty, there might be 
only illiberal values and cultures for people to choose. So the diversity of choices 
in pluralism in some cases might contain only non-freedom values or cultures. 
The diversity of choices in this case does not entail more freedom as Gray 
believes. It might entail non-freedom instead.  
 
On the other hand, as mentioned, the choices in liberalism must be between 
liberal values and cultures only, so liberal choices certainly entail freedom. But 
the fact that there is always only one sides of choices (only liberal values), it 
means that there can be no diversity of choices in liberalism. Put simply, the 
choices in liberalism entail only freedom but not diversity.    
 
In this case, freedom and diversity are not parallel with one another, or do not 
necessarily go together. They are distinct values. Gray seems to misinterpret that 
although the diversity of choices in pluralism must entail freedom, it is in fact not 
necessary. Pluralists can have diversity (of choices) without freedom (in some 
cases) and liberals seem to have freedom without diversity.  
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All the above discussions show the different natures of choices in liberalism and 
pluralism. The following discussion will be about the different purposes of their 
freedom of choice.  
 
2) Creating self-identity VS Resolving conflict  
 
Another difference regarding their freedom of choice is that liberals’ freedom of 
choice aims at self-creation. That is, the rational method which excludes the 
particular contexts of the persons before they enter into the OP makes their 
identity neutral. This identity is called the unencumbered self. Liberals believe 
that the persons with neutral identity (or unencumbered self) will use their 
rationality to the full, since they do not have to worry about their own particular 
interests. And their unencumbered self, which seems to be very general, will 
encourage the persons to reason and choose values that help them create their 
identity. As a result, they will choose freedom of choice to help them create or 
enhancing their identity further when they come out of the OP For example, 
Wolff says that they choose liberty to prevent any discrimination against the 
conceptions of the good that they might have outside the OP:     
 
As you do not know which group or groups you belong to it would be irrational to discriminate 
against one portion of society. 
310
 
 
While the persons in the O.P are influenced by their neutral identity, we might be 
able to assume that the persons in the O.P do not actually refer to their rationality 
to choose values as Rawls claims. But they tend to refer to their insecure 
emotions. That is, by their neutral identity, they might feel insecure not to know 
who they are. So they choose the values such as freedom to ensure that they can 
create their own identity; that they can choose to be what they want, outside the 
OP Freedom tends to make them feel more secure about their identity. The 
liberal rational method in this case turns out to be a psychological method. 
Barber also believes that the choices in the OP result from psychological 
conditions rather than from rationality:     
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All such strategies are cut from the same cloth and are part of a fabric that has nothing to do with 
rationality. In the absence of these kinds of preferences the two rules of justice simply are not 
defeasible as the inevitable choices of rational men in the OP  
311
 
 
And Wolff asks:  
 
Might this mean that the choice is a matter of temperament, rather than rationality? 
312
 
 
While the persons in the OP choose value such as freedom in order to enhance 
their identity further (outside the O.P), Gray claims that individuals in pluralism 
also choose values for the same reason – self-creation – despite the fact that in 
some situations there are only illiberal values for them to choose from. For 
example, Gray says that people in the illiberal cultures who are only able to 
choose illiberal values still choose in order to create their identity. Gray says:  
 
The value of negative freedom in Berlin’s thought is as a condition of self creation through 
choice making. The selves that are created or amended through choice making may or may not be 
selves which need negative freedom for their continued self creation.
313
    
  
However, it seems unlikely that the persons in pluralism choose values for self-
creation (or anything relating to the conception of the self). This is because 
Berlin does not agree with the unencumbered self of the liberals. He tends to 
agree more with the idea of collective self proposed by communitarians. The 
notion of a collective self stems from the claim that people develop their self 
from society and cultures and are not interested in developing it further by their 
own choices. Berlin gives an indication that he agrees with the collective self 
when he says that:  
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The ways in which men live, think, feel, speak to one another, the clothes they wear, the songs 
the sing, the God they worship, the food the eat, the assumptions, customs, habits, which are 
intrinsic to them, it is this that creates communities, each of which has its own life-style. 
314
 
 
With this type of identity, the persons in pluralism need not to choose values that 
help them create their identity. They have their identity already, and they know it 
(they do not forget it as do the persons in the O.P). As a result, individuals in 
pluralism tend to choose values only for resolving conflicts. That is, in their 
psychological method, pluralists ask the persons to enter into the life of other 
cultures and to understand and feel empathy for them. So the persons usually 
grant the values of others as being of equal worth to their own. Finally, there will 
always be at least two equally worthy values conflicting with one another and the 
persons in pluralism need to choose between them. Freedom of choice in 
pluralism is required at this stage for the persons to resolve conflicts between two 
equally worthy values that are conflicting with one another. Freedom of choice is 
therefore not for them to create their personal identity but only for resolving 
conflicts of values.      
 
Put simply, the purposes of freedom of choice in the two theories are different. 
For liberalism, because the persons in the OP have neutral identity, they reason 
and choose the value of freedom in order to develop and create their initial 
neutral identity. For pluralism, in the inside view, the persons already know their 
collective identity and do not want to create it further. They just want to 
understand and feel empathy for others’ identity. As a result, they grant the 
identity and the values of others as being of equal worth to their own; and when 
two values are equally worthy but naturally conflicting, the persons need to refer 
to their freedom of choice to choose between them in order to resolve the 
conflict. The two theories therefore have different purposes from one another in 
requiring and using freedom of choice.     
 
If the above analysis is true, freedom of choice in liberalism seems to be more 
genuine than that of pluralism, since liberals use their freedom to choose for 
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themselves (i.e. in order to create their identity). It is not a restriction for them to 
choose; rather, they are willing to do so for themselves. Pluralists however do not 
use their freedom to choose for themselves, but view it more as a restriction that 
obliges them to choose in order to resolve conflicts between values that always 
exist. Although it seems to be paradoxical, it is true that freedom of choice in 
pluralism is a restriction; that is, it is necessary for the persons in pluralism to 
choose, rather than them having a will to choose as in liberalism.     
 
Alternatively, we can see freedom of choice in pluralism as an instrument to 
resolve conflicts or to manage values, rather than as a core value as liberalism 
holds. And if it is merely an instrument to resolve conflicts, freedom of choice in 
pluralism might not be one of the ultimate values (or one of the choices). 
Pluralist ultimate values or the values on top of the rank can be, as mentioned, all 
illiberal values (such as in some situations or contexts), and the persons involved 
in pluralism must refer to freedom of choice in order to choose or to manage 
those illiberal values. This is how freedom of choice is used in pluralism; it is 
used as an instrument, not as a value. In liberalism, on the other hand, freedom 
must be one of the top ranking ultimate values. It is clearly a core value in 
liberalism.  
 
Therefore, Gray’s claim that freedom of choice in pluralism might make 
pluralism collapse into liberalism seems to be false, since freedom of choice 
plays a different role in pluralism to that which it plays in liberalism. The most 
important reason is that freedom of choice is not conducted in pluralism for self-
creation, as Gray claims, but merely as a means of managing conflicts between 
equally ultimate values. Freedom of choice has a different purpose in pluralism 
than in liberalism, and therefore does not make pluralism collapse into 
liberalism.      
 
To conclude chapter 4, there are three main differences between pluralism and 
liberalism. Firstly, their frameworks are different. The liberal framework is 
similar to the priority monism which has one compatible group of values on top 
of the ranking. There is no conflict of values since the conflicting values are 
ranked below the ultimate ones by the universal rationality; to choose one over 
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the other does not create the sense of loss, but is instead only a trade-off. The 
pluralist framework, on the other hand, has at least two values of equal worth to 
one another, on top of the ranking. They are normally conflicting with one 
another, since there is no appeal to the universal ranking at this stage in 
pluralism, but this conflict needs to be resolved by choosing one over the other. 
This always creates a sense of loss, since they are equally worthy as one another.  
 
Secondly, their methods of justifying universal values are different. Liberals 
refers to the rational method while pluralist refers to the psychological method. 
These different methods lead them to a number of other differences, such as their 
different conceptions of the universal values, their different methods to eliminate 
prejudice, their different possibilities of applying their methods to the real world, 
and their different perspectives to resolve conflicts in practice.   
 
Finally, Gray claims that pluralism inevitably collapses into liberalism since it 
requires freedom of choice to choose between the ultimate values. However, 
after the investigation that has been conducted here, the freedom of choice in 
liberalism and that in pluralism can be seen to have different purposes from one 
another.   
 
If the two theories are independent from one another, we can contend that Berlin 
does not write pluralism in order to present it as another version of traditional 
liberalism or to make it PUT by combining it with traditional liberalism. Instead, 
he seems to merely present his idea of pluralism, which might only have some 
overlapping elements with liberalism (such as negative liberty or freedom of 
choice).  
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Chapter 5 – Pluralism as a PPT (a particular theory) and as a PMT (a meta-
theory) 
 
If pluralism is independent from both theories of liberalism – i.e. from the 
counter-enlightenment liberalism and from traditional liberalism – then clearly it 
does not combine them, and we can in consequence conclude that it should not 
be considered a PUT (a universal theory) on this basis.  We can thus now move 
to the next step of our argument, which is to weigh up the evidence as to whether 
pluralism can still be viewed as a PUT despite this independence, or whether it 
should instead be seen as a PPT (a particular theory) or as a PMT (a meta-
theory). As mentioned in the first chapter, pluralism may hold one or more 
positions amongst these three options.  
 
The evidences for pluralism as a PPT and the rejection of its status as a PUT 
 
Two of these positions – PUT and PPT – are incompatible with one another. 
Pluralism cannot be both; it can only be one or the other. It seems that Berlin’s 
comments on pluralism lead towards the conclusion that it should be considered 
a PPT; this therefore immediately implies the rejection of pluralism as PUT. The 
evidence for pluralism as a PPT rather than as a PUT is as follows.  
 
1) Incompatibility: in the previous chapters of this thesis we’ve seen that 
pluralism is a distinct theory from the two theories of liberalism. We can also see 
that the main elements of these three theories (pluralism and the two theories of 
liberalism) conflict with one another. Their conceptual frameworks can be set out 
as follows:  
 
The framework of pluralism consists of at least two ultimate values, relative to 
their contexts or cultures, which are of equal worth to one another. They are 
justified as ultimate by the psychological method of the inside view. They are 
within the scope of the human horizon of non-violence and the psychological 
conditions which are the criteria for accepting values in pluralism. And because 
of the equal status of the ultimate values, they must always be compromised, or 
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one of them must always be chosen over the other if a conflict between them is to 
be resolved.      
 
The framework of traditional liberalism is based around the value of freedom and 
other compatible values, which are justified as ultimate in relation to others by 
the method of rational enquiry, as in the OP. The ultimate liberal values are 
objective and/or absolute. They cannot be compromised or sacrificed.   
 
The framework of counter-enlightenment liberalism derives from a notion of 
freedom (freedom of the will) which is not justified by any basis at all. In other 
words, there is no ground for judgment in the counter-enlightenment liberalism. 
Freedom in this theory, therefore, is not objective or absolute, due to the lack of 
the ground for judgment. There are no other values which are ranked (by 
counter-enlightenment liberals) as being of equal worth to freedom. Freedom as 
the only ultimate value, however, can be sacrificed for other values in some 
necessary cases, so as to prevent radical revolutions or any violent activities.  
 
From the above, the frameworks of the three theories are obviously incompatible 
with one another; and if they are incompatible, then they cannot be reconciled 
into one and the same theory, and cannot be employed at the same time. 
 
This is similar to when two values are incompatible: in such a circumstance they 
cannot be reconciled, and we cannot have them both at the same time. For 
example, the values of humility and pride cannot be reconciled and supported 
simultaneously. Berlin says:  
 
…the Christian and the pagan answers to moral or political questions might both be correct given 
the premises from which they start; that these premises were not demonstrably false, only 
incompatible; and that no single overarching standard or criterion was available to decide 
between, or reconcile, these wholly opposed moralities.
315
    
 
Moreover, regarding the irreconcilability, Berlin says:  
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There are many objective ends, ultimate values, some incompatible with others, pursued by 
different societies […] anyone of which may find itself subject to conflicting claims of 
uncombinable…
316
 
 
It seems that Berlin would believe the same for theories; that is, he would believe 
that incompatible theories, such as the three theories mentioned above, are 
irreconcilable, and we cannot subscribe to them at the same time.  
 
2) Incommensurability: When the three theories are incompatible and 
irreconcilable, Berlin tends to believe that they are incommensurable as well. As 
mentioned earlier, Berlin does not believe in impartial methods of judgment that 
do not take contexts into account. So he would never refer to impartial rationality 
as the method of judgment, and nor would he refer to any other types of universal 
ranking. The indication that he rejects all types of universal ranking is for 
example:  
 
To assume that all values can be graded on one scale, so that it is a mere matter of inspection to 
determine the highest, seems to me to falsify our knowledge that men are free agents…
317
 
 
However, the universal ranking is the only way to judge and arrive at the one best 
answer to everything. Without an appeal to the universal ranking, there is no 
basis to judge pluralism as the one best theory (PUT). Even if Berlin wants 
pluralism to be a universal theory, he does not have any basis at all (insofar as he 
has rejected universal ranking) to support this position.  
 
Moreover, Berlin relies on the psychological method of the inside view – the 
attempt to understand the contexts of others, and to justify answers based on that 
understanding. It is not possible by this method that he could arrive at only one 
best answer. This is because if we can fully understand other contexts or cultures, 
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then it follows that we would justify many of them, if not all of them; certainly 
never only one of them.  
 
Berlin says that we can always sympathize with other contexts or cultures. He 
says:  
 
Members of one culture can understand and enter the minds of, and sympathize with, those of 
another. 
318
  
So by our understanding and sympathy with others, we tend to justify many of 
them and never to justify only ours. By this idea of understanding and sympathy 
with others, Berlin cannot justify pluralism as the one best theory (PUT). He 
would justify many other theories as well.  
 
Without the universal ranking, and by the method of the inside view, we can say 
that Berlin always takes contexts into account when he makes judgments of 
anything. Refer to the descriptions in the first chapter, when Berlin judges 
values, he takes contexts into account. And he is unable to judge one value as 
better than another, or being a supreme value, since each value is ultimate within 
its own contexts. For example, if he takes into account the contexts (in this case 
the musical categories) in which Mozart and the Beatles are situated, he would be 
unable to judge either Mozart or the Beatles as better than the other: each one is 
ultimate in its own category.   
 
It seems that Berlin would judge theories in the same way, that is, by taking 
contexts into account. The outcome would be the same that he would be unable 
to judge one theory as better than the other or, as a universal theory (PUT), 
including even pluralism. That is, if he takes into account the context of 
traditional liberalism, the context of counter-enlightenment liberalism and also 
the context of pluralism, he would be unable to judge one theory as better than 
the others: each is ultimate in its own context.  
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John Gray also agrees on the idea that political theories especially liberalism are 
contextual dependent. He says:  
 
The task for liberal theory, as I see it, is […] to retheorize liberalism as itself a particular form of 
common life. 
319
  
 
Contexts of theories  
 
Having said that political theories tend to be ultimate in the different contexts, 
the following will be examples of contexts that the three theories would flourish. 
These examples are implied from the theories’ conceptual frameworks as well as 
the consistent demands and/or claims from the theorists of each theory. Although 
there are many elements that could be considered as contexts for theories, in this 
thesis we will specify ‘contexts’ as the perspectives, held by the majority of a 
population; perspectives that are influenced by the conditions of their societies 
(such as history and culture) and by the relations between the political and 
cultural spheres of those societies. Put simply, the contexts of theories are the 
specific characteristics of the people and the society to which the theory best 
corresponds.   
 
The context of traditional liberalism  
 
For traditional liberalism, the context might be one in which people value 
freedom and rationality over cultural differences or cultural identities. This might 
result from the condition of their society. That is, their society may have a shorter 
history (such as the new nation like the US). Their cultures tend to have existed 
for a shorter period compared with those in other societies. Therefore, people in 
that society tend not to be committed to their cultures so deeply. They do not 
tend to make demands for the recognition and/or the self-determination of their 
cultures. In this case, although there are a diversity of cultures or religions in that 
society, by virtue of the shorter history of their society and cultures, the people 
within them are not so deeply attached to them, and do not demand recognition 
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for them. They seem to have a rather independent attitude towards their cultures, 
in that they can quit their membership with them at any time they wish. While 
they are less attached to their cultures, it follows that their identities are likely to 
be close to the unencumbered one. From all the above descriptions, we can say 
that the condition of people and society is quite close to the condition of the 
parties and society in the OP, in which the parties’ identities are unencumbered 
and the society is non-historical and non-cultural. Therefore, it is likely that the 
people in liberal context would value freedom and rationality (which is contrary 
to cultural attachments) over cultural identities, as do the parties in the OP. 
 
When people in society value freedom and rationality over cultural identities, the 
government of that society tends to create a clear distinction between the political 
(or public) sphere and the cultural (or personal) sphere. In the political sphere, 
they will refer entirely to freedom and rationality in order to reach decisions on 
public policy. They will prevent the cultural sphere (such as cultural or religious 
beliefs and demands) from interfering with the decisions. In this case, we might 
be able to say that they give priority to freedom and rationality over cultural 
beliefs by preventing the latter from interfering with the former. As a result the 
latter would not have a chance to receive or share any political power with the 
former at all.  
 
According to Dees, the context of liberalism or the society that best suits 
liberalism is the one with a clear distinction between political and cultural 
spheres. He says:  
 
The key elements of liberalism are not individual rights and freedoms or autonomy and self 
determination, although it supports all of these but the practices that embody the conceptual and 
social distinctions that become significant after the conflicts of the 17th century. Those practices 
encouraged a practical division between wealth and rank, between person and office and between 
religion and government. What they have in common is that they participate in what Michael 
Walzer has called the ‘art of separation’.  
 
On this view, liberalism is characterized by the political separation of realms of value – so that 
religious influence cannot be converted into political power […] the root intuitions are that 
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success in one realm should not be automatically converted into success in another and that 
considerations from one realm should have no weight in another. 
320
 
 
This division of the political and cultural spheres is consistent with Rawls’s PL. 
As Kymlicka explains:      
 
One way to understand Rawls’s Political Liberalism is to say that, for Rawls, people can be 
communitarians in private life and liberals in public life. 
321
 
 
Kymlicka says that by the division of the two spheres in PL, Rawls in fact gives 
more weight to the value of freedom and rationality (as in the overlapping 
consensus) over cultural demands. Kymlicka says:  
 
Yet Rawls does not allow traditionalist communitarian groups to establish millet-like systems. 
His definition of freedom of conscience is the full liberal one, which protects the right of 
individuals to reject their inherited religion as well as tolerance between religious groups. 
322
  
 
So it seems that the division of the two spheres does not help to give equal 
weight to the cultural differences, as Rawls claims, but on the contrary helps to 
give more weight to the value of freedom and rationality by preventing the 
interference of the cultural sphere on the political one. Gray says:  
 
The key move in Rawlsian political liberalism, in other words, is the removal from political life 
[in this case Gray means cultural/religious beliefs] of the principles specifying the basic liberties 
and justice in distribution.[…] the object of Rawlsian political liberalism is the removal of these 
distinguishing marks of the political from both its method and its results. In consequence political 
life is in Rawlsian political liberalism void of substance. 
323
 
 
From the above, it can be considered that in a society where people value 
freedom and rationality over cultural identities, it tends to follow that the 
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political and cultural spheres will be clearly separated, so as to give priority to 
the value of freedom and rationality in the political sphere without the 
interference of cultural or religious beliefs and demands. In other words, they 
clearly separate the two spheres in order to stress the liberal values and reduce 
(or even get rid of) the power of the cultural values in the political sphere. In this 
case, there will be no attempt to establish a balance between liberal values and 
cultural demands, or no compromise of the former towards the latter, but only the 
former’s priority. And, according to Dees, this is the context that best suits 
liberalism.  
 
An example of the denial to balance or compromise of the political sphere 
towards the cultural demands can be the rejection of wearing the burqa in France 
as Grayling mentions:  
 
…it’s important to note that what is meant by “banning the burqa” is that any French citizen who 
accesses public provisions of the French state, such as education or welfare, is required to do so 
as a French citizen, rather than as a member of one or another self-selected identity group such as 
constitutes a religion. I don’t think France is asking anybody not to wear their religious symbols 
or their religious dress in their own private time. What it’s saying is, if you want to access public 
provision in some way, don’t come disguised, masked, or wearing any major religious symbol, 
which seems to give the message that you’re demanding you be treated differently.
324
  
 
To conclude, the context that best suits liberalism seems to be one in which 
people (or rather the majority of people) value freedom and rationality over 
cultural identities. Their identities and society are close to the condition of the 
OP. And there is a clear distinction between the political and cultural spheres, so 
as to ensure that the latter cannot receive or share political power with the 
former. 
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The context of counter-enlightenment liberalism/communitarianism  
 
For counter-enlightenment liberalism, as mentioned in chapters 2 and 3, the 
ultimate value is free will (or freedom without foundations). One might claim 
that free will has later been developed into the demands for identity politics or 
the demands for cultural recognition (which are often demands to be free from 
universal justification). If this is true, we can say that the ideas of counter-
enlightenment liberalism later became developed into communitarian theory. 
Although the claims of the three thinkers (Herzen, Tolstoy and Turgenev) 
described in chapter 2 and 3 were based around free will, not cultural identities, 
other counter-enlightenment thinkers do base their claims on the latter. Vico and 
Herder, for example, stress the need for a diversity of culturess. Berlin says:  
 
[Herder] maintained that values were not universal, every human society, every people, indeed 
every age and civilization, possesses its own unique ideals, standards, way of living and thought 
and action. […] Every society, every age, has its own cultural horizons. Every nation has its own 
traditions, its own character, its own face. Every nation has its own centre of moral gravity, 
which differs from that of every other; there and only there its happiness lies – in the 
development of its own national needs, its own unique character.  
325
 
 
On the basis of this interpretation of Vico and Herder who are, in Berlin’s view, 
significant counter-enlightenment thinkers, we might be able to affirm that 
counter-enlightenment ideas – especially those focused on cultures – have been 
developed into communitarian theory.  
 
For the context of communitarianism, it seems to be contrary to that of traditional 
liberalism. That is, the perspective of people that best suits communitarianism is 
one in which people value cultural identities over freedom and rationality. This 
tends to result from the condition of their society. That is, their society tends to 
have a lengthy history, and their cultures tend to have existed for a long period 
compared to those in other societies. Therefore, people in that society tend to be 
committed deeply to their cultures. They tend to make demands for the 
recognition and/or self-determination of their cultures. In this case, it does not 
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matter if there is a diversity of cultures in society; the lengthy history of their 
society and cultures still makes people deeply attach to them, and this deep 
commitment makes it less probable for them to quit their membership of their 
cultures (unlike people in the above context). Their identities in this case are 
likely to be the collective one. As a result, it is likely that they would value their 
cultural identities (including their cultural rationality) over the value of freedom 
and (impartial) rationality (which is often contrary to cultural beliefs). This 
condition of people and society is clearly opposed to the condition of the parties 
and society in the OP (where the parties’ identities are unencumbered and the 
society is non-historical and non-cultural). The result of this condition of people 
and society therefore turns out to be opposed to that of liberalism. That is, they 
would value cultural identities over the value of freedom and rationality.    
 
When people in society value cultural identities over freedom and rationality, 
they tend not to have the division between the political and cultural spheres. The 
demands from the cultural or personal spheres can always be raised in the 
discussions of the political sphere. The political sphere will refer to freedom and 
rationality to a lesser extent than cultural rationality or cultural beliefs when 
reaching decisions on public policy. In other words, cultural rationality or beliefs 
have more influence on decisions of public policy than freedom and rationality. 
Most of the time, the state would agree to grant some political power to some 
cultures according to their cultural demands, such as granting them the 
recognition of their traditions, or in some cases independent political authority. 
Kymlicka gives examples of the cultural groups that ask for the recognition of 
their differences, such as:  
 
…many religious minorities who feel stigmatized and excluded from the national culture, and 
who seek various forms of recognition of their differences (e.g. public recognition of their 
religious holidays, exemptions from laws that interfere with religious worship such as animal 
slaughtering legislation that prohibits the ritually prescribed form of slaughtering for Jews and 
Muslims, or dress codes which prevent Sikhs from wearing their turbans in the army or police). 
326  
 
                                                
326
 Kymlicka, 2002, 330-331  
 175 
And the examples of the groups that ask for independent political authority:  
 
…many indigenous peoples, who reject integration in the name of maintaining themselves as 
distinct nations or people, and who claim a variety of differentiated rights to achieve this goal, 
including land claims, treaty rights and self government powers. 
327
 
 
If the government always grants these cultures the recognition of their 
differences or in some cases grants them an independent political authority, we 
might be able to say that the government in that society gives priority to cultural 
identities over the value of freedom and rationality. That is, they would not refer 
to liberal values (and practical reasoning) as the universal justification of public 
policy, and nor would they try to balance or compromise between liberal values 
and cultural values. But they always take the beliefs and demands of cultures as 
the main factors for the decisions on the public policy. In other words, they 
always allow the cultural sphere to be involved with the political sphere (on 
public policy), or to have influence upon it.   
 
To conclude, from this view of the context that best suits communitarianism, we 
might be able to say that it is most likely to be found where people seem to value 
cultural identities over freedom and rationality. Their identities are the collective 
ones, as opposed to those of the OP, and there is no division between the political 
and cultural spheres: both influence one another. Canada could be an example of 
such a context. The Hutterites (large agricultural communities in Canada), based 
on their religious beliefs, try to restrict the freedom of their members. For 
example, they say that it is according to their religious doctrine that their 
members could not leave their group ‘without abandoning everything, even the 
clothes on their backs’. In this case, the Canadian Supreme Court permits them to 
do so, on the basis of their religious doctrine. It is clear in this case that, in 
Canada, the cultural sphere can always be involved with and/or receive political 
recognition from the political sphere. Kymlicka says:  
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…the majority of justices on the Canadian Supreme Court defended the right of the Hutterites to 
expel apostates without any compensation…[…] the Supreme Court only reached the opposite 
conclusion [to Rawls’ PL] by subordinating the individual rights of freedom of conscience to the 
group’s right to uphold religious doctrine… 
328
 
 
The context of pluralism  
 
For pluralism, Berlin also claims to have supported demands for group rights and 
the self-determination of some nations, such as Zionism. As Wollheim explains 
Berlin:  
 
Zionism is a discrete nationalism, and one which Berlin supported, despite his hostility to the 
Jewish religion.
329
  
 
However, Berlin is not a communitarian since he does not support the self-
determination of all nations. Wollheim says:  
 
[Berlin] made really something of an exception in favor of Zionism […] he did show himself less 
sympathetic to other nationalisms with their communitarian bases. 
330
  
 
As mentioned in chapter 3, Berlin is an eclectic who tries to balance liberal and 
cultural demands (or balance the enlightenment ideas and the counter 
enlightenment ones). The context that best suits the theory of pluralism seem to 
be the one in which people do not favor freedom and rationality over cultural 
identities but give them equal weight. In such a society there tends to be a 
lengthy history of nation and a lengthy history of cultures. People tend to be 
committed to their cultures deeply. Their identities are likely to be the collective 
one. There tends to be some demands for the recognition and/or self-
determination from some cultures.  
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However, while people are committed deeply to their cultures, they are also 
committed to the neutral liberal values such as freedom and rationality. They 
might have seen the neutral liberal values as one culture among many (e.g. 
political culture), which they also accept and respect. As a result, they would not 
value cultural values over liberal values or vice versa, but would rather value 
them equally, even though these two opposed sides of values often conflict with 
one another. This condition of people and society is consistent with the condition 
of Berlin’s inside view, which takes into account societal history and cultures, 
but which at the same time does not rule out the political values (or political 
culture) that conflict with them. The result of this condition of people and society 
therefore turns out to accord with Berlin’s pluralism, which justifies all ultimate 
values, cultural and political, as equally worthy as one another.   
 
When people in this type of society give equal weight to politics and cultures, 
there might be, to some extent, division between the political sphere and the 
cultural sphere. However, they would allow the spill-over in some cases, as 
Berlin claims that the clear distinction does not always work well:  
 
A sharp distinction between public and private life, or politics and morality, never works well. 
331
  
 
And  
 
…the limits of private and public domain are difficult to demarcate, that anything a man does 
could, in principle, frustrate others; that no man is an island; that the social and the individual 
aspects of human beings often cannot, in practice, be disentangled. 
332
   
 
Since people in this context give both sides (politics and culture) an equal 
weight, they must try to balance them. Sometimes, they might allow cultures to 
raise their demands in the political sphere, while at other times they might not 
allow them to do so. The decision on whether or not they would allow the 
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involvement of cultures in the political sphere seems to rest on a case by case 
basis. Berlin mentions the attempt to balance between the two spheres as:  
 
The extent of men’s, or a people’s, liberty to choose to live as they desire must be weighed 
against the claims of many other values…
333
 
 
We can say that, in this context, the government might agree with the recognition 
of some cultures, or that they might grant independent authority to them in some 
necessary cases, since the government tries to balance between the cultural 
demands and the political values. But there would not be as many agreements (on 
cultural demands) as in the context of communitarianism, where people value 
cultural identities over rationality.    
 
The difference between the pluralist context and the communitarian context is 
therefore that communitarian context gives priority to cultural demands over 
political values while the pluralist context gives them an equal emphasis (i.e. no 
priority). Gray states this difference by saying that communitarians give entire 
weight to the cultural identities, while pluralists stress the diversity of values in 
society, not only the cultural ones. He says:  
 
We all – all of us, at any rate, who belong to a modern culture, and live in a modern society – 
have plural allegiances, belong to diverse communities, and  know the experience of conflicting 
roles. […] Both the left wing and the right wing communitarian versions of the ideal of an 
integral or organic community flout this fact of the complexity and conflict which is the 
inheritance of all of us.
334
 
 
Hardy also affirms the attempt to balance between the two opposed sides 
(political and cultural spheres) by saying that the pluralist context does not agree 
with the cultural demands all the time, especially if they are against those of 
human rights. The pluralist context, on the other hand, always refers to freedom 
and rationality (or political values), balances them equally with the cultural 
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demands, and thereby decides whether or not they would justify cultural rights. 
As Hardy says:  
…it is not sensible, despite the stipulations of political correctness, to regard all bona fide 
cultures […] as automatically of equal merits, simply in virtue of their status as cultures…
335
 
 
Berlin says, in some cases, restriction is needed:  
 
We justify them on the ground that ignorance or a barbarian upbringing or cruel pleasures and 
excitements are worse for us than the amount of restraint needed to repress them. 
336
 
 
To conclude, from the above context that best suits pluralism, we might be able 
to say that it is where people seem to favor freedom and rationality to the same 
extent with cultural identities. There might be, to some extent, division between 
the political and cultural spheres. But the division is not clear-cut, as the political 
sphere sometimes accepts the demands of some cultures to be discussed in the 
political sphere. They will balance the cultural demands equally with the political 
values, and they will agree to compromise political values to some extent with 
the cultural demands; or, in some necessary cases, grant some cultures the 
recognition of their differences.  
 
The above claims are only examples of contexts that seem to best suit the three 
theories. The context for traditional liberalism is one in which people, as 
supported by history and cultures in their society, favor freedom and rationality 
over cultural identities. The context for the counter-enlightenment liberalism or 
the communitarian view is one in which people, as supported by history and 
cultures in their society, favor cultural identities over freedom and rationality. 
The context for pluralism is one in which people, as supported by history and 
cultures in their society, favor both sides equally. While each theory is 
appropriate in each context (especially for the different characteristics of people 
and society), it is difficult to refer to any universal ranking to compare them and 
justify one as being the supreme, or normative.  
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It should be noted that Berlin does not make claims as to the contexts of any 
theories, especially that of pluralism, but these views can be implied, if not only 
from the frameworks of theories and the claims of theorists, from Berlin’s idea of 
incommensurability or the lack of universal ranking, which tends to apply to 
theories as well.   
 
3) Equally worthy: from the above implication, the three theories are 
incommensurable in the sense that they are ultimate in the different contexts and, 
by this implication, Berlin would be unable to justify one as better than the 
others. He would then justify them (pluralism, counter-enlightenment liberalism 
and traditional liberalism) as equally worthy as one another, in the same way that 
he justifies ultimate values held in different contexts. To justify these theories as 
equally worthy, Berlin can refer to the three ways that are used to justify ultimate 
values as equally worthy in pluralism.  
 
That is, firstly, he can justify them as equally worthy by their equally ultimate 
conceptions. That is, even if Berlin takes into account the conceptions (or the 
frameworks) of the three theories (without taking into account their contexts) and 
compares them impartially, as in the OP environment, he might not be able to 
claim one as better than the other. This is because their conceptions are ultimate 
in their different aspects; for example, the conception of traditional liberalism is 
ultimate in terms of rationality, the conception of counter-enlightenment 
liberalism is ultimate in terms of free will and the conception of pluralism is 
ultimate in terms of the balance and compromise between conflicting values. If 
Berlin needs to compare them, therefore he tends to justify all of them as equally 
worthy to one another, based on their equally ultimate conceptions.  
 
Secondly, he can justify these three theories as equally worthy by the respect and 
commitment people have for them. The ethical or political theories, by the views 
of some scholars such as Lukes, can be seen to be in the category of cultures or 
sacred values, and when they are sacred values it means that there are a number 
of people committed to them (in this case, different groups of people are 
committed to different theories). By the commitment or respect that people (of 
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different groups) have for them equally, people sometimes avoid comparing 
them and instantly grant them as equally worthy to one another. This is in the 
same way as when they avoid comparing their religions with one another, and 
agree to grant all as equally worthy.  
 
Considering the commitment or respect that Berlin himself has for the three 
theories, it seems that he values them equally. There are a number of indications 
showing his admiration for the counter-enlightenment liberalism and traditional 
liberalism to the extent that we can see his justification for them as equally 
worthy to pluralism. For example, he mentions the counter-enlightenment thinker 
such as Herder (whose idea is consistent to communitarians) in a way that 
indicates that he entirely agrees with him. Berlin says:  
 
Herder speaks for the counter-enlightenment when he says that ‘each culture has its own centre of 
gravity’. Herder means by this that different civilizations pursue different goals and they are 
entitled to pursue them. The fact that we are not Greeks is not against us, the fact that we are not 
Romans is not a reproach. The idea of trying to make us like the Romans is to distort our proper 
nature. 
337
  
 
His admiration for the counter-enlightenment thinkers can also be referred to the 
three Russian thinkers mentioned in chapter 2. Consider traditional liberalism, 
Berlin also shows his admiration for them (although he is not consistent in his 
claims). Sometimes he even claims himself to be a liberal rationalist. He says:  
 
Fundamentally, I am a liberal rationalist. The values of the enlightenment, what people like 
Voltaire, Helvetius, Holbach, Condorcet, preached, are deeply sympathetic to me.
338
  
 
By his admiration for the counter-enlightenment liberalism and traditional 
liberalism, it is likely that he would avoid comparing them with pluralism and 
would, if he is asked to compare them, justify them as equally worthy to 
pluralism.    
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Thirdly, Berlin can justify the three theories as equally worthy by referring to the 
mutual understanding between the theorists of the different theories. Mutual 
understanding can be found, for example, when liberals can understand the 
pluralist framework and accept its worthiness (such as its worthiness to some 
contexts) even if they do not personally agree with it, and vice versa. When 
theorists have this mutual understanding of one another, it is likely that they can 
agree to justify the theories of others as equally worthy to their own theories. 
Berlin himself, as he is committed to the inside view, has tried to understand 
other theories (such as the counter-enlightenment liberalism and traditional 
liberalism) to the full, and would be able to justify them as equally worthy to 
pluralism.  
 
4) Particular theory: If the three theories are justified as equal to one another, 
and if we cannot have all of them at the same time (since they are incompatible, 
as mentioned), it follows that we have to choose each of them according to 
context. Pluralism, as one of the three, must be chosen according to context as 
well. For example, pluralism must be chosen in the context as mentioned above, 
and not in other contexts. There should not be any exception for pluralism, so as 
to render it a universal theory, when pluralism is equally worthy to the other two.  
 
Although there is no claim from Berlin saying that pluralism is a particular 
theory, all indications – as already mentioned – lead to the conclusion that it is a 
particular theory (PPT).  
 
Pluralism as a particular theory can be illustrated as:  
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From  the above explanations, the evidences (in Berlin’s pluralism) that prove 
pluralism to be a particular theory (i.e. its incompatibility, incommensurability 
and equal worth to the other two theories) are based on the same evidences that 
prove the ultimate values in pluralism to be particular values (such as being 
relative to their contexts or cultures). In other words, the evidence that proves the 
ultimate values in pluralism as particular can be used to prove that the theory of 
pluralism is particular too.    
 
To conclude this section, from a number of indications, it shows that the three 
theories (pluralism, liberalism and counter-enlightenment liberalism) are 
incompatible in the sense that their frameworks cannot be reduced into one and 
the same framework, or it is not possible have all of them at the same time. They 
are also incommensurable in the sense that there is no universal ranking to justify 
the best one (at least in Berlin’s view); they tend to be ultimate in their different 
contexts. However, Berlin seems to rank them as equally worthy as one another 
based on their equally ultimate conceptions, his commitments to them equally 
and his full understanding of them. By the equal status he gives them and the fact 
that they cannot be employed at the same time, it is necessary to choose each of 
them according to context. This leads to the conclusion that pluralism (as well as 
the other two theories) according to Berlin is particular.  
 
 
 
 
Pluralism as PPT = equally 
worthy as enlightenment 
liberalism and counter-
enlightenment liberalism  
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The universal human nature: the need for a diversity of cultures 
 
While the above conclusion that pluralism is PPT is based mainly on the idea that 
Berlin does not agree with the use of any universal ranking to compare theories, 
one might ask if there is other way for Berlin to claim pluralism as a universal 
theory without necessarily referring to any universal ranking or reasoning. Is 
there another element that might justify that pluralism can be applied to all 
contexts or cultures? It is possible that universal human nature can be used as a 
basis to justify pluralism as a universal theory. There are three elements in 
Berlin’s account that can be seen in terms of universal human nature: 1) the 
central core of non-violence; 2) the psychological ability to empathize others; 
and 3) the universal need for a diversity of culture. As regards the third, although 
Berlin does not claim it directly as an aspect of universal human nature, he often 
stresses the point in his writings. We can assume that, for Berlin, the need for a 
diversity of culture is part of universal human nature. Crowder says:  
 
A sense of belonging, of feeling at home in your surroundings among people who understand 
you, is for Berlin a basic good for all human beings. 
339
 
 
And  
 
In general, Berlin believes that human cultures are valuable and that cultural diversity is 
desirable. 
340
 
 
Among the three elements, the first two – the demand for non-violence and the 
feeling of empathy – are not a sufficient basis for justifying pluralism as a 
universal theory, since these elements by themselves do not specify pluralism. 
Other theories such as liberalism can also have them. For example, liberalism has 
the element of human rights, which is quite close to the demand for non-violence 
and the feeling of empathy. These two elements can be used as criteria to justify 
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the acceptable values in pluralism, but they cannot be used to justify pluralism as 
a universal theory.  
 
Apart from those two elements, the third one – the universal need for a diversity 
of cultures – might be able to justify pluralism as a universal theory, since it 
seems to specify pluralism. That is, if all people have the need for belonging at 
all times, by their differing cultures, they will always demand for a diversity of 
cultures in their societies. And pluralists can claim that their theory responds best 
to this demand. So pluralism should be a universal theory by its best response to 
this universal demand.  
 
However, it should be noted that Berlin acquires the universal human nature 
merely from historical observation, and that the method of historical observation 
cannot be used to justify the universal nature of any element in the form of being 
an absolute or permanent truth. This means changes can occur; and if one day 
human natures change into something different or even opposite to what Berlin 
has observed, then pluralists must be able to accept that this new form of human 
nature no longer fits into the theory of pluralism. Pluralists would then need to 
justify another theory, instead of pluralism.  
 
In other words, it can be explained that historical observation is the method from 
which we infer conclusions (in this case the universal need for culture) from past 
evidence. This is the induction method, which cannot guarantee the absolute or 
permanent nature of the conclusion. In this case, we cannot affirm that the 
conclusion will certainly occur in the future. There might be situations in which 
human beings no longer have the need for a diversity of cultures in their society.   
 
Hypothetical situations  
 
Hypothetically, there can be some examples of situations in which people no 
longer have the need for a diversity of cultures in their society. Firstly, it can be 
the Utopian situation: the situation in which all people in society have good 
hearts, love one another and have no greed or envy. There are no thieves, and no 
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criminals; people do not fear one another, as their society is always a safe place 
to live in. Berlin explains the Utopian situation as follows:  
 
…there was no misery and no greed, no danger or poverty or fear or brutalizing labor or 
insecurity […] Broadly speaking, western Utopias tend to contain the same elements: a society 
lives in a state of pure harmony, in which all its members live in peace, love one another, are free 
from physical danger, from want of any kind, from insecurity, from degrading work, from envy, 
from frustration, experience no injustice or violence, love in perpetual, even light, in a temperate 
climate, in the midst of infinitely fruitful, generous nature. 
341
   
 
Moreover, Berlin says that apart from all the perfect conditions mentioned above, 
they all have the same goals as well. He says:  
 
…human beings as such seek the same essential goals, identical for all, at all time, 
everywhere…
342
 
 
Berlin raises the examples of the Utopias as he says:  
 
Plato speaks in the Symposium, of the fact that men were once – in a remote and happy past – 
spherical in shape…[…] Virgil speaks about Saturnia regna, the Kingdom of Saturn, in which all 
things were good. The Hebrew Bible speaks of an earthly paradise, in which Adam and Eve were 
created by God and led blameless, happy, serene lives – a situation which might have gone on 
forever…[…] the poet Alfred Tennyson spoke of a kingdom ‘Where falls not hail, or rain, or any 
snow, Nor ever wind blows loudly…  
343
 
 
Berlin does not believe in the Utopias, neither the ones in the past nor the 
possibility of having them in the future. He says:  
 
The idea of a single perfect society of all mankind must be internally self contradictory…
344
 
 
And  
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…the very concept of Utopia, is incompatible with the interpretation of the human world as a 
battle of perpetually new and ceaselessly conflicting wills, individual or collective…
345
 
 
Berlin does not believe in the Utopia, since for him people with different 
identities and cultural commitments could not cease to conflict (such as in their 
demands) with one another. However, if we consider the possibility in the future, 
Utopia might be possible by the development of medicine. For example, in the 
future, we might be able to build new medical devices that could select the DNA 
of our children, and as a result all future people will become intelligent, having 
merely positive characters and good looks. And with this development, people 
will tend to become similar; to think, act and look like one another. If this 
happens, identities will cease to be diverse, as they will become reconciled and 
will become the same. The diversity of cultures (which responded to the diversity 
of identities) will cease to be diverse as well. They will also be reconciled, and 
will turn into one culture following the reconciliation of the identities. 
 
In Buddhism, there is also a prediction that in the far future – two thousand years 
from now – people’s identities and cultures will turn into this perfect single 
whole condition. The Buddhist Utopia seems to be extreme when compared with 
the Western ones since, for them, people will look exactly similar to one another 
to the extent that we cannot separate one from the other. They could not even 
remember one another, since they all look the same; their society at that time will 
be perfectly harmonious and peaceful. In this case, it is likely that there will be 
no diversity of cultures but only one. So there seems to be no demands for the 
diversity of cultures.       
 
Apart from Utopian societies, in the circumstance described by Hume as the 
circumstance of scarcity, in which people are in the condition of dire scarcity 
and are unsure of their survival, the demand for justice is irrelevant. As Wolff 
explains:  
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Hume argues that gross scarcity also makes justice inappropriate. This is more controversial, but 
Hume argues that if there is so little that people’s survival is in doubt, no one can be criticized for 
taking and holding on to whatever they can. We could describe this as the view that there are 
circumstances where justice begins to become a luxury. 
346
 
 
While justice is not applicable in all situations, this might be similar to the 
demands for preserving cultures and for having a diversity of cultures. They 
might not be applicable in all situations as well. In Hume’s circumstance of 
scarcity, where justice is a luxury, we might be able to say that in these 
conditions the demand for preserving cultures and for having a diversity of 
cultures seems to be a luxury as well. People tend to focus merely on their 
survival. In other words, they tend to focus on their basic needs (physiological 
needs) rather than worrying about the preservation of their cultures or the 
maintenance of their cultural identities; they thus tend to be disinterested in 
cultures. Therefore, in the circumstance of scarcity, there seems to be no demand 
for the diversity of cultures as well.    
 
Another hypothetical situation wherein people tend not to have the need for a 
diversity of cultures can be found in Tolstoy’s society of nature, where people 
are not committed to academic knowledge and philosophical knowledge 
(including cultures or religions) at all. They reject the life of the city and all 
demands for civilization, and go back to what they believe to be their natural 
origin, which is where they assume all real knowledge can be found. That is, they 
will begin discovering truth anew there. For example, Berlin explains Tolstoy’s 
idea by way of the following:  
 
…the solution to all our perplexities stares us in the face [i.e. in the nature] – that the answer is 
about us everywhere, like the light of day, if only we would not close our eyes or looks 
everywhere but at what is there, staring us in the face, the clear, simple irresistible truth. […] all 
his life he defended the proposition – which his own novels and sketches do not embody – that 
human beings are more harmonious in childhood than under the corrupting influences of 
education in later life; and also that simple people have a more natural and correct attitude 
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towards these basic values than civilized men; and they are free and independent in a sense in 
which civilized men are not. 
347
 
 
In Tolstoy’s society of nature, people will let go of all their demands for cultures 
and religions (which are the sources of philosophical knowledge) as well as all 
the demands for civilization (which is opposed to the nature). They will return to 
their pure childhood minds. Berlin says:  
 
The child is closer to the ideal harmony than the grown man and the simple peasant than the torn, 
‘alienated’, morally and spiritually unanchored and self destructive parasites who form the 
civilized elite. 
348
  
 
If Tolstoy’s society of nature becomes real – for example, if in the future people 
want to be independent from their knowledge and cultural beliefs, or get bored 
with civilized life and decide to leave it in favor of a supposedly ‘pure’ nature – 
then there will no longer be the need for cultures (which are part of their existing 
knowledge and beliefs) unless we count ‘living with nature’ itself as one culture. 
And if living with nature is one culture, there will be only one culture in that 
circumstance, not a diversity of them.     
 
Tolstoy’s society of nature can be considered as a type of anarchist Utopia where 
people let go of all their commitments, their civilized society and return to live 
with nature. There are no institutions, no government and no control, and there 
are no conflicts between human beings or between human beings and 
institutions; only harmonious life. As Berlin says:  
 
[in nature] Truth is discoverable: to follow it is to be good, inwardly sound, harmonious.
349
   
 
This might be consistent with Zeno’s anarchist Utopia as Berlin describes:  
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Zeno the Stoic conceives an anarchist society in which all rational beings live in perfect peace, 
equality and happiness without the benefit of institutions. If men are rational, they do not need 
control; rational beings have no need of the state, or of money, or of law courts, or of any 
organized, institutional life. In the perfect society men and women shall wear identical clothes 
and ‘feed in a common pasture’. Provided that they are rational, all their wishes will necessarily 
be rational too, and so capable of total harmonious realization. 
350
 
 
Tolstoy’s society seems to be similar to Zeno’s anarchist Utopia in that there are 
no institutions and/or authoritarian control. The difference is only that Tolstoy 
refers to nature (or the pure childhood mind) as the element for perfection, while 
Zeno refers to rationality as the element for perfection. In both cases, there seems 
to be no need for a diversity of cultures.  
 
Although these three hypothetical situations – the situation of the Utopia, the 
circumstance of scarcity and Tolstoy’s society of nature – are relatively extreme, 
they can give us the idea that human nature could unexpectedly change into 
something entirely different from what we have seen. If human nature could 
actually change from what Berlin has observed, then people in some places or 
times no longer have the need for a diversity of cultures (i.e. if one of the 
hypothetical situations becomes real), and pluralism, which claims to be the best 
theory on the basis of a universal human need for a diversity of cultures, would 
no longer be applicable.  
 
Pluralism could not then be a universal theory, but only a contextual dependent 
theory. It can be the best theory only when people have the need for a diversity 
of cultures, and not in other different contexts of nature. Put simply, Berlin’s 
claim as to the need for a diversity of cultures as a universal aspect of human 
nature cannot be the basis for pluralism as a universal theory, because human 
nature could change and become different from Berlin’s observations.   
 
It should be noted that if Berlin does not refer to historical observation as the 
basis of justifications for the need for a diversity of cultures; if he refers to other 
method to justify it (such as the rational method, like liberals), or if he claims it 
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to be a metaphysical truth (as communitarians claim for the collective identity) 
which could make the need for a diversity of cultures an absolute or permanent 
truth, then pluralists might refer to the need for a diversity of cultures as a basis 
for justifying pluralism as a universal theory. However, Berlin does not refer to 
either rational method or metaphysical truth but only to historical observation. 
The need for a diversity of cultures which is based merely on historical 
observation cannot be the basis for justifying pluralism as a universal theory, 
since there is some possibility for changes in the future.          
 
The evidences for PMT     
 
In the sections above, we concluded that pluralism is a particular theory (PPT) 
and that the need for a diversity of cultures cannot be the ground for pluralism as 
the universal theory (PUT). We might now consider the evidence that pluralism 
can be seen as a meta-theory (PMT). The first evidence is the theories that he 
justifies.  
 
The theories that Berlin justifies 
 
Referring back to the evidences for pluralism as PPT: because Berlin tends to 
believe that the three theories (pluralism and the two theories of liberalism) are 
equally worthy to one another, it is also possible that he might justify some other 
theories as being of equal worth to these theories as well. For example, there are 
some indications that Berlin might justify multiculturalism and 
communitarianism as equal to pluralism.  
 
Communitarianism, as mentioned earlier, can be seen to have developed from 
counter-enlightenment liberalism. Berlin seems to admire and justify it as equally 
worthy to pluralism, although he is well aware that it consists of a different (and 
conflicting) framework with pluralism. For example, Gray claims that Berlin 
agrees in some part with communitarianism:  
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Berlin is at one with the communitarian critics of liberalism in affirming that there is an 
ineliminable public or communal dimension of individual well being for all, or almost all, human 
beings. 
351
     
 
And it is quite certain that Berlin agrees with the idea of the collective self 
claimed by communitarianism. As Gray says:  
 
[according to communitarian], we are not free floating Kantian subjects, for which every 
relationship is revocable and no form of common life definitive, we find ourselves embedded in 
relationships and attachments which enter into and shape our very identities. With all of this, 
Berlin concurs. 
352
 
 
For multiculturalism, it is the theory that has the framework as close to 
communitarianism but is claimed to attach more to the liberal values such as 
freedom and equality. Berlin seems to be also sympathetic with this theory. It is 
more likely that he would justify it as equally worthy to pluralism. Some scholars 
even believe that Berlin’s pluralism implies multiculturalism. As Crowder says:  
 
Williams Galston has argued that value pluralism implies a generous form of multiculturalism 
that is best facilitated by an accommodating tolerant form of liberalism. 
353
   
 
Although this claim is not true since multiculturalism is the developed theory 
from liberalism while pluralism, as we know, has the framework which is 
incompatible with liberalism, the opinion of these scholars shows that Berlin 
agrees to some extent with multiculturalism in the same way as he does with 
liberalism.  
 
The theories that Berlin rejects  
 
While Berlin seems to justify many theories as of equal worth to pluralism, he 
does not justify every theory. For example, he claims not to justify relativism, 
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utilitarianism and totalitarianism. For relativism, Berlin explicitly disagrees 
with it on the basis that it does not require any cross-cultural judgment or even 
cross-cultural understanding. He says:  
 
Relativism is something different [from pluralism], I take it to mean a doctrine according to 
which the judgment of a man or a group, since it is the expression or statement of a taste, or 
emotional attitude or outlook, is simply what it is, with no objective correlate which determines 
its truth or falsehood. […] The most extreme versions of cultural relativism, which stress the vast 
differences of cultures hold that one culture can scarcely begin to understand what other 
civilizations lived by [which is different from pluralism]. 
354
 
 
For totalitarianism, Berlin would certainly reject it since he rejects every idea 
that rules out all possibility for freedom. He says:  
 
…I have to say that no better excuse, or even reason, has ever been propounded for unlimited 
despotism or the part of an elite which robs the majority of its essential liberties. 
355
  
 
From the theories that he justifies and those that he rejects, it shows that Berlin 
accepts only the theories that have some resistance to violence which is parallel 
with the conception of the human horizon. We might be able to say that Berlin 
refers to the objective human horizon to select or to justify these theories.  
 
To explain further, the theories that he justifies, such as the two theories of 
liberalism, multiculturalism and communitarianism, are all within the human 
horizon of non-violence and psychological conditions of understanding and 
empathy. Communitarianism might in some cases agree to compromise or 
sacrifice some human rights; they might, for example, agree on some extent of 
limitation of individual freedom based on some religious discipline. The 
Hutterite in Canada as mentioned earlier is an example.356 However, 
communitarians would not accept extreme cultural beliefs or activities that are 
beyond our ability to understand or sympathise, or those that create and/or lead to 
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violence. We might then be able to say that communitarian framework is still 
within the scope of the human horizon, which is why Berlin justifies it.    
 
On the other hand, the framework of relativism is not within the human horizon, 
in that it does not have any justification of values. In this case, it might allow 
violent activities which are beyond our ability to understand and empathize with. 
Utilitarianism and totalitarianism, by their principles can also lead to violent 
activities. For example, utilitarianism might allow killing a few people in order to 
save many others. Totalitarianism certainly agrees with violent activities, such as 
the Nazi racism. While Berlin does not accept these theories, and whilst all of 
them could lead to violence, it can be implied that Berlin refers to the human 
horizon to justify theories in the same way as he does with values.  
 
As indicated in the first chapter of this thesis, it seems that Berlin, as based on his 
observations, considers the human horizon of non-violence and psychological 
conditions of understanding and empathy to be universal. That is, he tends to 
believe that it is what all human beings share, and he uses it as the universal 
criteria to justify values in pluralism. If it is actually universal in Berlin’s view, 
then it is likely that he would refer to it to justify theories as well.  
 
As we saw in the previous sections, Berlin seems to believe that the political 
theories are particular (or relative to their contexts; this includes pluralism). They 
are incompatible and incommensurable with one another, and at the same time 
they are of equal worth to one another. In this case, when he refers to the human 
horizon to justify them, the structure of his views on theories can be illustrated as 
follows:   
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The picture above is similar to Berlin’s structure of values which appears, as 
shown in chapter one, in the following picture:  
 
 
 
This means his attitude or judgment of political theories is according to the 
pluralist framework, which accepts a plurality of theories as being of equal 
worth to one another (including pluralism) so long as all are within the human 
horizon (which is the universal criterion of judgment in the pluralist framework). 
The pluralist framework in this case acts as a meta-theory (PMT), or as the 
framework that Berlin uses to manage all equally worthy political/ethical 
theories. It should be noted that the term ‘meta-theory’ in this case does not have 
Ultimate theories within the 
human horizon, such as 
pluralism, the two theories of 
liberalism, multiculturalism, 
communitarianism   
The theories unjustified by the 
human horizon, such as relativism 
utilitarianism and totalitarianism  
Values within the human 
horizon, such as freedom, 
equality, cultural and religious 
values    
Values unjustified by the human 
horizon, such as Nazism and 
Cannibalism   
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any formal meaning which involves the implication of institutions; it only means 
the ‘attitude’ or ‘perspective’ that Berlin uses to manage or justify political and 
ethical theories.  
 
When Berlin uses this framework both to manage values and theories, it is likely 
that he sees this framework as ‘universal’. It is certainly not universal in the 
sense of being an absolute or permanent truth, but universal in the sense of being 
the framework which should be used to manage all levels of political/ethical 
properties. This also indicates that pluralism as PMT has a monist form, which 
claims the pluralist framework to be the one most able to manage all 
political/ethical properties.     
 
As noted in the previous chapter, Gray claims that Berlin’s pluralism is universal. 
He might not believe it to be universal in terms of being a PUT, since he should 
be well aware of the nature of pluralism that it does not attach to any universal 
ranking. Consequently, his contention should really be that pluralism is a PMT. 
In other words, he should agree with the claims set out above. 
 
To conclude this chapter: from the evidence presented above, pluralism can be 
seen as a PPT (or a particular theory) on the grounds that the three theories – 
pluralism, traditional liberalism and counter-enlightenment liberalism – have 
conceptual frameworks that are incompatible with one another. They are 
incompatible to such an extent that they cannot be reduced into one and the same 
theory; nor can we have all of them at the same time. They are incommensurable, 
as they are ultimate in their own differing contexts. Traditional liberalism is 
ultimate in a context where people value freedom and rationality over cultural 
identities. In such a context the identities and society of the people concerned 
would be close to the condition of the OP. In this context there is also a clear 
distinction between the political and cultural spheres, so as to ensure that the 
latter cannot receive or share political power with the former. Counter-
enlightenment liberalism or communitarianism, however, is ultimate in a context 
in which people value cultural identities over freedom and rationality. Their 
identities are the collective identity; this differs from the conditions of the OP. In 
addition, there is no division between the political and cultural spheres, which 
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means that the cultural sphere can always receive or share political power with 
the political sphere. Thirdly, pluralism, as the eclectic theory that stands between 
the two opposed theories, is ultimate in a context in which people value freedom 
and rationality to the same extent as they value cultural identities. There might be 
some division between the political and cultural spheres, but the division is not 
clear-cut. In this pluralist context the political sphere sometimes accepts the 
demands of certain cultures to have their requests and requirements discussed 
within the political sphere, which then tries to balance these cultural demands 
with political values.    
 
It is assumed to be Berlin’s view that the three theories are ultimate in their own 
different contexts. There can be no universal reasoning able to justify one of 
them as a universal theory. At the same time, Berlin seems to rank them as being 
of equal worth to one another, on the basis of their equally ultimate frameworks, 
and according to his equal commitments to them or according to his 
understanding and empathy for all of them. As a result, by their equal status, it is 
necessary to choose each theory according to context. This leads to the 
conclusion that pluralism (as well as the other two theories), according to Berlin, 
is a particular theory (a PPT).  
 
One might argue that pluralism can be a universal theory by not referring to 
universal reasoning or to ranking, but rather to other factors, such as conceptions 
of universal human nature. As Berlin seems to justify the need for a diversity of 
cultures as a universal human nature, we might consider it as grounds for 
pluralism to be a universal theory (a PUT). That is, because all people have the 
need for culture, by their differing cultures, they therefore always demand a 
diversity of cultures in their society. Pluralism is the political theory that best 
responds to this demand, and it could therefore be cast as a universal theory on 
this basis.  
 
However, Berlin’s claim as to the universality of human nature (the universal 
need for a diversity of culture) is based merely on historical observation; and if it 
is based on observation, it cannot be an absolute or permanent truth, but only a 
contingent truth. There is a possibility that changes might occur in the future: for 
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example, human natures and societies may change into some kind of extreme 
circumstance, such as those that can be found in portrayals of Utopia, within 
which the eradication of scarcity or a return to nature may prompt the issues 
discussed above. Human beings will no longer have the need for a diversity of 
cultures and as a result pluralism could no longer be presented as the response to 
requirements of a universal human nature. Therefore, assuming the latter’s 
continual need for a diversity of cultures on the basis of historical observation 
(which entails the possibility for change) cannot provide a basis for pluralism as 
a universal theory or (as a PUT).  
 
When pluralism is a particular theory one can also find evidence that it could be 
viewed as a meta-theory (or PMT) as well. That is, from a consideration of the 
theories that Berlin justifies (e.g. the two theories of liberalism, 
communitarianism, multiculturalism) and of those that he does not (i.e. 
relativism, utilitarianism and totalitarianism), it can be shown that he refers to the 
human horizon as a criterion for justifying them. This means that his attitude 
towards judging theories can be seen to accord with the pluralist framework, 
which accepts a plurality of theories (including pluralism) as being of equal 
value, provided they fall within the human horizon. The pluralist framework in 
this case acts as a meta-theory (or PMT).  
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Abbreviations  
 
The following abbreviations are used in this thesis for the titles of books by 
Berlin:  
 
CTH   The Crooked Timber of Humanity (2003)  
FEL   Four Essays On Liberty (1969)  
POI   The Power of Ideas (2000)  
ROR    The Roots of Romanticism (2000)  
RT   Russian Thinkers (2008)  
 
The following abbreviations are used in this thesis for the titles of books about 
Berlin:  
 
Berlin    Berlin (1995)  
CWI   Conversation with Isaiah Berlin (1991)  
EW   Enlightenment’s Wake (1995)  
LIB   The Legacy of Isaiah Berlin (2001)  
OAM   The One and The Many (2007)  
 
The following abbreviations are used in this thesis for the titles of books by Ruth 
Chang:  
 
MCC   Making Comparisons Count (2002)  
IIPR Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical 
Reason (1997)  
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